In re DED

• Decision Date: 11 March 1996
• Docket Number: No. 94-FS-555.,94-FS-555.
• Citation: 672 A.2d 582
• Parties: In re: D.E.D., Appellant.
• Court: D.C. Court of Appeals

672 A.2d 582

In re: D.E.D., Appellant.

No. 94-FS-555.

District of Columbia Court of Appeals.

Argued December 14, 1995.

Decided March 11, 1996.

D.E.D., pro se.

Sonia A. Bacchus, Assistant Corporation Counsel, with whom Garland Pinkston, Jr., Corporation Counsel at the time, and Charles L. Reischel, Deputy Corporation Counsel, were on the Motion by the District of Columbia, for Summary Affirmance.

Before STEADMAN, FARRELL and REID, Associate Judges.

FARRELL, Associate Judge:

D.C.Code § 16-311 (1982) provides in relevant part:

From and after the filing of the petition for adoption, records and papers in adoption proceedings shall be sealed. They may not be inspected by any person, including the parties to the proceeding, except upon order of the court, and only then when the court is satisfied that the welfare of the child will thereby be promoted or protected.

Appellant, the "child" under this statute, was born in 1957 and adopted in 1959. In 1993, she applied for a court order permitting her to inspect the records of her adoption. She asserted, what for present purposes we must assume is true, that neither her biological parents (whose identity she knows) nor her adoptive parents oppose the request. The trial court, apparently construing § 16-311 to require a particularized showing of how inspection would "promote" the welfare of the child, denied the request on the ground that appellant "seeks merely to physically peruse the file for the sake of doing so, but has no additional need of information contained in the file." We vacate the trial court's order and remand for further consideration, because we do not read the statute as barring inspection by an adult adoptee asserting her own interest ("welfare") in inspection where—on the present record at least—each of the parents concerned has consented.

I.

Appellant, thirty six years old at the time, moved under § 16-311 to be allowed to examine the record of her adoption maintained by Associated Catholic Charities, Inc. (Catholic Charities). Catholic Charities operated St. Anne's Infant and Maternity Home where appellant assertedly had spent much of her infant life before adoption. The motion stated that appellant had "a strong and healthy desire and curiosity to learn more about her adoption proceedings and her stay at St. Anne's" following her birth. Attached to the motion were letters from appellant's biological mother and adoptive mother consenting to the adoption, and a similar letter from her putative natural father, who, however, did not admit paternity. Appellant alleged as well that her adoptive father, while unwilling to execute a formal consent, had not "indicated that he would file an objection." She also wrote a letter to the court explaining her request:

The reason is simple: The first nine months of my life are a blank to me. I want to fill in those blanks. All I know is that I was at an orphanage run by Catholic Charities. I don't know what I ate, who fed me, how I was taken care of, whether I got sick, whether I cried a lot, nothing. I want to know as much as possible.

The trial court held the request in abeyance while directing Catholic Charities "to inspect its records to determine whether inspection of the adoption file by the adoptee would promote the welfare of the adoptee" and to report to the court accordingly. In its report, Catholic Charities stated that, although its "policy" was that "our agency records are confidential and not made available for client inspection," it had examined appellant's record and thereafter furnished her with "non-identifying information" about her adoption. It had also contacted her by telephone "to determine any further questions she had about her adoption and natural parents," but that she responded "that she does not have further specific questions," desiring only "to personally inspect the records." Catholic Charities therefore informed her that it could not allow inspection in these circumstances.

Upon receipt of the agency's report, the trial court denied appellant's request in a brief written order, which noted that Catholic Charities had "already provided to the adoptee all non-identifying information about her adoption and natural parents." Beyond this, it "appeared to the court that the adoptee seeks merely to physically peruse the file for the sake of doing so, but has no additional need of information contained in the file." That showing, even if all of the parents concerned had consented to inspection, was inadequate in the court's view to justify breaching of the seal imposed by § 16-311.

II.

The District of Columbia defends the trial court's ruling on the ground that a person seeking inspection under § 16-311 must demonstrate that her welfare would be promoted if she were allowed to inspect her adoption records.¹ This requires a particularized showing of benefit, the District argues, otherwise the test reduces to simple consent of the affected parties. And if consent were the criterion for inspection, the legislature would have written a different statute, not one permitting inspection—as does this one—"only then when the court is satisfied that the welfare of the child will thereby be promoted or protected." Moreover, the statute commits unsealing to the discretion of the trial court, In re Adoption of S.E.D., 324 A.2d 200, 202 (D.C.App.1974), and refusal to allow inspection sought merely in a general quest for information, in the District's view, cannot be an abuse of that discretion.²

Since discretion must be exercised in accordance with law, see Johnson v. United States, 398 A.2d 354, 365 (D.C.App.1979), the issue before us is the proper construction of § 16-311. The...