In re Derrick B., S124205.

Citation139 P.3d 485,47 Cal.Rptr.3d 13,39 Cal.4th 535
Decision Date10 August 2006
Docket NumberNo. S124205.,S124205.
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court (California)
PartiesIn re DERRICK B., A Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. The People, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Derrick B., Defendant and Appellant.

E. Katherine Dashiell, under appointment by the Supreme Court, Sacramento, and Dale J. Blea, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, Manuel M. Medeiros, State Solicitor General, Robert R. Anderson, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Mary Jo Graves, Assistant Attorney General, Stan Cross and Janet E. Neeley, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

CORRIGAN, J.

[139 P.3d 537]

Here we conclude that a juvenile offender may not be ordered to register as a sex offender under Penal Code section 290 if his offenses are not among those listed in subdivision (d)(3).1

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

At the age of 17 Derrick B. was committed to the California Youth Authority. The commitment followed four years of juvenile court intervention

[139 P.3d 538]

beginning when Derrick was accused of lewd and lascivious acts with a child under 14. (§ 288, subd. (a).) Derrick was then 13 years old and living with the family of a 10-year-old girl. While she slept, he reached under her clothes and touched her chest, buttocks, and vagina. Pursuant to an agreement, Derrick was declared a ward of the court for having committed the lesser offense of sexual battery (§ 243.4). He was ordered to live in a group home and attend sex offender treatment, as conditions of probation.

Derrick failed in several group home placements. During the course of his wardship he admitted to counselors that he had sexually assaulted a number of victims. He also reported his own sexual victimization at the hands of his parents' friends.

In 2002, Derrick was found to have committed a misdemeanor weapons offense, continued as a ward, and again ordered to undergo sex offender treatment. In 2003, Derrick admitted misdemeanor violations for assault and battery. The court sent Derrick to the California Youth Authority, choosing his earlier sexual battery offense as the basis for the principal term. (Welf. & Inst.Code, § 602, subd. (a).) The court also directed that he register as a sex offender upon his release. The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment, with a modification of precommitment credit.

The only issue before us is the validity of the section 290 registration order.

II. DISCUSSION

Three provisions of section 290 must be analyzed to resolve this question.

Subdivision (a)(2)(A) requires registration by adults convicted of various sex offenses, including sexual battery (§ 243.4).2

[139 P.3d 539]

Subdivision (d)(3) pertains to juveniles sent to the Youth Authority. It lists specific offenses giving rise to a registration requirement upon discharge or parole.3 Sexual battery is not included in this list.

A third subdivision authorizes a court to require registration in connection with unlisted offenses if the court makes certain findings and states reasons for the imposition. (§ 290, subd. (a)(2)(E).)4 The Attorney General relies on this subdivision to defend the juvenile court's order. The reliance is misplaced.

The well-settled objective of statutory construction is to ascertain and effectuate legislative intent. (People v. Trevino (2001) 26 Cal.4th 237, 240, 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 567, 27 P.3d 283 (Trevino); People v. Gardeley (1996) 14 Cal.4th 605, 621, 59 Cal.Rptr.2d 356, 927 P.2d 713.) To determine that intent, we turn first to the words of the statute, giving them their usual and ordinary meaning. (Trevino, at p. 241, 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 567, 27 P.3d 283; Trope v. Katz (1995) 11 Cal.4th 274, 280, 45 Cal.Rptr.2d 241, 902 P.2d 259.) When the statutory language is clear, we need go no further. If, however, the language supports more than one reasonable interpretation, we look to a variety of extrinsic aids, including the objects to be achieved, the evils to be remedied, the legislative history, the statutory scheme of which the statute is a part, and contemporaneous administrative construction, as well as questions of public policy. (People v. Flores (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1059, 1063, 135 Cal.Rptr.2d 63, 69 P.3d 979; Granberry v. Islay Investments (1995) 9 Cal.4th 738, 744, 38 Cal.Rptr.2d 650,

[139 P.3d 540]

889 P.2d 970; People v. Woodhead (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1002, 1007-1008, 239 Cal.Rptr. 656, 741 P.2d 154.)

Under section 290, subdivision (a)(2)(E), a court may order registration for unlisted offenses if it "finds at the time of conviction or sentencing that the person committed the offense as a result of sexual compulsion or for purposes of sexual gratification." (Italics added.) This language is clear. "Conviction" and "sentencing" are terms of art usually associated with adult proceedings. Because the Legislature used these terms, we construe this subdivision as applying only in cases of adult convictions.5

In People v. Burton (1989) 48 Cal.3d 843, 258 Cal.Rptr. 184, 771 P.2d 1270 (Burton), we held that a capital defendant's prior juvenile adjudications, though serious offenses, were not prior felony convictions within the terms of section 190.3, factor (c).6 As we explained: "Welfare and Institutions Code section 203 provides that `[a]n order adjudging a minor to be a ward of the juvenile court shall not be deemed a conviction of a crime for any purpose, nor shall a proceeding in the juvenile court be deemed a criminal proceeding.' This court and the Courts of Appeal have consistently agreed that adjudications under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 are not criminal convictions. (E.g., People v. Weidert (1985) 39 Cal.3d 836, 844-847 [218 Cal.Rptr. 57, 705 P.2d 380]; In re Joseph B. (1983) 34 Cal.3d 952, 955 [196 Cal.Rptr. 348, 671 P.2d 852]; Leroy T. v. Workmen's Comp. Appeals Bd. (1974) 12 Cal.3d 434, 439 [115 Cal.Rptr. 761, 525 P.2d 665]; People v. Sanchez (1985) 170 Cal.App.3d 216, 218-219 ; see also People v. Lucky (1988) 45 Cal.3d 259, 294-295 [247 Cal.Rptr. 1, 753 P.2d 1052].)" (Burton, at p. 861, 258 Cal.Rptr. 184, 771 P.2d 1270, italics added.)

"We must assume that the voters, when they enacted section 190.3, were aware of Welfare and Institutions Code section 203 and judicial constructions of its terms. (People v. Weidert, supra, 39 Cal.3d 836, 844 [218 Cal.Rptr. 57, 705 P.2d 380].) With such an awareness, the voters cannot have intended the term `prior felony conviction' contained in section 190.3, factor (c) to refer to juvenile court adjudications. We employ a presumption that when the language of a statute uses a term that has been judicially construed, the term is used in the precise sense which the court gave it. (Weidert, supra, at pp. 845-846 [218 Cal.Rptr. 57, 705 P.2d 380].) Consistent with past decisions and in the absence of any evidence the voters intended a different interpretation for section 190.3, factor (c), we conclude evidence of juvenile

[139 P.3d 541]

adjudications is not admissible under factor (c). (See People v. Lucky, supra, 45 Cal.3d at pp. 294-295 [247 Cal.Rptr. 1, 753 P.2d 1052].)" (Burton, supra, 48 Cal.3d at pp. 861-862, 258 Cal.Rptr. 184, 771 P.2d 1270.)7

The same reasoning bolsters the conclusion that the Legislature, in choosing the terms "conviction" and "sentencing" in its 1994 enactment of section 290, subdivision (a)(2)(E),8 was aware of Welfare and Institutions Code section 203 and judicial constructions of its terms, including Burton, supra, 48 Cal.3d 843, 258 Cal.Rptr. 184, 771 P.2d 1270, and the cases it cites.

In re Bernardino S. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 613, 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 746 (Bernardino S.) provides additional support for this construction. Bernardino S. was accused of performing a lewd and lascivious act on a child under the age of 14. He admitted the allegations, was adjudged a ward, and required to register as a sex offender under section 290. (4 Cal.App.4th at pp. 616-617, 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 746.) The Court of Appeal reversed, holding that before the enactment of subdivision (d), section 290 was inapplicable to juvenile offenders.

"Prior to 1986, Penal Code section 290 required registration only by persons who had been `convicted' of specified sex offenses. Under the juvenile court law, a person adjudged a ward of the court has not been `convicted' of anything. Welfare and Institutions Code section 203 provides that a wardship adjudication `shall not be deemed a conviction of a crime for any purpose, nor shall a proceeding in the juvenile court be deemed a criminal proceeding.' [¶] ... [¶]

"The Legislature's own interpretation of the statute as applied to juvenile wards became apparent when, in 1985, it amended Penal Code section 290 by adopting a new subdivision (d) expressly dealing with wards of the juvenile

[139 P.3d 542]

court. Extrinsic legislative materials strongly indicate that the preamendment statute had no application whatever to juvenile wards: `Although persons, including remanded minors, committed to Youth Authority from criminal court for specified sex offenses must register under current law, juvenile court commitments do not currently have to register no matter how violent their offense.' (Assem. Office of Research, 3d reading analysis of Sen. Bill No. 888 (1985-1986 Reg. Sess.) as amended Sept. 12, 1985, p. 2 [3d reading analysis].) The Legislature viewed the amendment as an expansion of the statute's sweep to persons previously excluded. (Legis. Counsel's Dig., Sen. Bill No. 888, 4 Stats. 1985 (Reg.Sess.), Summary Digest, p. 553 [`expanding the category of persons to which a criminal penalty is applicable']; 3d reading analysis, supra, p. 1 [`expands application of the registration requirements'].)

"Given this legislative interpretation of the pre-1986 statute and the complete absence of contrary authority, it seems clear that the sole statutory basis for requiring juvenile wards to register as sex offenders is the 1985 amendments themsel...

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