In re Dauphin County Grand Jury Investigation Proceedings (No. 2)

• Decision Date: 07 September 1938
• Docket Number: 2183
• Parties: Dauphin County Grand Jury Investigation Proceedings (No. 2)
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

2 A.2d 802

332 Pa. 342

Dauphin County Grand Jury Investigation Proceedings (No. 2)

No. 2183

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

September 7, 1938

Argued September 6, 1938.

No 29, Misc. Docket, No. 1, Petition of Investigating Committee of the House of Representatives for writ of prohibition in re investigation by the September 1938 Dauphin County Grand Jury. Petition dismissed; jurisdiction retained.

After the petition of the Governor and the Attorney General for a writ of prohibition was refused and the record was remanded to the court below for further proceedings, SCHAEFFER, P.J specially presiding in the court below, after concluding that an investigation was necessary, made an order directing that the grand jury be convened. Subsequently, the Governor issued a proclamation convening the General Assembly in extraordinary session and thereafter statutes were enacted relating to the investigation of charges of misdemeanor in office made against civil officers subject to impeachment providing that the jurisdiction of the House of Representatives to make such investigations should have precedence over the jurisdiction of grand juries; limiting the circumstances under which courts might authorize grand juries to make such investigations; regulating investigations by the House of Representatives; providing for the appointment of special committees for making such investigations and for the summoning of witnesses and for the punishment of persons refusing to appear, produce evidence or testify; and suspending, retroactively as well as prospectively, any other pending investigation, whether legislative, executive or judicial. The committee, designated by the Speaker of the House to investigate charges made against state officials, prepared to hold hearings. Whereupon, on application of the District Attorney, in which certain prospective witnesses before the grand jury joined, the presiding judge made an order impounding all the evidence in the District Attorney's possession, and ordering the District Attorney and his subordinates, and the particular witnesses, not to testify or produce any information before any legislative committee. The chairman of the House Investigating Committee made motions that the latter order be vacated and that any investigation by the grand jury be suspended, pursuant to the Act of July 30, 1938, P.L. 18, which motions were refused. The chairman of the House Investigating Committee then filed a petition in the Supreme Court for a writ of prohibition.

A rule to show cause was granted by the Supreme Court, and proceedings were stayed pending the disposition of the case. A return to the rule was filed by the presiding judge in the court below.

Albert L. Thomas, Abram Salsburg and Guy K. Bard, Attorney General, for petitioner.

Samuel Handler, Assistant District Attorney, with him Carl B. Shelley, District Attorney, and Earl V. Compton, Special Assistant District Attorney, for respondent.

Before KEPHART, C.J., SCHAFFER, MAXEY, DREW, LINN, STERN and BARNES, JJ.

OPINION

MR. KEPHART, CHIEF JUSTICE.

The Court is unanimously of the opinion that the order of the court below, dated August 1, 1938, which forbids District Attorney Shelley, Charles J. Margiotti and Edward Friedman from testifying before the legislative committee, and also impounds documentary evidence, must be and it is hereby vacated and set aside, because of lack of power in the court to make it. The information given to the District Attorney and others named in this order is not privileged in the sense that the witnesses may not be required to divulge it on the ground of privileged communications as argued; nor may the documentary evidence be impounded beyond the reach of the legislative committee.

The main question, whether Acts 1 and 4, are constitutional, is reserved for further consideration; they provide that investigation by the legislature of charges of misdemeanor in office, made against civil officers subject to impeachment, shall have precedence over the jurisdiction of grand juries, and suspend any other pending investigation. The importance of this question before us cannot be overestimated, as it involves an examination of the fundamentals of our form of government and the entire doctrine of the separation of powers lodged in the three coordinate divisions thereof, judicial, legislative and executive, each of which must be supreme within its allotted field if our form of government is to endure; the boundaries necessarily to be determined by the Supreme Court.

We will briefly at this time state our reasons for the action taken.

The constitution provides in Article VI, section 1, that "The House of Representatives shall have the sole power of impeachment." This plain language makes the power plenary within constitutional limits, that is to say, "for any misdemeanor in office," which is a criminal act in the course of the conduct of the office, to which impeachments are limited. For crimes not misdemeanors in office, impeachment cannot be brought. This is the clear wording of section 3 of Article VI, which reads, "The Governor and all other civil officers shall be liable to impeachment for any misdemeanor in office." Therefore, the courts have no jurisdiction in impeachment proceedings, and no control over their conduct, so long as actions taken are within constitutional lines. It follows from this, that the courts cannot prohibit a witness from testifying before a legislative committee, which is conducting an investigation under Act 2, not here in question, to determine whether civil officers shall be proceeded against by impeachment. The courts cannot stay the legislature and the witnesses named are subject to call by the legislative committee at any time.

Section 3 further provides that "the person accused [of an impeachable offense] whether convicted or acquitted shall nevertheless be liable to indictment, trial, judgment and punishment according to law." This means liable in a court, because the legislature has no power to indict, try, judge and punish according to law. This power is plenary in the courts. The legislature can only remove from office and disqualify from holding office because the section named also provides "judgment in such cases [of impeachment] shall not extend further than to removal from office and disqualification to hold any office of trust or profit under this Commonwealth."

Can the legislature limit, qualify or suspend the jurisdiction of the courts to investigate alleged crimes committed by civil officers, as the acts here in question seek to do, is the vitally important question presented to us. May the legislature stay the judicial hand until the legislature has completed its investigation, or may the two coordinate branches of government, legislative and judicial, concurrently proceed, each free from trammel or interference by the other? The solution of this problem is of the utmost gravity and should be arrived at, only after the most thorough investigation, study and consideration, to the end that there shall be no unseemly conflict between the two branches of government, the legislative and judicial, and a breakdown in its orderly administration. The further question whether the Attorney General may supersede the District Attorney will be passed upon when we decide the main question. Upon these reserved questions, the Court will, after further necessary deliberation, hand down its opinion as soon as a decision can be reached.

Order of August 1, 1938, is vacated and set aside.

OPINION REFUSING COMMITTEE'S REQUEST FOR WRIT OF PROHIBITION.

Constitutional law -- Courts -- Grand jury -- Indictment -- House of Representatives -- Impeachment -- Civil officers -- Legislative power to halt grand jury investigation -- Power of Supreme Court -- Act of July 30, 1938, P.L. 18 -- Constitution, Article I and Article VI.

1. The Act of July 30, 1938, P.L. 18, which provides that whenever the House of Representatives shall undertake the investigation of charges of misdemeanor in office on the part of the governor, or any other civil officer who is liable to impeachment, any other investigation of the same charges, theretofore instituted by or before any other officer, body, agency or court of the Commonwealth, or any political subdivision thereof, whether such investigation be legislative, executive or judicial, shall be suspended until the House shall have completed its investigation, and shall not thereafter be resumed unless the legislative, executive or judicial officer, body, agency or court which shall have ordered the investigation shall, after examining the testimony taken by the House, or its committee, determine that a further investigation is necessary to develop information not disclosed to the House, or its committee, is unconstitutional, in that it is a deprivation of the exercise of a judicial power vested in the court by the Constitution. [348-58]

2. Article VI of the Constitution, which provides, section 1, that the House of Representatives shall have the sole power of impeachment, and, section 3, that the governor and all other civil officers shall be liable to impeachment for any misdemeanor in office, but judgment in such cases shall not extend further than to removal from office and disqualification to hold any office of trust or profit under the Commonwealth, and that the person accused, whether convicted or acquitted, shall nevertheless be liable to indictment, trial, judgment and punishment, according to law, does not in express words, nor by implication, confer authority on the legislature to take from the quarter sessions its power to direct an investigation by a grand jury or to halt such a proceeding pending in that court. [348-58]

3. An indictment can be...