In re Det. of Hatfield

Decision Date23 November 2015
Docket NumberNo. 73662–1–I.,73662–1–I.
Parties In the Matter of the DETENTION OF Division One Richard HATFIELD, Appellant.
CourtWashington Court of Appeals

191 Wash.App. 378
362 P.3d 997

In the Matter of the DETENTION OF Division One Richard HATFIELD, Appellant.

No. 73662–1–I.

Court of Appeals of Washington, Division 1.

Nov. 23, 2015.


362 P.3d 1000

Kevin Andrew March, Nielsen, Broman & Koch, PLLC, Nielsen Broman Koch PLLC, Attorney at Law, Seattle, WA, for Appellant.

Jeremy Scott Bartels, Washington State Attorney General, Sarah Sappington, Office of the Atty General, Seattle, WA, for Respondent.

DWYER, J.

191 Wash.App. 382

¶ 1 Following a bench trial, Richard Hatfield was committed to the custody of the State as a sexually

191 Wash.App. 383

violent predator (SVP). Prior to the commitment trial, Hatfield was found incompetent and a guardian ad litem (GAL), attorney Peter MacDonald, was appointed to represent his interests. On the first day of trial, MacDonald appeared in court for some preliminary matters but left the courtroom prior to opening statements. On appeal, Hatfield contends that the commitment order should be reversed because (1) RCW 4.08.060 mandated MacDonald's physical presence in the courtroom throughout the entirety of the trial, (2) the superior court GAL rules mandate a GAL's presence at trial, (3) due process required that MacDonald be present, (4) Hatfield's counsel provided ineffective assistance by not demanding MacDonald's continued presence throughout the trial, (5) requiring a GAL's presence at all times makes good policy sense, and (6) Hatfield's confinement violates substantive due process because his underlying mental illness will not be appropriately treated at the Special Commitment Center. Finding no error, we affirm.

I

¶ 2 On February 21, 2012, the State filed a petition seeking the civil commitment of Hatfield as an SVP pursuant to chapter 71.09 RCW. The petition alleged that in April 1982 Hatfield was convicted of attempted lewd and lascivious conduct with a minor under the age of 14 in California, that in April 1998 he was convicted of first degree child molestation, a sexually violent offense, in Clark County, and that he currently "suffers from a mental abnormality and/or personality disorder" that "causes him to have serious difficulty controlling his dangerous behavior and makes him likely to engage in predatory acts of sexual violence unless confined to a secure facility." Based on the petition, the superior court found probable cause to believe Hatfield was an SVP.

¶ 3 On October 10, 2013, the attorneys for the parties appeared by telephone before the trial court and indicated

191 Wash.App. 384

that, since the initiation

362 P.3d 1001

of the action, concerns had developed regarding Hatfield's mental competency. The parties jointly moved for the appointment of a GAL for Hatfield. A competency hearing was scheduled for the following day.

¶ 4 On October 11, the competency hearing was conducted by telephone. The court heard testimony from two experts, one called by the State and the other by Hatfield. Based on the testimony, the trial court determined that it was "reasonably convinced that Mr. Hatfield is not competent to understand the significance of legal proceedings and the effect of such proceedings on his best interests." The trial court then appointed attorney Peter MacDonald, pursuant to RCW 4.08.060, to serve as Hatfield's GAL. The order of appointment stated, in pertinent part, that MacDonald "is subject to any and all orders of this Court pertaining to Mr. Hatfield."

¶ 5 On April 7, 2014—the first day of trial—MacDonald appeared before the trial court in order to waive Hatfield's presence. The trial court accepted this waiver. The court then inquired whether MacDonald would be attending trial. After some discussion regarding how the trial court would explain MacDonald's presence to the jury, MacDonald determined that "there's no reason for me to [remain]" during the trial.1

¶ 6 At trial, the court heard testimony from three witnesses. The State called one witness, forensic psychologist Dr. Henry Richards, Ph.D. Hatfield called two witnesses, forensic and child psychiatrist Dr. Fabian Saleh, M.D., and forensic psychologist, Dr. Brian Abbott, Ph.D.

¶ 7 Attorneys Christine Sanders and Rachel Forde appeared as counsel for Hatfield and engaged in the questioning of the witnesses.

¶ 8 At the close of all of the evidence, and after hearing closing arguments, the trial court entered findings of fact,

191 Wash.App. 385

conclusions of law, and an order committing Hatfield to the custody of the State as an SVP.

¶ 9 Hatfield now appeals.

II

¶ 10 Hatfield contends that " RCW 4.08.060 mandates the presence of a court-appointed GAL at all times during trial." Br. of Appellant at 15. We disagree.

A

¶ 11 Hatfield's contention that RCW 4.08.060 mandated MacDonald's physical presence at trial relies on the improper assumption that the word "appear," as it is used in the statute, necessarily means physical presence.

¶ 12 "The meaning of a statute is a question of law reviewed de novo." Dep't of Ecology v. Campbell & Gwinn, LLC, 146 Wash.2d 1, 9, 43 P.3d 4 (2002). "Our primary duty in interpreting a statute is to discern and implement legislative intent." Johnson v. Recreational Equip., Inc., 159 Wash.App. 939, 946, 247 P.3d 18 (2011) (citing Campbell & Gwinn, 146 Wash.2d at 9, 43 P.3d 4 ). "[I]f the statute's meaning is plain on its face, then the court must give effect to that plain meaning as an expression of legislative intent." Campbell & Gwinn, 146 Wash.2d at 9–10, 43 P.3d 4. "[U]nder the ‘plain meaning’ rule, examination of the statute in which the provision at issue is found, as well as related statutes or other provisions of the same act in which the provision is found, is appropriate as part of the determination whether a plain meaning can be ascertained." Campbell & Gwinn, 146 Wash.2d at 10, 43 P.3d 4.

¶ 13 "Further, a court must not add words where the legislature has chosen not to include them. A court also must construe statutes such that all of the language is given effect, and ‘no portion [is] rendered meaningless or superfluous.’ "

191 Wash.App. 386

Rest. Dev., Inc. v. Cananwill, Inc., 150 Wash.2d 674, 682, 80 P.3d 598 (2003) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v. J.P., 149 Wash.2d 444, 450, 69 P.3d 318 (2003) ). "[I]f, after this inquiry, the statute remains susceptible to more than one reasonable

362 P.3d 1002

meaning, the statute is ambiguous and it is appropriate to resort to aids to construction, including legislative history." Campbell & Gwinn, 146 Wash.2d at 12, 43 P.3d 4.

¶ 14 RCW 4.08.060 provides, in relevant part:

When an incapacitated person is a party to an action in the superior courts he or she shall appear by guardian, or if he or she has no guardian, or in the opinion of the court the guardian is an improper person, the court shall appoint one to act as guardian ad litem.

(Emphasis added.)

¶ 15 Hatfield's contention that MacDonald's presence throughout the trial was mandated by the statute assumes that the word "appear" necessarily means physical presence. However, this narrow definition ignores that the word has more than one meaning, as evidenced by its ordinary dictionary and legal definitions. Because "appear" is the verb form of "appearance," a discussion of both words is instructive.2

¶ 16 Webster's Third New International Dictionary provides, in pertinent part, that the words "appear" and "appearance" mean:

191 Wash.App. 387
appear ... 2: to come formally before an authoritative body ed before the committee in executive session ... >; specif: to present oneself formally as plaintiff, defendant, or counsel

appearance ... d: the act or action of coming formally before an authoritative body e(1): the coming into court of either of the parties to a suit (2): the coming into court of a party summoned in an action or his attorney (3): the act or proceeding by which a party proceeded against places himself before the court and submits to its jurisdiction (as by making the proper entry in the court records and remaining within reach of its process)

WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 103 (2002).

¶ 17 In these definitions, Webster's sets forth how the verb "appear" and the related noun "appearance" are used in common parlance. The dictionary defines the word "appear" as "to come formally before an authoritative body." As illustrative examples of how a person appears in this manner, the dictionary specifies that one "appear[s]" as "plaintiff, defendant, or counsel." It is apparent from these examples that, in common usage, the focus of the word "appear" is on the role or status that a person assumes when he or she "comes formally before an authoritative body" as a plaintiff, defendant, or counsel—not on whether a...

To continue reading

Request your trial

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT