In re Dir., TDCJ-CID

• Decision Date: 17 August 2022
• Docket Number: 3:20-cv-487-K-BN
• Parties: DIRECTOR, TDCJ-CID, Respondent. v. ROGER LEE HOOTON TDCJ No. 2173989, Petitioner,
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Texas

ROGER LEE HOOTON TDCJ No. 2173989, Petitioner, v. DIRECTOR, TDCJ-CID, Respondent.

No. 3:20-cv-487-K-BN

United States District Court, N.D. Texas, Dallas Division

August 17, 2022

FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

DAVID L. HORAN, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.

Petitioner Roger Lee Hooton is a Texas prisoner convicted, after entering an open guilty plea, of Injury To A Child with Serious Bodily Injury and sentenced to life in prison. See State v. Hooton, No. F-1675058-P (203rd Jud Dist. Court. Dallas Cnty., Tex., Dec. 13, 2017); Dkt. No 21-1 at 4. His conviction was confirmed on direct appeal as modified to indicate that he plead true to two enhancement paragraphs that the trial court found to be true. See Hooton v. State, No. 05-18-00012-CR (Tex. App. Dallas 2018 - pet ref d); Dkt. No. 18-3 at 1. Hooton filed a petition for discretionary review (PDR), which the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals (“TCCA”) refused. Dkt. No. 18-12 at 1.

Hooton then filed a state writ of habeas corpus. See Ex parte Hooton, WR16-75058-P(A) (Tex. Crim. App. Jan. 28, 2020). While his state habeas application was pending, Hooton filed this federal habeas application. Dkt. No. 3. The Court referred this action to the undersigned United States magistrate judge for pretrial management under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) pursuant to a standing order of reference from United States District Judge Ed Kinkeade.

The Court dismissed Hooton's original federal application without prejudice to his ability to present it again after exhausting his state remedies. Dkt. No. 10. The TCCA subsequently denied Hooton's application without written order on the findings of the habeas trial court without hearing and on the Court's independent review of the record. Ex parte Hooton, WR-91,874-01 (Tex. Crim. App. Mar. 10, 2021); see also Dkt. No. 18-17 at 1.

Hooton then filed an amended federal habeas petition (Dkt. No. 12), and the Court re-opened the case. Dkt. No. 13. The State responded to Hooton's amended application; and Hooton filed a reply. Dkt. Nos. 23, 24. The undersigned now enters these findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recommendation that the Court should deny Hooton's application for a writ of habeas corpus.

Legal Standards

“Federal habeas features an intricate procedural blend of statutory and caselaw authority.” Adekeye v. Davis, 938 F.3d 678, 682 (5th Cir. 2019). In the district court, this process begins - and often ends - with the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) under which “state prisoners face strict procedural requirements and a high standard of review.” Adekeye, 938 F.3d at 682 (citation omitted).

Under the AEDPA, where a state court has already rejected a claim on the merits, a federal court may grant habeas relief on that claim only if the state court adjudication:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); see Adekeye, 938 F.3d at 682 (“Once state remedies are exhausted, AEDPA limits federal relief to cases where the state court's decision was ‘contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States' or was ‘based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented.'” (citation omitted)); see also Allen v. Vannoy, 659 Fed.Appx. 792, 798-99 (5th Cir. 2016) (per curiam) (describing Section 2254(d) as “impos[ing] two significant restrictions on federal review of a habeas claim ... ‘adjudicated on the merits in state court proceedings'”).

And “[t]he question under AEDPA is not whether a federal court believes the state court's determination was incorrect but whether that determination was unreasonable - a substantially higher threshold.” Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 473 (2007); see also Sanchez v. Davis, 936 F.3d 300, 305 (5th Cir. 2019) (“[T]his is habeas, not a direct appeal, so our focus is narrowed. We ask not whether the state court denial of relief was incorrect, but whether it was unreasonable - whether its decision was ‘so lacking in justification' as to remove ‘any possibility for fairminded disagreement.'” (citation omitted)).

A state court decision is “contrary” to clearly established federal law if “it relies on legal rules that directly conflict with prior holdings of the Supreme Court or if it reaches a different conclusion than the Supreme Court on materially indistinguishable facts.” Busby v. Dretke, 359 F.3d 708, 713 (5th Cir. 2004); see also Lopez v. Smith, 574 U.S. 1, 2 (2014) (per curiam) (“We have emphasized, time and time again, that the [AEDPA] prohibits the federal courts of appeals from relying on their own precedent to conclude that a particular constitutional principle is ‘clearly established.'” (citation omitted)).

“A state court unreasonably applies clearly established Supreme Court precedent when it improperly identifies the governing legal principle, unreasonably extends (or refuses to extend) a legal principle to a new context, or when it gets the principle right but ‘applies it unreasonably to the facts of a particular prisoner's case.'” Will v. Lumpkin, 978 F.3d 933, 940 (5th Cir. 2020) (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 407-08 (2000); citation omitted)). “But the Supreme Court has only clearly established precedent if it has ‘broken sufficient legal ground to establish an asked-for constitutional principle.'” Id. (quoting Taylor, 569 U.S. at 380-82; citations omitted).

“For purposes of § 2254(d)(1), an unreasonable application of federal law is different from an incorrect application of federal law.... A state court's determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as fairminded jurists could disagree on the correctness of the state court's decision.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101 (2011) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). “Under § 2254(d), a habeas court must determine what arguments or theories supported or ... could have supported, the state court's decision; and then it must ask whether it is possible fairminded jurists could disagree that those arguments or theories are inconsistent with the holding in a prior decision of [the Supreme] Court.” Id. at 102 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Evans v. Davis, 875 F.3d 210, 216 (5th Cir. 2017) (recognizing that Section 2254(d) tasks courts “with considering not only the arguments and theories the state habeas court actually relied upon to reach its ultimate decision but also all the arguments and theories it could have relied upon” (citation omitted)).

The Supreme Court has further explained that “[e]valuating whether a rule application was unreasonable requires considering the rule's specificity. The more general the rule, the more leeway courts have in reaching outcomes in case-by-case determinations.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 101 (internal quotation marks omitted). And “even a strong case for relief does not mean the state court's contrary conclusion was unreasonable.” Id. at 102. The Supreme Court has explained that, “[i]f this standard is difficult to meet, that is because it was meant to be,” where, “[a]s amended by AEDPA, § 2254(d) stops short of imposing a complete bar on federal court relitigation of claims already rejected in state proceedings,” but “[i]t preserves authority to issue the writ in cases where there is no possibility fairminded jurists could disagree that the state court's decision conflicts with this Court's precedents,” and “[i]t goes no further.” Id. Thus, “[a]s a condition for obtaining habeas corpus from a federal court, a state prisoner must show that the state court's ruling on the claim being presented in federal court was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.” Id. at 103; accord Burt v. Titlow, 571 U.S. 12, 20 (2013) (“If this standard is difficult to meet - and it is - that is because it was meant to be. We will not lightly conclude that a State's criminal justice system has experienced the extreme malfunction for which federal habeas relief is the remedy.” (internal quotation marks, brackets, and citations omitted)).

As to Section 2254(d)(2)'s requirement that a petitioner show that the state court adjudication “resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding,” the Supreme Court has explained that “a state-court factual determination is not unreasonable merely because the federal habeas court would have reached a different conclusion in the first instance” and that federal habeas relief is precluded even where the state court's factual determination is debatable. Wood v. Allen, 558 U.S. 290, 301, 303 (2010). Under this standard, “it is not enough to show that a state court's decision was incorrect or erroneous. Rather, a petitioner must show that the decision was objectively unreasonable, a substantially higher threshold requiring the petitioner to show that a reasonable factfinder must conclude that the state court's determination of the facts was unreasonable.” Batchelor v. Cain, 682 F.3d 400, 405 (5th Cir. 2012) (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted).

The Court must presume that a state court's factual determinations are correct and can find those factual findings unreasonable only where the petitioner “rebut[s]...