In re Dingler's Estate
Decision Date | 13 October 1947 |
Docket Number | No. 69,April Term, 1947.,69 |
Citation | 319 Mich. 189,29 N.W.2d 108 |
Parties | In re DINGLER'S ESTATE. |
Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Appeal from Circuit Court, Ingham County; Paul G. Eger, judge.
Proceeding in the matter of the estate of Mary A. Dingler, deceased, upon complaint filed by Jane A. Dingler and another for a determination that trust provisions of decedent's will are void. From a decree upholding the validity of the will and dismissing the complaint, plaintiffs appeal.
Decree affirmed.
Before the Entire Bench.
H. Eugene Field, of Royal Oak, for plaintiffs and appellants.
Hammond & Schram, of Lansing, for executrix-appellee.
Mary A. Dingler died testate, leaving an estate consisting of real and personal property. Her last will and testament contained the following provision:
‘Third, all the balance of my property of every kind and nature whatsoever, I give, devise and bequeath unto Bertha Maybelle Pless, of Howell, Michigan, but in trust nevertheless, for the benefit of my two granddaughters, Jane A. Dingler and Patricia M. Dingler, as follows:
‘1. After the payment of all texes and expenses, said trustee shall pay to my said granddaughters the net income from trust fund in quarterly installments until my said granddaughters shall reach the age of 30 years, and said trustee may also use such parts of the principal as in her judgment is necessary for the benefit of my said granddaughters in case of an emergency such as illness, accident or extraordinary financial distress.
‘2. Said trustee shall have full custody of all property, comprising said trust estate, with the right to invest and reinvest all personal property, and to sell, contract for sale, mortgage, exchange or lease any real or personal property belonging to my estate, as she may deem proper.
The plaintiffs, twin sisters, are the granddaughters Jane A. Dingler and Patricia M. Dingler named in the will and the sole heirs at law of the testatrix. At age 23 they filed the bill of complaint herein, praying that the court determine the trust provisions of the third paragraph of said will to be void as violative of the laws of the state of Michigan. From a decree upholding the validity of the will in all respects and dismissing the bill of complaint, plaintiffs appeal.
Under the heading of questions involved it is stated in the plaintiffs' brief that ‘the following propositions appear to be involved’:
1. Whether a trust which postpones the absolute enjoyment of property by the beneficiaries until they reach age of 30 years, but gives them the income from the trust until that time, is valid?
2. Whether the trust violates the rule against perpetuities as a suspension beyond lives in being and 21 years?
3. Whether the trust must fail because it involves and is built upon the suspension of the absolute power of alienation of real estate for a period of time not measured by life?
4. Whether the collection of rents and profits and the payment to named beneficiaries in quarterly installments constitutes an accumulation within the meaning of 3 Comp.Laws 1929, § 12957, Stat.Ann. § 26.37?
Our views of the case, as hereinafter expressed, make a consideration of other questions raised by plaintiffs unnecessary to the decision.
1. In connection with the first question, plaintiffs rely on Bennett v. Chapin, 77 Mich. 526, 43 N.W. 893,7 L.R.A. 377, from which they develop the proposition that when any person is entitled absolutely to property, enjoyment thereof may not be postponed; that when an estate granted by devise is absolute, no restriction which can neither promote nor prejudice any interest but that of the devisee may be imposed to limit devisee's power over the estate. In the Bennett case the court found that no contingency could arise by which the devisee and her lawful heirs could be divested of the estate. Such is not the situation in the instant case. In the event either granddaughter dies without issue before reaching the age of 30 years, her share is to be paid to the survivor. Were each of the plaintiffs to be decreed, as prayed in their bill of...
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