In re Daniels
Decision Date | 09 September 1988 |
Docket Number | Bankruptcy No. 87 B 3900. |
Parties | In re Robert L. DANIELS, Jr., Debtor. |
Court | United States Bankruptcy Courts. Seventh Circuit. U.S. Bankruptcy Court — Northern District of Illinois |
Robert J. Adams, James J. McGraw, Chicago, Ill., for debtor.
Marc C. Scheinbaum, Fisher & Fisher, P.C., Chicago, Ill., for Fleet Mortg. Corp.
Jack McCullough, Chicago, Ill., Trustee.
AMENDED MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER DENYING DEBTOR'S MOTION TO RECEIVE POST JUDGMENT RATE OF INTEREST ON JUDGMENT OF FORECLOSURE
(Corrected and Reissued September 9, 1988)
This proceeding is under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code. It was filed after a Judgment of Foreclosure and Sale was entered in favor of Fleet Mortgage Corporation ("Fleet") against Robert L. Daniels, Jr. ("Debtor"). Debtor moved for entry of a "Judgment Creditor Order." That proposed Order as drafted would provide for Debtor to pay Fleet over five years the foreclosure judgment with interest to accrue at the Illinois Statutory post-judgment rate of 9% per annum as part of his Plan, plus certain escrow payments. Fleet objected to the proposed Order because it objects to that interest rate. It contends that the mortgage note and contract rate of interest (15½% per annum) should govern and the requested judgment Order should not be entered except at the higher interest rate. Fleet is apparently agreeable to the Plan and Order should the higher rate be offered.
The requested Order essentially seeks approval of part of Debtor's Chapter 13 Plan, and creditor's objection stands as objection to that part of the Plan.
For reasons set forth by Memorandum Opinion on January 21, 1988, Debtor's Motion was denied because the rate offered was found to be improper, and creditor was found to be required to accept a judgment order only if entered at the contract interest rate. Debtor moved for reconsideration. Upon reconsideration and review of applicable authorities and the record of this case, the Court finds that the requested order and Plan modifies Fleet's rights to its security interest in Debtor's sole residence within the meaning of § 1322(b)(2); that no cure and deacceleration of the mortgage is offered under § 1322(b)(5); and therefore the requested order is in violation of § 1322 regardless of the interest rate offered. Only with consent of the affected creditor can a "Judgment Creditor Order" of this nature become part of a Chapter 13 Plan when § 1322(b)(2) applies.
Accordingly, on reconsideration the Debtor's motion is again denied. The case is set for status to determine whether the parties can reach agreement on terms of an order to pay off the Judgment, or whether Debtor will instead seek to cure the arrearage and reinstate the mortgage. The earlier Opinion of January 21, 1988 is withdrawn and the Order of that date will be vacated.
On December 27, 1981, Robert Daniels, Jr. ("Debtor") executed a Note in favor of Mortgage Associates, Inc. It was secured by a mortgage on certain residential property that was and is Debtor's only residence. This Note was subsequently assigned to Fleet Mortgage Corporation ("Fleet"), the creditor herein. The balance due was payable in monthly installments with interest at the contract rate of 15½% annually "until paid". However, there is no provision therein specifically providing for that or any specified interest rate to continue to be due after foreclosure judgment. The mortgage is not due to be paid off until January 1, 2012, long after the proposed Chapter 13 Plan will end. (Ex. B.1, Motion to Reconsider.) The Note was given in consideration for a loan upon Debtor's purchase of the mortgaged Illinois property, his present residence which he is not surrendering under the Chapter 13 Plan.
Debtor made the required mortgage payments until June of 1986 and then defaulted on the loan. Thereafter, Fleet sued in our District Court to foreclose the mortgage. That action was brought under the former Illinois Mortgage Foreclosure Act. On February 5, 1987, a Default Order was entered against the mortgagors, and also a Judgment of Foreclosure and Sale. The District Court found that the total Judgment indebtedness amounted to $39,926.60 including principal, interest to that date, attorneys fees, and costs. Debtor claims a value of $46,000 to that home. (Dr. Chapter 13 Petition filed March 13, 1987, real estate schedule.) Debtor therefore claims an equity of about $6,000 in the property.
On March 13, 1987, Debtor filed this proceeding under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code. Debtor's Plan has not yet been confirmed. Confirmation of the Plan awaits ruling on Debtor's pending motion to pay Fleet's Foreclosure Judgment by a "Judgment Plan" with payments over the five year life of the plan.
In the meantime, Fleet has moved to modify the stay to permit it to proceed with the sale following foreclosure. Fleet has agreed that the stay should remain in effect until the interest issue is decided and Debtor has an opportunity to offer a judgment order that meets Fleet's demands. Therefore the stay has remained in effect by agreement while the parties briefed and the Court decided the issues before it.
In an imperfect world it appears inevitable that many debtors will not file for protection in bankruptcy until the eve of disaster. In Chapter 13 cases, that point often comes after the homestead is foreclosed on and judgment is entered, but just prior to foreclosure sale. When that happens prior to sale, Debtor may cure and deaccelerate the mortgage in bankruptcy under 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(5), In re Clark, 738 F.2d 869 (7th Cir.1984), both under the old Illinois Mortgage Act, In re Schnupp, 64 B.R. 763 (Bankr.N.D.Ill.1986); In re Tukes, Bankr. No. 86 B 5418 (Bankr.N.D. Ill.1988, J. Ginsberg, unpublished) and also under the new Illinois Mortgage Act, In re Josephs, 85 B.R. 500 (Bankr.N.D.Ill., J. Wedoff, 1988).
Had Debtor here simply sought to deaccelerate and cure the mortgage, the question of interest rate would be decided as a cure problem under § 1322(b)(5).
Analysis of § 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii) would then deal with the interest rate issue.
The parties assumed in their briefing that a Judgment Order is permissible in the absence of creditor agreement; they only disputed the applicable interest rate. Therefore this Court did not originally focus on the underlying question of whether any such order can be crammed down in Chapter 13 on a creditor secured by Debtor's only residence that objects to such Order for any reason. In failing to reach that question, the earlier opinion did not address the issue properly.
Under Illinois foreclosure law, Illinois is a "li...
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