In re Delric H.

• Decision Date: 27 March 2003
• Docket Number: No. 2027,2027
• Citation: 150 Md. App. 234,819 A.2d 1117
• Parties: In re DELRIC H.
• Court: Court of Special Appeals of Maryland

819 A.2d 1117

150 Md. App. 234

In re DELRIC H.

No. 2027, Sept. Term, 2001.

Court of Special Appeals of Maryland.

March 27, 2003.

Mark Colvin, Assistant Public Defender (Stephen E. Harris, Public Defender on the brief for appellant, Delric H.), Baltimore, Neil I. Jacobs of Rockville, on the brief for appellant, Albree Bell.

Celia Anderson Davis, Assistant Attorney General (J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Attorney General, Baltimore, and Douglas Gansler, State's Attorney for Montgomery County of Rockville, on the brief), for appellee.

Argued before KENNEY, DEBORAH S. EYLER, and SHARER, JJ SHARER, Judge.

Appellant, Delric H., appeals from an order of the Circuit Court for Montgomery County requiring him, and his mother,¹ to pay restitution after he was adjudicated a delinquent child. In the adjudicatory hearing, Delric admitted to having committed a second degree assault on another juvenile.

At the restitution hearing (held separately from both the adjudicatory and disposition hearings), appellant challenged, on hearsay and authentication grounds, the introduction of eleven exhibits, all of which were related to medical or dental services provided to the victim. The court admitted ten of the eleven exhibits on the basis that Title 5 of the Maryland Rules (i.e., the Maryland Rules of Evidence) is inapplicable in a parental/juvenile restitution hearing and, in the alternative, that strict application of the rules of evidence is not required in a juvenile restitution hearing.

Appellant raises two questions for our review. We have rephrased the second question for simplicity, but have left appellant's first question intact.

1. Did the juvenile court err, at the restitution hearing, by admitting evidence that does not satisfy the requirements of Title 5 of the Maryland Rules?

2. Did the juvenile court abuse its discretion in ordering restitution?

We answer both questions in the negative, and affirm the ruling of the juvenile court.

FACTUAL and PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On February 8, 2001, Delric H.² committed a second degree assault on a fellow student. Delric "chased the victim, punched him in his face, then picked up the victim and body slammed him." As a result, "[t]he victim fell, face first on the sidewalk, injuring his mouth and nose ... chipp[ing] two teeth and one tooth was smashed...."

In due course, an appropriate petition was filed alleging Delric to be a delinquent child and, on July 6, 2001, the juvenile court held an adjudicatory hearing and a disposition hearing immediately thereafter. At this time, the court adjudicated Delric a delinquent child and placed him on supervised probation.

Several months later, on October 2, 2001, the court convened a restitution hearing. That hearing was recessed and then resumed and concluded on October 19, 2001. During the hearing, the State presented evidence, through the testimony of the minor victim's father, detailing the hospital visit on the day of the assault, and the charges for medical and dental care that resulted. According to the father's testimony, the victim was transported by ambulance to Montgomery County General Hospital. As a result of the assault, and the resulting facial and dental injuries, doctors and dentists removed four of the victim's teeth.

The State sought to introduce eleven exhibits to prove that the medical and dental expenses were necessitated by the assault, and to establish the appropriate amount of restitution. The eleven exhibits included copies of bills for medical services and treatment and medication, all of which had been paid by the victim's father by check, credit card, or cash.³ Counsel for Delric made a timely objection to admission of the bills on the grounds that all of the exhibits constituted hearsay, and further, that they were not properly authenticated business records as required by Md. Rules 5-803(b)(6), 5-901, and 5-902.

Noting the objection, the juvenile court ruled that the Maryland Rules of Evidence do not apply in a restitution hearing, because Md. Rule 5-101(b)(9) excepts the application of the rules in a sentencing proceeding under Md. Rule 4-342. In reviewing Md. Rule 4-342(j) (2001),⁴ titled "Restitution from a parent[,]" the court determined that the present restitution hearing fell within the purview of Rule 4-342; thus, he opined, the rules of evidence did not apply.

As an alternative, citing Md. Rules 5-101(b)(12) and 5-101(c)(8), the court declined to apply strict rules of evidence, finding that prior to adoption of the Maryland Rules of Evidence, common law rules of evidence had not applied to restitution hearings. The juvenile court judge stated, "I am going to decline to apply strict rules of evidence to these proceedings ... at least in so far as these bills go."

Despite finding the rules of evidence inapplicable, or otherwise relaxed, the court reviewed each of the eleven exhibits under a "general reliability requirement," to determine if they passed "some kind of minimal, entry level smell test."⁵ After his review, the court "found them all to pass muster, except number nine."⁶ Accordingly, State's Exhibits 1 through 8, 10, and 11 were admitted into evidence. The ten bills totaled $6,693.89.

STANDARD of REVIEW

Given the two questions presented by appellant, we face two different standards of review. In reviewing whether the court properly determined that the Maryland Rules of Evidence do not apply, or are otherwise relaxed, in a restitution hearing, we must determine if the court's legal conclusions were legally correct. Gregg Neck Yacht Club, Inc. v. County Commr's of Kent County, 137 Md.App. 732, 752, 769 A.2d 982 (2001) (citations omitted). Then, we shall review the trial court's order, requiring Delric and his mother to pay restitution, under an abuse of discretion standard. In re Lorne S., 123 Md.App. 672, 680, 720 A.2d 920 (1998) (citing In re Don Mc., 344 Md. 194, 200-01, 686 A.2d 269 (1996)).

DISCUSSION

1. Did the juvenile court err at the restitution hearing, by admitting evidence that does not satisfy the requirements of Title 5 of the Maryland Rules?

I.

Whether the Maryland Rules of Evidence (Md. Rule 5-101 et seq.) apply in a parental/juvenile restitution hearing is, we conclude, a question of first impression.

Here, as we have noted, the juvenile court ruled that Md. Rule 5-101(b)(9) excepts the rules of evidence from application in a sentencing proceeding under Md. Rule 4-342, and that the present case was a restitution hearing under Rule 4-342(j). Although we agree with the juvenile court's ultimate result, we disagree with the conclusion as to the applicability of Md. Rule 4-342(j), because that rule applies to restitution hearings in criminal proceedings, but not in juvenile delinquency proceedings.⁷ That interpretation was made clear in In re Victor B., 336 Md. 85, 646 A.2d 1012 (1994), wherein the Court of Appeals said:

We find that neither the Maryland Rules nor the Juvenile Causes Act provides for the application of the criminal rules of Title 4 to juvenile proceedings. Furthermore, we find no implied incorporation of the criminal rules into the juvenile rules.

* * *

We hold that title 4 of the Maryland Rules, which governs procedure in criminal cases, is not applicable to juvenile proceedings.

Id. at 96, 646 A.2d 1012; cf. In re John M., 129 Md.App. 165, 189, 741 A.2d 503 (1999) ("Although juvenile proceedings are civil in nature, they are governed by the rules of procedure contained in Chapter 11 of the Maryland Rules.").

As an alternative ground, citing Md. Rules 5-101(b)(12) and 5-101(c)(8), the court declined to strictly apply rules of evidence, based on its conclusion that common law rules of evidence had not applied to restitution hearings prior to the adoption of the Maryland Rules of Evidence. We note that an oft-accepted practice was to waive or relax evidentiary rules in restitution hearings before (and after) the formal adoption of Title 5 of the Maryland Rules on July 1, 1994. Nonetheless, we hesitate to conclude that restitution courts were never bound by the laws of evidence prior to the adoption of the Maryland Rules. Our language in In re Appeal No. 769, 25 Md.App. 565, 335 A.2d 204 (1975), suggests that, at least at one time, rules of evidence did apply in restitution hearings. Id. at 571, 335 A.2d 204 ("The rules of evidence applicable to civil cases shall apply at [parental restitution] hearings. Rule 912, § c.");⁸see also In re Johnson, 254 Md. 517, 524, 255 A.2d 419 (1969)("While [juvenile] proceedings are informal, § 60, the rules of practice, of procedure, of evidence, and standards of fairness must be observed.") (citations omitted), appeal dismissed, 403 U.S. 926, 91 S.Ct. 2257, 29 L.Ed.2d 706 (1971).

II.

In Maryland, a "court may enter a judgment of restitution against the parent of a child, the child, or both as provided under Article 27, § 807 of the Code." Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 3-829 (Repl.Vol.1998).⁹ Article 27 § 807(a)(1), in turn, outlines the factors that a court will review in determining whether to require the juvenile or parent to pay restitution to a victim. Md. Ann.Code art. 27, § 8-207 (Repl.Vol.1996 & Supp.2000).¹⁰ We draw special attention to the fact that a § 807 parental/juvenile restitution hearing "may be held as part of the sentencing or disposition hearing." Md. Ann.Code art. 27, § 807(a)(3)(iii).¹¹

Notably, pursuant to Md. Rule 5-101(c)(6), a court may decline to require strict application of the rules in "[Juvenile] Disposition hearings under Rule 11 115."¹²

We believe it logical to conclude from relevant provisions of the Maryland Code and Maryland Rules that a strict application of the rules is not necessary when a restitution hearing is held in conjunction with a disposition (or sentencing) hearing.¹³ Our reasoning is further supported by Md. Rule 11-118 ("Juvenile Causes"), which states that a restitution hearing "may be conducted contemporaneously with a disposition hearing, if...