In re D.M.
| Citation | 228 Md.App. 451,139 A.3d 1073 |
| Decision Date | 29 June 2016 |
| Docket Number | No. 2712, Sept. Term, 2014.,2712, Sept. Term, 2014. |
| Parties | In re D.M. |
| Court | Court of Special Appeals of Maryland |
Brian M. Saccenti (Paul B. DeWolfe, Public Defender, on the brief), Baltimore, MD, for appellant.
Mary Ann Ince (Brian E. Frosh, Atty. Gen., on the brief), Baltimore, MD, for appellee.
Panel: MEREDITH, ARTHUR, J. FREDERICK SHARER (Retired, Specially Assigned), JJ.
The Circuit Court for Baltimore City, sitting as a juvenile court, found D.M., appellant, “involved” in the delinquent act of theft of property valued at less than $1,000, thus affirming the findings of the juvenile master. Appellant was subsequently committed to the Department of Juvenile Services for placement.
In this appeal, appellant raises two questions for our consideration:
For the reasons expressed herein, we find neither reversible error nor abuse of discretion, and affirm the judgments of the circuit court.
At about 9:50 a.m. on August 5, 2014, Nicole DiHart was walking on Pratt Street in Baltimore City when her cell phone rang. As she retrieved the cell phone to answer the call, it was snatched from her hands by a young black man with short hair, whom she estimated to be between ten and 12 years of age, wearing blue jeans, blue underwear visible above the jeans, and no shirt, riding an older blue and red BMX-style bicycle. As he rode away, he looked back over his shoulder two times, allowing DiHart to see his face. When she got to work at the University of Maryland, DiHart reported the incident to the campus security officers in her building.
About two-and-a-half hours later, DiHart was contacted by the police who asked her if she would ride by in a police cruiser to view a potential suspect at a nearby McDonald's. At the McDonald's, DiHart first noticed an older blue and red BMX-style bicycle parked nearby. She then recognized appellant as the person who had snatched her cell phone earlier that morning. She noticed that he had changed his clothes and was now wearing a shirt or jumpsuit, but was, nonetheless, able to affirmatively identify him to the police. At the adjudicatory hearing, DiHart again identified appellant as the individual who had stolen her cell phone.
Following his arrest, appellant appeared with his attorney at several hearings before a juvenile court master.1 On November 6, 2014, appellant was brought to court for an adjudicatory hearing before the master. He was transported in leg and wrist restraints by court security officers, and remained so shackled during the proceedings.
At the outset, appellant's attorney requested that the master authorize the removal of appellant's restraints, which the master declined to order. We shall discuss that matter in further detail in Part I of this opinion. Counsel also moved to suppress DiHart's out-of-court identification. After hearing testimony from DiHart and argument from counsel, the master denied the suppression motion and ruled that appellant was involved in the theft of DiHart's cell phone.2 The formal adjudication followed.
Appellant filed exceptions challenging both the master's denial of his motion to suppress and her refusal to order removal of his shackles during the adjudication hearing. The exceptions were heard, on the record, in the circuit court on January 20, 2015. After hearing the arguments of counsel, the court determined that the identification procedure used by the police was not impermissibly suggestive and that DiHart's out-of-court identification was reliable. The court further concluded that requiring appellant to remain shackled during his adjudication hearing was not prejudicial. Accordingly, the court denied appellant's exceptions, and affirmed the delinquency adjudication.
Prior to each of his hearings before the juvenile master, defense counsel requested that appellant's shackles be removed. In each instance, the master denied the request without making any findings of the need for him to remain shackled.
At the adjudicatory hearing on November 6, 2014, appellant's attorney again requested that appellant's restraints be removed during the proceedings. For understanding of the issue, we include the following exchange:
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