In re D.A.H.

Decision Date20 April 2021
Docket NumberNo. COA20-212,COA20-212
Citation857 S.E.2d 771
Parties In the MATTER OF D.A.H.
CourtNorth Carolina Court of Appeals

Attorney General Joshua H. Stein, by Special Deputy Attorney General Vanessa N. Totten, for the State.

Appellate Defender Glenn Gerding, by Assistant Appellate Defender Jillian C. Katz, for the Juvenile.

JACKSON, Judge.

¶ 1 The issue in this case is whether a juvenile is entitled to Miranda warnings prior to being interrogated by his school principal, when the school resource officer ("SRO") is present but does not ask questions. Because we conclude that the trial court relied on an improper legal test in determining that the juvenile was not entitled to Miranda warnings, we reverse and remand this matter for further proceedings.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

¶ 2 This matter arises from a series of events that occurred at Gentry Middle School in Mount Airy, North Carolina during March 2019. On 11 March 2019, Deputy William Sechrist—who acted as the SRO at Gentry Middle School—was informed by school personnel that a student, Daniel,1 had been found with marijuana on the school bus. The school bus driver had observed Daniel holding a small netted bag containing a leafy substance. The bus driver handed over the bag to Deputy Sechrist, who recognized the substance as marijuana. Deputy Sechrist then escorted Daniel to the principal's office and called Daniel's father.

¶ 3 Once inside the principal's office, Daniel "asked to speak freely," but Deputy Sechrist told him to "wait until your daddy gets here." Once Daniel's father arrived, Daniel told Deputy Sechrist the details of how he obtained the marijuana. Daniel explained that the previous weekend, he had contacted a fellow student—13-year-old Deacon—via Snapchat asking to buy some marijuana. Daniel and Deacon then met up in the school locker room on the morning of March 11, and Deacon gave Daniel a small bag of marijuana in exchange for $25. Deputy Sechrist performed a field test on the substance, which confirmed that the substance was 0.7 grams of marijuana.

¶ 4 Deacon was absent from school the following two days (March 12 and 13) and the record contains no indication that the school or the deputy took any efforts to contact Deacon or his guardian during this time. On 14 March 2019, Deacon reappeared in class and was summoned to the principal's office. When Deacon arrived at the principal's office, both Principal Whitaker and Deputy Sechrist were present. Deputy Sechrist was in uniform, and Principal Whitaker was wearing a suit and tie. Principal Whitaker and Deputy Sechrist sat together on one side of the table, facing Deacon. At the time that Deacon arrived, his guardian had not been told that Deacon was in the principal's office.

¶ 5 Principal Whitaker began questioning Deacon. The only evidence of what occurred during this meeting comes from the testimony of Deputy Sechrist, who offered three slightly differing accounts of how the meeting proceeded. When first asked about the meeting (on direct examination), Deputy Sechrist did not specify what precisely was asked of Deacon, but stated that Deacon "advised Mr. Whitaker he did not come to school for two days [because] he was scared he was going to get in trouble because he ... sold marijuana to [Daniel]."

¶ 6 When asked about the meeting for a second time on cross-examination, Deputy Sechrist stated that Principal Whitaker had "asked [Deacon] to tell ... what had taken place," and in response Deacon told them "that he had sold [Daniel] some marijuana, where he got it, and all this other stuff."

¶ 7 When asked about the meeting for a third time on redirect-examination, Deputy Sechrist described the conversation in more detail, explaining that the following exchange occurred between Deacon and Principal Whitaker:

[Principal]: Where have you been for the last few days?
[Deacon]: Well, I've been afraid to come to school I'd get in trouble [sic].
[Principal]: In trouble for what?
[Deacon]: What I sold [Daniel].
[Principal]: What did you sell him?
[Deacon]: Marijuana.

¶ 8 Deputy Sechrist stated that after this confession, Principal Whitaker called Deacon's grandmother, who arrived "probably ... 10 minutes" after Deacon was brought into the office. He also stated that "[n]ot very many questions were even asked prior to her arrival."

¶ 9 After Deacon's grandmother arrived, the principal asked Deacon to tell his grandmother "what had taken place[,]" and Deacon repeated his statements to his grandmother. Deputy Sechrist testified that at no point was Deacon read his Miranda rights, told he did not have to answer their questions, nor told that he was free to leave.

¶ 10 Several months later, a juvenile petition was filed on 13 May 2019 alleging that Deacon had sold a schedule six controlled substance (marijuana) to another student in violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 90-95(a)(1). Deacon filed a motion to suppress on 13 August 2019, arguing that his statements to Principal Whitaker were inadmissible as his confession was obtained in violation of his Miranda rights. A hearing was held on the matter that same day (13 August 2019), during which the trial court concluded that Deacon was not entitled to Miranda warnings because the meeting with the principal was not a custodial interrogation. In denying Deacon's motion to suppress, the trial court found and concluded in open court as follows:

I am going to deny the Motion to Suppress. A number of things stand out to me. The officer ... he is the SRO. He's there every day. This wasn't some strange police officer that was called to stand guard at the door. I think it's not unusual in a school setting for many or any of the children to be called to the office or principal's office. I don't think that automatically tends to turn it into a custodial interrogation. The young man was not in custody. He wasn't even questioned by the School Resource Officer, who was a daily presence there at the school. It wasn't some strange officer in a uniform.
Also, another reference was made, of which I think that anybody at school would have had reason to ask, if apparently [Deacon] was out of school. Because the officer said that [Deacon] ... told the principal he didn't come to school for two days because he was scared he would get in trouble for selling marijuana. I don't know that any officer would ever even ask: Why didn't you come to school? But a principal certainly would or should ask if a child's been absent from school.
Therefore, I don't see that it was outside the scope of anything. I think that was certainly, regardless of who was in the room or not, a proper question. And that's what it sounds like it was in response to: Why weren't you in school the past two days? Well, I didn't come to school the past two days because I was afraid I'd get in trouble for selling marijuana to [Daniel].
So I don't see this as a custodial interrogation. And the motion is denied.

¶ 11 Deacon was ultimately adjudicated delinquent for the sale and delivery of marijuana. In adjudicating Deacon delinquent, the trial court relied on Deacon's confession that he had sold marijuana to Daniel, as well as Daniel and Deputy Sechrist's hearing testimony that the substance sold was marijuana.

¶ 12 A disposition order was not entered within 60 days after entry of the adjudication order, so, pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-2602, Deacon entered notice of appeal within 70 days from entry of the adjudication order. The trial court ordered on 25 October 2019 that disposition was stayed pending resolution of Deacon's appeal.

II. Analysis

¶ 13 On appeal, Deacon argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress because his statements were the product of a custodial interrogation and made without Miranda warnings or the additional protections of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-2101. Deacon further argues that the trial court's error was prejudicial and not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. As explained below, we hold that the trial court's order fails to apply the appropriate legal principles, and we must remand this matter to the trial court for additional proceedings.

A. Standard of Review

¶ 14 Our review of a trial court's order on a motion to suppress is "strictly limited to determining whether the trial judge's underlying findings of fact are supported by competent evidence, in which event they are conclusively binding on appeal, and whether those factual findings in turn support the judge's ultimate conclusions of law." State v. Cooke , 306 N.C. 132, 134, 291 S.E.2d 618, 619 (1982). "Legal conclusions, including the question of whether a person has been interrogated while in police custody, are reviewed de novo." In re K.D.L. , 207 N.C. App. 453, 456, 700 S.E.2d 766, 769 (2010). Under de novo review, this Court "considers the matter anew and freely substitutes its own judgment for that of the lower tribunal." In re A.K.D. , 227 N.C. App. 58, 60, 745 S.E.2d 7, 8 (2013) (citation omitted).

B. Motion to Suppress—Legal Background
1. Juvenile Miranda Rights

¶ 15 This case presents a unique issue regarding the nature and extent of a juvenile's right to receive Miranda warnings in the context of a school interrogation. Miranda rights stem from the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution, which guarantees that "[n]o person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." U.S. CONST. amend. V. The basic holding of Miranda v. Arizona instructs that "when an individual is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom by the authorities in any significant way and is subjected to questioning, the privilege against self-incrimination is jeopardized" and thus "[p]rocedural safeguards must be employed." Miranda v. Arizona , 384 U.S. 436, 478, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, (1966).

¶ 16 It is well-established that juveniles, just like adults, are entitled to receive Miranda warnings prior to in-custody interrogations in order to protect their right against self-incrimination. In re Gault ...

To continue reading

Request your trial
2 cases
  • O.W. v. Sch. Bd. of City of Va. Beach
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Virginia
    • February 14, 2023
    ...are uniquely susceptible to police pressure and may feel compelled to confess when a reasonable adult would not.” Matter of D.A.H., 857 S.E.2d 771, 782 (N.C. 2021) (citing J.D.B., 564 U.S. at 277). O.W. argues his statements were coerced because of his age; the small size and location of th......
  • In re L.G.A.
    • United States
    • North Carolina Court of Appeals
    • April 20, 2021

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT