In re D.E.M.
Citation | 810 S.E.2d 375,257 N.C.App. 618 |
Decision Date | 06 February 2018 |
Docket Number | No. COA17-755,COA17-755 |
Court | Court of Appeal of North Carolina (US) |
Parties | In the MATTER OF: D.E.M. |
No brief for petitioner-appellee.
Anné C. Wright, Boone, for respondent-appellant.
Respondent ("Alberto")1 appeals from an order terminating his parental rights. After careful review, we vacate and remand.
Alberto is the father of the juvenile D.E.M. ("Danny"). Petitioner ("Beryl") is Danny's mother. On 25 August 2015, Beryl filed a petition to terminate Alberto's parental rights. Beryl claimed that Alberto had no contact with Danny since February 2005, that Danny had resided exclusively with Beryl since his birth, and that Alberto had not provided consistent child support for Danny's care and maintenance. On 26 April 2017, the trial court entered an order terminating Alberto's parental rights pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B–1111(a)(7) (2017). Alberto filed timely notice of appeal.
Alberto argues that the trial court erred by concluding that grounds existed to terminate his parental rights. We agree.
Every proceeding to terminate parental rights involves two distinct stages, the adjudication stage and the disposition stage. In re D.H. , 232 N.C. App. 217, 219, 753 S.E.2d 732, 734 (2014) (citation omitted). At "the adjudication stage, the trial court must determine whether there exists one or more grounds for termination of parental rights under N.C.G.S. § 7B–1111(a)." Id . at 219, 753 S.E.2d at 734. N.C.G.S. § 7B–1111 sets out the statutory grounds for terminating parental rights. A finding of any one of the separately enumerated grounds is sufficient to support termination. In re N.T.U ., 234 N.C. App. 722, 733, 760 S.E.2d 49, 57 (2014). The standard of appellate review is whether the trial court's "findings of fact are supported by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence and whether the findings of fact support the conclusions of law." In re Huff , 140 N.C. App. 288, 291, 536 S.E.2d 838, 840 (2000), disc. review denied, appeal dismissed , 353 N.C. 374, 547 S.E.2d 9 (2001) ).
Pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B–1111(a)(7), the trial court may terminate parental rights where "[t]he parent has willfully abandoned the juvenile for at least six consecutive months immediately preceding the filing of the petition or motion[.]" In re Adoption of Searle , 82 N.C. App. 273, 275, 346 S.E.2d 511, 514 (1986) (internal quotations and citations omitted). Factors to be considered include a parent's financial support for a child and "emotional contributions," such as a father's "display of love, care and affection for his children."
In re McLemore , 139 N.C. App. 426, 429, 533 S.E.2d 508, 510 (2000) (citations omitted). "Although the trial court may consider a parent's conduct outside the six-month window in evaluating a parent's credibility and intentions, the ‘determinative’ period for adjudicating willful abandonment is the six consecutive months preceding the filing of the petition." In re D.M.O. , ––– N.C. App. ––––, ––––, 794 S.E.2d 858, 861 (2016) (internal citations, quotation marks, and alterations omitted).
Here, the relevant six-month period was between 25 February and 25 August 2015. The trial court made the following findings of fact to support its conclusion that Alberto abandoned the juvenile:
Our review of the trial court's findings leads us to the determination that they are inadequate to support the court's conclusion that respondent willfully abandoned the juvenile. First, the trial court's findings do not specifically address Alberto's behavior within the relevant six-month period immediately preceding the filing of the petition as required to adjudicate willful abandonment. We note that none of the trial court's findings provide any dates. In particular, in finding number 6, the trial court found that Alberto sent Beryl a letter prior to her filing the petition, but the finding neglects to indicate whether this action occurred prior to or during the relevant six-month period.
Second, the trial court's findings are inadequate to support its ultimate finding that Alberto's abandonment of Danny was willful. Alberto notes that he was incarcerated throughout the relevant six-month period, and that Beryl refused to provide him with contact information for herself or Danny. Thus, Alberto contends that his inability to contact Danny negates a conclusion of willfulness.
"Our precedents are quite clear—and remain in full force—that incarceration, standing alone, is neither a sword nor a shield in a termination of parental rights decision." Matter of M.A.W ., 370 N.C.149, 153, 804 S.E.2d 513, 517 (2017) (internal citations, quotation marks, and alterations omitted). Thus, a showing of incarceration alone is insufficient to prove willful abandonment. In re Adoption of Maynor , 38 N.C. App. 724, 726–27, 248 S.E.2d 875, 877 (1978). Although a parent's options for showing affection while incarcerated are greatly limited, a parent " ‘will not be excused from showing interest in his child's welfare by whatever means available .’ " In re J.L.K. , 165 N.C. App. 311, 318–19, 598 S.E.2d 387, 392 (emphasis added) (quoting Whittington v. Hendren , 156 N.C. App. 364, 368, 576 S.E.2d 372, 376 (2003) ), disc. review denied , 359 N.C. 68, 604 S.E.2d 314 (2004). Nevertheless, "the circumstances attendant to a parent's incarceration are relevant when determining whether a parent willfully abandoned his or her child, and this Court has repeatedly acknowledged that the opportunities of an incarcerated parent to show affection for and associate with a child are limited." D.M.O. , ––– N.C. App. at ––––, ––––, 794...
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