In re Davidson S. S. Co.
| Decision Date | 22 November 1904 |
| Citation | 133 F. 411 |
| Parties | In re DAVIDSON S.S. CO. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Wisconsin |
C. E Kremer, for petitioner.
Goulder Holding & Masten, for respondents.
On (1) exceptions to the answer of the Ohio Transportation Co. to the petition, and (2) exceptions to the claim filed on behalf of that company as owner of the Steamer Gladstone, and of the representatives of her cargo.
While the exceptions are independent in classification, both involve a primary question of the rule of pleading applicable to the issues respectively. In that view they are considered together, and the inquiry thereupon is not free from difficulty, owing to the want of clear precedents. My conclusions are, however, that the petition and answer on the one hand and the claims of damages on the other present distinct issues, which are to be separately adjudicated in the order named, as indicated by the opinion of Judge Brown in La Bourgogne (D.C.) 106 F. 232, 233. Whatever the form of pleading to that end, I am of opinion that each of such issues must be presented independently of the other, and in conformity with the general requirements applicable to pleadings in the admiralty.
This proceeding is commenced by the petitioner to limit liability and the issuable allegations thereupon are the facts prescribed by statute as the grounds for limitation. It is unquestionable that the petitioner must allege and prove the state of facts thus required to obtain the relief sought. Nevertheless, a claimant contesting the right to limit liability must take issue by answer to the petition (rule 56), and I am of opinion that such answer must 'be full and explicit and distinct to each separate article and separate allegation,' as required by rule 27 for answer to libels. Thereupon 'the cause must stand for hearing on proof like any other cause at issue. ' Bened, Adm. Pr. (3d Ed.) Sec. 580. The doctrine which is to govern admiralty pleadings is now settled, though uncertain prior to 1844, when the rules were promulgated by the Supreme Court as authorized by act of Congress. Thus, in an early case (Clarke v. The Dodge Healy, 4 Wash.C.C. 651, 656, Fed. Cas. No. 2,849) it was said, 'If the answer does not acknowledge the truth of the allegations of the libel, it must be proved by those who assert it;' while Judge Lacombe, in Virginia Home Ins. Co. v. Sunberg (C.C.) 54 F. 389, 390, construes the rule and practice in admiralty to entitle the libelant 'to an admission or denial of each distinct and separate averment in its libel, separately and distinctly. ' The last-mentioned view plainly conforms to the intent of rule 27, and is deemed equally applicable to the pleadings upon the issue as to limited liability. The proof required in support of the petition that any liability incurred was 'without the privity or knowledge of' the petitioner, does not reach the subsequent issue of liability, as it relates only to the personal negligence or conduct of the owners. Benedict's Adm. Pr. (3d Ed.) Sec. 565.
Upon the further issue of liability for damages arising out of the collision the petitioner brings the case within rule 56 which reserves its right to contest such liability. 'No presumption arises from the happening of a collision against either vessel' (Henry's Admr. Jur. & Proc. Sec. 82) without fault on the part of one shown or confessed, and it is unquestionable that the general rule and practice in admiralty intend that all issues be well defined by pleadings in some form, with simple and explicit allegations of fact. I am satisfied, therefore, that the claim under which proof of liability is to be presented (rule 55) must be treated as a pleading in the nature of libel, and must set out 'the various allegations of facts upon which the claimant relies in support of his suit,' in accord with rule 23. While this requirement is not expressed in rule 55, and neither of the rules states the method of framing such issue, nor mentions...
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THE PRINCESS SOPHIA
...limited period bars recovery. Filing a claim in a limitation proceeding is the libel in personam in an admiralty action. In re Davidson S. S. Co. (D. C.) 133 F. 411; The Pere Marquette 18 (D. C.) 203 F. 127. It must follow that exceptions to all claims (see (1) set out in margin) filed more......
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THE PRINCESS SOPHIA
...administered until claimant appears and states the facts substantially as in a libel showing prima facie right of recovery. In re Davidson S.S. Co. (D. C.) 133 F. 411. See, also, The Pere Marquette 18 (D. C.) 203 F. 127. Hartford Acc. & Ind. Co. v. Sou. Pac., supra, is not to the contrary. ......
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PETITION OF COMPANHIA DE NAVEGACAO LLOYD BRASILEIRO
...be competent to sue. * * * The nature of a claimant is that of a plaintiff or libellant." The Titanic (C.C.A.) 225 F. 747; In re Davidson S. S. Co. (D.C.) 133 F. 411; The John H. Starin (C.C.A.) 191 F. 800; The S. S. Hewitt (D.C.) 284 F. 911; The Princess Sophia (C.C.A.) 61 F.2d 339, certio......
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THE MANDU
...to sue by whatever name he is called. The Ship-Owner asserts that here the Insurance Company has no such capacity. In re Davidson S. S. Co. (D.C.) 133 F. 411-412; The John H. Starin (C.C.A.) 191 F. 800; The S. S. Hewitt (D.C.) 284 F. 911; The Princess Sophia (D.C.) 35 F. (2d) 736-739; Id. (......