In re Curtis

• Citation: 30 A. 769,64 Conn. 501
• Court: Supreme Court of Connecticut
• Decision Date: 09 July 1894
• Parties: In re CURTIS et al.

30 A. 769

64 Conn. 501

In re CURTIS et al.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

July 9, 1894.

Appeal from superior court, Fairfield county; Shumway, Judge.

Proceedings by Lewis F. Curtis, in the nature of a remonstrance against the acceptance of the award of arbitrators appointed in an agreement between himself and Samuel D. Castle, afterwards made a rule of court, to pass upon their claims against each other with reference to certain realty in the city of Bridgeport From an order sustaining a demurrer to the allegations of his remonstrance, and a judgment against him, re-monstrator appeals. Affirmed.

Allan W. Paige and George P. Carroll, for appellant.

Lewis F. Curtis. Alfred B. Beers, for appellee, Samuel D. Castle.

ANDREWS, C. J. Section 1203 of the General Statutes provides that when any persons have submitted any controversy existing between them to the arbitrament of certain persons by them named, on their desiring such submission to be made a rule of court, the same may be entered of record, and a rule made that the parties shall submit to and be finally bound by such arbitration; and it is further provided that, "the award of the arbitrators being returned to and accepted by the court, judgment shall be rendered thereon for the party in whose favor the award is made, to recover the sum awarded to be paid to him, with costs; and execution shall be granted," etc. The acceptance of an award by the court to which it is returned, in order that it may become the basis of a judgment, undoubtedly requires an exercise of the judicial will of the court in its favor. "To accept" means to receive with approval; to adopt; to agree to. Unless the award does receive such favorable action from the court, no judgment upon it can be rendered and no execution can issue. In cases where there is no objection, such favorable action would be given almost as a matter of course. The duty imposed on a court in the acceptance of the award of arbitrators is closely similar to the duty in the acceptance of the report of a committee, or of an auditor, or of a referee. The same word is used by the statutes, and the duties imposed must be substantially the same. That arbitrators are not officers of the court, as are committees, does not change the power or the duty of the court in this respect. The purpose of the acceptance in either case is the same,—to establish the award in the one case, and the report in the other, as the judgment of the court. In most of the cases where courts are authorized to accept the report of a committee, or other like board, the power is expressly given to reject it for cause, as in the case of a highway committee. Section 2715. But the power to accept would seem to carry with it the power to refuse to accept The former implies the latter. In re Clinton Oyster Ground Committee, 52 Conn. 8; Stebbins v. Waterhouse, 58 Conn. 370, 20 Atl. 480. "Where a submission is made by rule of court, it is competent for the party aggrieved by it, when it is returned to court, and before acceptance, to impeach it, not only for apparent defects, but extrinsic causes. In the case of defects apparent on the award, he can only question it before the acceptance; but if he should not object to it for extrinsic causes before acceptance, especially if he had no knowledge of their existence, he may, after acceptance, file his bill in equity to be relieved against it, on the same ground as where the submission is not by rule of court" 1 Swift, Dig. top p. 480. The rule so stated has been followed in this state for many years. Parker v. Avery, Kirb. 353; Lewis v. Wildman, 1 Day, 153; Halsey v. Fanning, 2 Root, 101; Bel ton v. Halsey, 1 Root, 221; Bray v. English, 1 Conn. 498; Fisher v. Towner, 14 Conn. 26.

This rule requires that for defects apparent on the award the parties can obtain relief only before the acceptance, unless they are such as absolutely to deprive the court of jurisdiction; but for extrinsic causes it permitted a party to obtain relief after the acceptance. As, since the practice act, parties are enabled to obtain equitable and legal relief in the same action, there is no reason why a party who seeks to impeach an award for any cause, whether it be apparent on the award or not, should not do so by way of remonstrance to the acceptance. We think this is the better practice, and the one which now ought to be followed. Arbitration is an arrangement for taking and abiding by the judgment of selected persons in some disputed matter, instead of carrying it to the established tribunals of justice; and is intended to avoid the formalities, the delay, the expense, and vexation of ordinary litigation. When the submission is made a rule of court, the arbitrators are not officers of the court, but are the appointees of the parties, as in cases where there is no rule of court. In either case the submission names the disputed matter upon which the arbitrators are to adjudge, and often prescribes the principles according to which they are to proceed, and the rules they are to follow in their decision. The submission in the present case does this in an ample manner. It provides that the arbitrators "shall proceed upon the principle of equity, in hearing the matters in dispute and making their award; it being the desire of both parties that the matters in dispute between them shall be equitably settled and adjusted so each may have all that is equitably due to him from the other." Counsel for the appellant, in their brief, speak of this designation of the authority given to the arbitrators as a limitation. We do not so read it. To us it seems rather a liberal and highly creditable grant of power. In hearing the matter committed to them, and in making their award, the arbitrators are commanded to act upon the principles of equity, to the end that each of the parties may have from the other all that he is equitably entitled to. This is not "equity" In any narrow or limited meaning. It is "equity" in its broadest and most generous sense. It means good conscience; fair dealing; justice. It is in the spirit of the precept "to live honestly, to injure no man, and to render to every man his due." It is the golden rule, to do' by others as we would that others should do by us. It is in the light of this direction to the arbitrators that we are to inquire whether their award should have been set aside for any of the reasons alleged in the remonstrance.

It is to be observed that in the remonstrance the appellant does not charge any willful or intentional misconduct to the arbitrators; nothing in the nature of fraud, or corruption, or of partiality. He seems rather to have studiously avoided any such charge. He asks the court not to accept the award for the reasons stated, "in respect to which said arbitrators erred and acted improperly in a legal sense." The reasons of remonstrance are not entirely harmonious. In some respects, indeed, they are inconsistent. And they do not admit of any very accurate classification; but, in a general way, they may all be brought into these three classes: First. That the arbitrators did not make, and refused to make, a finding of the facts on which they based their judgment. If within the term "finding of facts" is included a statement of the amounts found due on each of the several claims of the parties, then to this class may be referred the 1st, 2d, 3d, 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, 10th, and 11th reasons of the remonstrance. Second. That the arbitrators erred in admitting parol testimony to vary a writing. To this class may be referred the 8th, 9th, 12th, 13th, and 15th reasons. Third. That the...