In re Doe Children
Decision Date | 16 June 2004 |
Docket Number | No. 24697.,24697. |
Citation | 93 P.3d 1145,105 Haw. 38 |
Parties | In the Interest of DOE CHILDREN: John, Born on January 27, 1987, and Jane, Born on July 31, 1988, minors. |
Court | Hawaii Supreme Court |
Jay K. Goss, Deputy Attorney General (DAG) and Mary Anne Magnier, DAG, for the appellant Department of Education, State of Hawai'i.
Kimberly S. Towler, Appellee-Guardian Ad Litem.
The appellant Department of Education (DOE) appeals from the following orders of the family court of the first circuit, the Honorable John C. Bryant, Jr. presiding: (1) the September 10, 2001 minute order, ordering the Department of Education (DOE) to place John Doe (John) in the eighth grade; and (2) the October 16, 2001 orders concerning the Child Protective Act, denying the motion of the DOE and the Department of Human Services (DHS), filed on October 1, 2001, for reconsideration of the September 10, 2001 minute order.1
The DOE asserts the following on appeal: (1) that the family court erred in finding that it had the authority to enter orders that violated the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 United States Code (U.S.C.) §§ 1400-1487 (2001)2 and the Felix consent decree;3 (2) that the family court erred in finding that it had subject matter jurisdiction to decide the educational placements of children; (3) that, assuming arguendo that the family court did have jurisdiction to review the decisions of the DOE regarding grade placement of children, the family court erred in reviewing John's grade placement in accordance with the "best interest of the child standard," as opposed to the "contrary to law" or "abuse of discretion" standard; and (4) that the issues raised in the present matter are not moot simply because the DOE followed the family court's order and placed John in the eighth grade, inasmuch as (a) the family court could order that John remain in the eighth grade indefinitely and (b) the issue of the family court's subject matter jurisdiction is capable of repetition but, if moot, would evade appellate review.
John's Guardian Ad Litem (GAL) responds as follows: (1) that the family court is authorized by Hawaii Revised Statutes (HRS) chapters 5714 and 5875 to order the DOE to place John in the eighth grade, because, among other things, in the GAL's view, the statutory scheme expressly confers that authority; (2) that administrative review was unavailable and the individualized education program (IEP)6 process was stalemated, effectively denying John his right to due process of law, augmenting the need for the family court to address the problem; and (3) that once the DOE decided not to move John from the eighth to the ninth grade, the conflict became moot.
For the reasons discussed infra in section III, we hold: (1) that GALs do not have standing to pursue an IDEA claim and cannot avail themselves of the "futility exception" to the requirement of administrative exhaustion; (2) that the district family courts may not exercise judicial review of administrative proceedings conducted pursuant to the IDEA; and (3) that the district family courts lack subject matter jurisdiction, under any circumstances, to order the DOE to alter a child's grade placement. Accordingly, we reverse the family court's September 10, 2001 and October 16, 2001 orders.
Pursuant to HRS § 302A-1102 (Supp.2003),7 the DOE is responsible for the administration of the IDEA pursuant to a federal-state statutory and regulatory regime. For present purposes, inasmuch as this court previously discussed the statutory and regulatory background underlying the IDEA in In re Doe Children: Jane, Born on September 2, 1983; and John, Born on May 12, 1983, 96 Hawai'i 272, 30 P.3d 878 (2001) [hereinafter, "In re Doe Children"], we reiterate the following:
Id. at 276-78, 30 P.3d at 882-84 (emphases omitted).
In re Doe Children also noted as follows:
Id. at 287, 30 P.3d at 893 (emphases added). More specifically, HAR § 8-56-72(a) provides that "[a] parent or the [DOE] may initiate a hearing on any of the matters described in section 8-56-68(a)[12] (relating to the identification, evaluation or educational placement of a student with a disability, or the provision of a free appropriate public education to the student)." (Emphasis added.) HAR § 8-56-2 defines the term "parent" as follows:
(Emphasis added.) HAR § 8-56-80 requires that the DOE ...
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