In re Dependency of A.K., 78426-4.
| Decision Date | 20 December 2007 |
| Docket Number | No. 78426-4.,78426-4. |
| Citation | 174 P.3d 11,162 Wash.2d 632 |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
| Parties | In the Matter of the DEPENDENCY OF A.K. In the Matter of the Dependency of M.H.-O. In the Matter of the Dependency of Y.H. |
¶ 1 Petitioners M.H.-O. and Y.H. are teenage girls who ran away multiple times from foster homes in which they had been placed. The juvenile court found each of them in contempt of court for running away and used its "inherent contempt power" to order each of them to spend 30 to 60 days in detention. Petitioners ask this court to reverse the Court of Appeals decision affirming the juvenile court orders. They argue that the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that the juvenile court has the inherent power to impose punitive sanctions on a youth for indirect contempt. Although we disagree with petitioners' assertion, we conclude that the juvenile court improperly resorted to the use of its inherent power in this case. We, therefore, reverse the Court of Appeals.
¶ 2 In 2001, Y.H. was found by the Yakima County Juvenile Court to be a dependent child. Consequently, she was placed in foster care. Y.H. ran away from the foster home at least six times in 2003 and 2004. The first time she ran away, Yakima County Juvenile Court Commissioner Robert Inouye warned her that she needed to stay in the foster home in which she had been placed. After subsequent runs, Y.H. was found in contempt and sentenced to three to seven days in detention, with the option to purge her contempt by writing an essay and promising not to run away again. After her fourth disappearance, Y.H. was also moved to a new foster home. The fifth time Y.H. ran away, Commissioner Inouye warned her that if she ran again he might have to resort to the court's inherent contempt power in order to impose greater sanctions.
¶ 3 Finally, after the sixth time Y.H. ran away, respondent, Department of Social and Health Services (DSHS), asked the juvenile court to exercise its inherent contempt power and impose a punishment greater than the statutory remedy of up to seven days in juvenile detention with an option to gain earlier release by purging the contempt. Commissioner Inouye conducted a hearing on DSHS's request and heard testimony from witnesses. He subsequently sentenced Y.H. to 30 days in detention for contempt, without the opportunity to purge the contempt. He found:
If we continue to use [the] Becca procedure,[1] [Y.H.] will continue to make empty promises and continue to run and place her self at serious risk.
....
[Y.H.]'s disobedience to the court orders has escalated in severity over time, rather than lessening in response to the Becca contempt sanctions.
[Y.H.]'s mother believes that the Becca sanctions are inadequate to change [Y.H.]'s behavior, and that something different should be tried, if another run is to be avoided.
There is reason to believe that an inherent contempt disposition will likely have coercive effect on [Y.H.]. It will become clear to [Y.H.] that continued future decisions to violate court orders may have much more serious consequences. It will give her a period of time to stabilize without the adverse influences which she seeks while one [sic] the run. It will not give her the opportunity to run again the next day after her contempt hearing (as she did on 8-30-03).
The stakes are high at this point[. Y.H.] appears headed for a very dangerous life style which includes gangs, drugs and sex to the exclusion of stability, safety and education.... We are risking a catastrophe with her future if we are unable to formulate an adequate response to her bad choices.
Clerk's Papers (CP) (23252-2-III) at 73-74.
¶ 4 Y.H. moved for revision of the order. A judge of the Yakima County Superior Court upheld the commissioner's use of inherent contempt power to impose a 30-day sentence. Y.H. then appealed to the Court of Appeals.
¶ 5 Like Y.H., M.H.-O. was found by the Yakima County Juvenile Court to be a dependent child and placed in foster care. She also ran away from her placement at least six times in 2003 and 2004, two of these times within a day of promising the court she would not run again. After each of the first four of these disappearances, the juvenile court found M.H.-O. in contempt and sentenced her to four to seven days in detention, with the option to purge her contempt. Once, she was released after merely promising not to run again. After the third time M.H.-O. ran, Commissioner Inouye warned her that he might have to resort to the court's inherent contempt power to impose greater sanctions if she ran again.
¶ 6 The fifth time M.H.-O. ran away, DSHS moved for the juvenile court to exercise its inherent contempt power. Commissioner Inouye set a trial date, advised the parties that the contempt must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, and warned M.H.-O. that detention imposed under inherent contempt power could last until she turned 18 and carried no option to purge the contempt. M.H.-O. stipulated "that she had run as alleged," in exchange for a recommended sentence of 30 days. CP (23211-5-III) at 86. Sentencing M.H.-O. to 30 days, with no option to purge the contempt, Commissioner Inouye found:
[M.H.-O.] has repeatedly promised not to run, and repeatedly broken those promises. Given this recent history, a new purge promise not to run could not be believed.
There is reason to believe that an inherent contempt consequence with no purge option could achieve what a purgeable 7 days of civil contempt consequence could not. It will afford [M.H.-O.] a longer period of time to stabilize under the influence of a "home" where she is not on the streets and on the run. It will give her an opportunity to reflect and become more accustomed to a lifestyle which includes school and continuity.
¶ 7 A week after M.H.-O. was released from detention, she ran away again. DSHS again moved for the court to use its inherent contempt power to impose an appropriate sanction upon M.H.-O. After being advised of the "potential consequences" of the contempt motion "and of her rights," M.H.-O. again stipulated that she had violated a court order by running away. Id. at 76. In determining a proper sanction for M.H.-O.'s sixth contempt, Commissioner Inouye stated:
This court has attempted to persuade [M.H.-O.], through use of the usual civil contempt remedies, to begin following court orders and live in a safe manner. These efforts have failed, repeatedly.
....
[M.H.-O.] has repeatedly demonstrated that this limited consequence does not deter her from choosing to run....
....
Hopefully [M.H.-O.] will grow out of this phase, before she suffers further serious or irreparable harm. Eventually a civil contempt sanction may have some actual coercive effect for her ....
At present, the court is unable to assure the basic safety of [M.H.-O.] without resort to the inherent contempt powers[.] The legislatively provided tools have proven inadequate.
Id. at 78. Commissioner Inouye went on to explain that there was "a reasonable basis for believing that some other specific period of detention will achieve what seven days will not," because M.H.-O. was "asking for help with in-patient drug treatment," and he believed that "[a] more extended period of time under the auspices of juvenile detention would give a more significant opportunity for her to experience being drug free in a more structured environment including an education component." Id. at 79. Commissioner Inouye decided to give M.H.-O. a "more extended sentence" than he had prior to that time, because "that prospect is likely to have a greater deterrent effect." Id. Accordingly, he sentenced M.H.-O. to 60 days in detention, with no purge option.
¶ 8 M.H.-O. moved for revision of both orders. A judge of the Yakima County Superior Court upheld the commissioner's use of inherent contempt power to impose both the 30-day and 60-day sentences. M.H.-O. appealed to the Court of Appeals.
¶ 9 The Court of Appeals essentially consolidated Y.H.'s and M.H.-O.'s appeals, along with a similar appeal by a third juvenile, A.K.2 That court concluded that the...
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