In re Devon

Decision Date08 July 2003
Docket Number(SC 16930).
Citation825 A.2d 127
CourtConnecticut Supreme Court
PartiesIN RE DEVON B.

KATZ, J.

The respondent,2 Tammy M., appeals3from the judgment of the trial court committing her infant son, Devon B., to the custody of the petitioner, the department of children and families. The dispositive issue on appeal is the respondent's claim that the court improperly denied her motion to cite in the department of mental retardation as a necessary party.4 We conclude that the court abused its discretion in denying the respondent's motion, and, accordingly, reverse the judgment of the trial court.

The record reveals the following facts and procedural history. The respondent is mentally handicapped, and has been receiving services from the department of mental retardation since 1991. The respondent gave birth to Devon on September 10, 2001, at Yale-New Haven Hospital. At the time of Devon's birth, the respondent was homeless5 and had been working with the department of mental retardation to secure housing for herself and her child, but those efforts had been unsuccessful. Due to her situation, employees of the Yale-New Haven Hospital Women's Center questioned the respondent's ability to care for Devon and contacted the petitioner. On September 13, 2001, pursuant to General Statutes (Rev. to 2001) § 46b-129 (a),6 the petitioner filed a neglect petition and an application for temporary custody in the Superior Court, Juvenile Matters, claiming that the respondent was incapable of providing care and a home for Devon. The application was granted ex parte by the court, Esposito, J., and, on September 21, 2001, a hearing was held on the matter, pursuant to § 46b-129 (b).7 At the hearing, the court appointed an attorney and a guardian ad litem for the respondent, ordered a competency examination, and, by agreement of the parties, sustained the order for temporary custody.

After rejecting an initial competency evaluation as unsatisfactory, the court held a competency hearing on April 11, 2002. At that time, Charles Dike, a physician and forensic psychiatric fellow at Yale University who had examined the respondent, testified that the respondent was not competent to stand trial, but that he could not render an opinion as to whether she was restorable to competency. Thereafter, the court found that the respondent was incompetent, but restorable,8 and ordered her attorney and guardian to take the steps that they thought were necessary to restore her to competency. Additionally, the court set a date for a trial on the neglect petition.

Shortly before the commencement of trial, the respondent filed a motion for a continuance, pursuant to Practice Book § 35-2 (b),9 and a motion to cite in the department of mental retardation as a necessary party, pursuant to Practice Book § 9-18.10 Specifically, the respondent contended that a continuance was necessary so that the petitioner could hire appropriate professionals to restore the respondent to competency. She also asserted that it would not be possible for the court to issue meaningful specific steps to facilitate reunification with her child, as required under General Statutes (Rev. to 2001) § 46b-129 (j), as amended by Public Acts 2001, No. 01-142, § 6,11 without the joinder of the department of mental retardation as a party. The court denied both motions.

At trial, the court heard testimony from Reginald Hayes, the respondent's social worker from the department of mental retardation, who testified that the respondent was unable to earn a living or function on her own. Hayes also testified that the respondent required an assisted living environment, and that the department was attempting to procure such a facility for her, but thus far had been unsuccessful. He further testified that the department had been working to procure vocational training for the respondent.

Megan Pace and Mark Terreri, two social workers employed by the petitioner who had worked with the respondent, testified as to the services that the petitioner could offer the respondent. Pace testified that the petitioner could make housing referrals, but did not in this case "because [the department of mental retardation] was already involved in the case." Pace also indicated that the petitioner had not offered the respondent an opportunity to participate in parenting classes. Pace stated that the respondent was involved in the 'R Kids program, which provides certain parenting services, but that she did not ask 'R Kids to provide the respondent with any parenting classes, and was unaware if 'R Kids could assist the respondent in her parenting. Terreri testified that, although 'R Kids offers parenting classes, he was unaware if the respondent had been involved in those classes. Terreri had, however, contacted the department of mental retardation about parenting classes, and "[it was] going to look into an appropriate class for [the respondent]." Terreri indicated that he did not know if the department had been successful in arranging those classes for the respondent.

At the conclusion of all the testimony, the court adjudicated Devon as "uncared for due to homelessness," and committed him to the care of the petitioner. The court also issued specific steps to the respondent, with the caveat that there was no guarantee that compliance with all of the steps would ensure Devon's return to her. Specifically, the respondent was required to: (1) work with and attend all meetings with the petitioner; (2) inform the petitioner of any changes in her contact information, such as her address and telephone number; (3) attend parental and individual counseling; (4) continue to work with the department of mental retardation; and (5) continue working with the `R Kids program. This appeal followed.

The respondent claims that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied her motion to cite in the department of mental retardation as a necessary party. The petitioner responds that the department is not a necessary party, because it does not have an interest in the neglect proceeding. Moreover, it asserts that under § 46b-129 (b), for an order of temporary custody, the court is required only to issue specific steps to the petitioner and the parents. Put another way, the petitioner maintains that, because the department of mental retardation is not the responsible agency under the statute, and the statute does not require that department's involvement in the specific steps, the trial court properly denied the respondent's motion to cite in the department as a necessary party. We disagree with the petitioner's unduly narrow view of the basis for citing in a necessary party under the facts of this case.

"Necessary parties . . . are those persons having an interest in the controversy, and who ought to be made parties, in order that the court may act on that rule which requires it to decide on, and finally determine the entire controversy, and do complete justice, by adjusting all the rights involved in it. . . . But if their interests are separable from those of the parties before the court, so that the court can proceed to a decree, and do complete and final justice, without affecting other persons not before the court, the latter are not indispensable parties."12 (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Napoletano v. CIGNA Healthcare of Connecticut, Inc., 238 Conn. 216, 225-26 n.10, 680 A.2d 127 (1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1103, 117 S. Ct. 1106, 137 L. Ed. 2d 308 (1997). "A party is deemed necessary if its presence is absolutely required in order to assure a fair and equitable trial. . . . Biro v. Hill, 214 Conn. 1, 6, 570 A.2d 182 (1990)." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Caswell Cove Condominium Assn., Inc. v. Milford Partners, Inc., 58 Conn. App. 217, 224, 753 A.2d 361, cert. denied, 254 Conn. 922, 759 A.2d 1023 (2000).

"The decision whether to grant a motion for the addition of a party to pending legal proceedings rests generally in the sound discretion of the trial court." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Washington Trust Co. v. Smith, 241 Conn. 734, 747, 699 A.2d 73 (1997). Accordingly, "our review . . . is confined to determining whether the trial court abused its discretion. . . . Judicial discretion [however] . . . is always legal discretion, exercised according to the recognized principles of equity. . . . While its exercise will not ordinarily be interfered with on appeal to this court, reversal is required where the abuse is manifest or where injustice appears to have been done." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Rivera v. Veterans Memorial Medical Center, 262 Conn. 730, 742-43, 818 A.2d 731 (2003). "In essence, the trial judge's discretion should be exercised in conformity with the spirit of the law and in a manner to subserve and not to impede or defeat the ends of substantial justice." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Sturman v. Socha, 191 Conn. 1, 7, 463 A.2d 527 (1983).

Applying these principles, and with particular attention to § 46b-129, which requires reasonable efforts be made to reunite a parent and his or her child, we conclude that the department of mental retardation is a necessary party in the present case. Specifically, subsection (b) of the statute provides in relevant part that "upon issuance of an ex parte order, the court shall provide to the commissioner [of children and families] and the parent or guardian specific steps necessary for each to take to address the ex parte order for the parent or guardian to retain or regain custody of the child or youth." (Emphasis added.) General Statutes (Rev. to 2001) § 46b-129 (b).13 Additionally, the statute provides that after a hearing on the order of temporary custody, the court "shall order specific steps the commissioner and the parent or guardian shall take for the parent or guardian to regain or to retain custody of the child or youth . . . ." (Emphasis added.) General Statutes § 46b-129 (d). Furthermore,...

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