In re Detention of Cubbage

• Decision Date: 13 November 2003
• Docket Number: No. 02-0850.,02-0850.
• Citation: 671 N.W.2d 442
• Parties: In re The DETENTION OF William CUBBAGE. State of Iowa, Appellee, v. William Cubbage, Appellant.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

671 N.W.2d 442

In re The DETENTION OF William CUBBAGE.

State of Iowa, Appellee, v. William Cubbage, Appellant.

No. 02-0850.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

November 13, 2003.

Mark Smith, First Assistant Public Defender, and Melissa A. Anderson, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Andrew B. Prosser and Linda J. Hines, Assistant Attorneys General, and Patrick C. Jackson, County Attorney, for appellee.

CADY, Justice.

In this appeal, we consider whether an individual has a statutory or constitutional right to be competent during the course of proceedings instituted to determine whether he is a sexually violent predator. For the reasons that follow, we conclude he does not, and affirm the district court order finding that the respondent is a sexually violent predator and confining him for treatment.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

William Cubbage has been convicted of four sexually violent offenses in the past: assault with intent to commit sexual abuse (in 2000), indecent contact with a child (1997 and 1991), and lascivious acts with a child (1987). Iowa Code § 229A.2(8) (2001) (defining "sexually violent offense" for purposes of Iowa's Sexually Violent Predator Act (SVPA)). A forensic psychologist who examined Cubbage diagnosed him as possessing two psychological conditions: pedophilia and personality disorder NOS/mixed personality disorder (with antisocial and narcissistic features). The psychologist believed to a reasonable degree of scientific certainty that both of these conditions were "mental abnormalities" as that term is defined in the SVPA and these mental abnormalities made it seriously difficult for Cubbage to control his sexually dangerous behavior. Id. § 229A.2(4) (defining "mental abnormality"); see also In re Detention of Barnes, 658 N.W.2d 98, 101 (Iowa 2003)

(requiring "a showing [that an alleged sexually violent predator has] a serious difficulty in controlling behavior"). He reached these conclusions after conducting several assessments of Cubbage. These assessments revealed that Cubbage was a "high risk" to commit future acts of sexual violence if not held in a secure facility, possessed several factors that indicated recidivism was possible, and had never participated in sex offender treatment. See Iowa Code § 229A.2(9) (defining "sexually violent predator"). Moreover, many factors indicated that any future offenses Cubbage was likely to commit if not confined would be predatory. See id.

On August 14, 2001, the State filed a petition alleging Cubbage was a sexually violent predator subject to confinement for treatment based on his prior conduct and current mental status. See id. § 229A.4. The district court later found probable cause existed to confine Cubbage pending a more extensive trial on whether he was a sexually violent predator. See id. § 229A.5. Prior to the trial, Cubbage filed an application seeking a psychiatric evaluation of his competency to stand trial. In his application, Cubbage asserted that he had both a statutory and constitutional right to be competent during the trial inquiry into whether he was a sexually violent predator. Along with the application, Cubbage reported that another doctor had determined he suffered from senile dementia, was functioning in the mentally retarded range due to his senility, was unable to recall the date, day, month, or time when asked, and functioned below normal in understanding basic legal rights and processes. The doctor had also concluded that Cubbage was unable to assertively aid in his own defense.

The State resisted Cubbage's application for psychiatric evaluation contending that he had no statutory or constitutional right to be competent during the trial to determine whether he was a sexually violent predator. The district court denied the application. The parties proceeded to trial on the stipulated facts laid-out above. These facts led the district court to conclude the State had proven beyond a reasonable doubt that Cubbage was a sexually violent predator and should be confined for treatment. See id. § 229A.7(3). Cubbage appeals from this determination, challenging the district court's underlying denial of his application for a pre-trial psychiatric evaluation.

II. Standard of Review.

Cubbage's claims hinge on our interpretation of provisions of the SVPA and the state and federal constitutions. Our review of the district court's construction and interpretation of the statute is for correction of errors at law. In re Detention of Swanson, 668 N.W.2d 570, 575 (Iowa 2003). We review Cubbage's constitutional claim de novo. In re Detention of Garren, 620 N.W.2d 275, 278 (Iowa 2000).

III. Statutory Right of Competency.

Cubbage renews on appeal his arguments that he has both a statutory and constitutional right to be competent through the course of the trial inquiry into whether he is a sexually violent predator. He believes that his statutory right of competency arises from Iowa Code section 812.3, which provides,

If at any stage of a criminal proceeding it reasonably appears that the defendant is suffering from a mental disorder which prevents the defendant from appreciating the charge, understanding the proceedings, or assisting effectively in the defense, further proceedings must be suspended and a hearing had upon that question.

(Emphasis added.) See also Iowa Code § 812.4 (providing that, upon a finding of incapacity, "no further proceedings shall be taken under the complaint or indictment until the accused's capacity is restored"). However, both our prior interpretations of the SVPA and the statutory language Cubbage invokes as evidence of his statutory right of competency undermine his argument that he holds such a right.

In In re Detention of Garren, we determined "that the Sexually Violent Predator Act is civil in nature, not criminal." 620 N.W.2d at 283. As emphasized above, Iowa Code section 812.3 provides for a competency hearing in a criminal proceeding but makes no provision for a hearing in a civil proceeding. Cubbage offers no other source—including no specific provision of the SVPA—for his alleged statutory right to competency during proceedings under the act.¹ For these reasons, we conclude that Cubbage does not have a statutory right to be competent during the course of proceedings brought pursuant to the SVPA.²

IV. Constitutional Right of Competency.

Cubbage also argues that he has a constitutional right to be competent during the course of his SVPA proceedings. He believes this right is grounded in the substantive due process guarantees of both the state and federal constitutions. See U.S. Const. amend. V, XIV; Iowa Const. art. 1, § 9.³ He supports his position by analogy to cases considering competency that have arisen in the criminal law and extradition contexts and a decision of the Wisconsin Court of Appeals. See State v. Rieflin, 558 N.W.2d 149, 152 (Iowa 1996)

; In re Hinnant, 424 Mass. 900, 678 N.E.2d 1314, 1318 (1997); In re Commitment of

Smith, 229 Wis.2d 720, 600 N.W.2d 258, 261 (App.1999). He also contends that the failure to ensure his competency at this stage of the SVPA proceedings will later undermine the sexually violent predator treatment program in which he would be enrolled to the point of creating another due process violation.⁴

See Iowa Code §§ 229A.7(3), 229A.9.

A familiar jurisprudential process guides our consideration of substantive due process claims:

The first step in analyzing a substantive due process challenge is to identify the nature of the individual right involved. If the asserted right is fundamental, we apply strict scrutiny analysis. We must then determine whether the government action infringing the fundamental right is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest. Alternatively, if we find the asserted right is not fundamental, the statute must merely survive the rational basis test. To withstand rational basis review, there must be a reasonable fit between the government interest and the means utilized to advance that interest.

State v. Hernandez-Lopez, 639 N.W.2d 226, 238 (Iowa 2002) (citations omitted). In undertaking this analysis, we have "traditionally considered the federal and state due process provisions to be equal in scope, import, and purpose" and construed these provisions similarly. Garren, 620 N.W.2d at 284; see also Hernandez-Lopez, 639 N.W.2d at 237

. We do the same here.

Cubbage identifies two individual rights that he argues are fundamental and threatened by operation of the SVPA: the right to be free from bodily restraint and the right, as a mentally ill person, to treatment in an appropriate setting. See Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80, 112 S.Ct. 1780, 1785-86, 118 L.Ed.2d 437, 448 (1992)

; Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 369, 106 S.Ct. 2988, 2992, 92 L.Ed.2d 296, 304 (1986). Yet, under closer scrutiny, it is clear that these two claimed fundamental rights merely underlie Cubbage's broader claim that he has a right to be competent during the trial to determine his sexually violent predator status. This overarching alleged right of competency is directly related to the assessment of whether Cubbage is a sexually violent predator—the process that is at the core of this appeal— and must be focused upon in considering Cubbage's claim that he holds a fundamental right related to his competency.

As noted previously, Cubbage supports his due process arguments by citation to cases in the criminal and extradition case contexts and a case of the Wisconsin Court of Appeals. See Rieflin, 558 N.W.2d at 152

; Hinnant, 678 N.E.2d at 1318; Smith,

600 N.W.2d at 261. However, the specialized, civil nature of the proceedings under the SVPA undermines the application of the extradition and criminal case precedents he seeks to apply. See Garren,

620 N.W.2d at 283-84; see also In re Detention of Ewoldt, 634 N.W.2d 622, 624 (Iowa 2001); In re Detention of Williams, 628 N.W.2d 447, 451 (Iowa 2001)....