In re O'Donnell

• Decision Date: 19 August 1999
• Docket Number: No. 99-339-M.P.,99-339-M.P.
• Parties: In the Matter of William K. O'DONNELL.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

736 A.2d 75

In the Matter of William K. O'DONNELL.

No. 99-339-M.P.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

August 19, 1999.

Before WEISBERGER, C.J., and LEDERBERG, BOURCIER, FLANDERS, and GOLDBERG, JJ.

David Curtin, Chief Disciplinary Counsel, for petitioner.

Robert E. Craven, Providence, for respondent.

OPINION

PER CURIAM.

This disciplinary case is before the Court on a recommendation of the Supreme Court Disciplinary Board (board) that the respondent, William K. O'Donnell, be suspended from the practice of law. Article III, Rule 6(d), of the Supreme Court Rules of Disciplinary Procedure provides, in pertinent part' that "[i]f the [Disciplinary] Board determines that a proceeding * * * should be concluded by public censure, suspension or disbarment, it shall submit its findings and recommendations, together with the entire record, to this Court. This Court shall review the record and enter an appropriate order." This Court has reviewed the record of the proceedings before the board. The respondent appeared before the Court, with counsel, pursuant to an order to show cause why he should not be disciplined in accordance with the board's recommendations. Having heard the representations of the respondent, it is our opinion that cause has not been shown and that discipline is warranted.

The facts supporting the board's recommendation arose from three complaints filed with the board by clients of respondent. These separate matters were consolidated for hearing before a retired justice of the Superior Court in accordance with Article III, Rule 4(c), of the Supreme Court Rules of Disciplinary Procedure.¹ The hearing justice made extensive and detailed findings of fact which were adopted by the board and submitted to this Court. We summarize those facts relevant to the disposition of this case below.

The first complaint before the board was filed by Thomas W. Quinlan (Quinlan). In April 1989, Quinlan was involved in a physical altercation with his next door neighbor. As a result of the fight, he incurred personal injuries, and retained respondent to bring a claim for damages. On April 6, 1992, respondent filed a civil action in the Superior Court against Quinlan's neighbor, asserting claims for assault and battery and seeking compensation. The neighbor was duly served, and retained his own counsel to defend the suit.

The neighbor in the civil action proceeded to seek discovery. On February 18, 1993, the neighbor served a request for the production of documents on Quinlan in accordance with Rule 34 of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure. The respondent received the document production request. He did not object to the request or produce the requested documents within twenty days, as the rule in effect at that time provided.²

On March 12, 1993, the neighbor filed a motion with the Superior Court to compel a response to the discovery request. This motion was also received by respondent, who did not reply. Accordingly, by court rule, the motion was granted. A copy of the order granting the motion to compel was forwarded to respondent. When no response was forthcoming, the neighbor filed a motion to dismiss Quinlan's civil action for failure to comply with the court's order. This motion was also received by respondent, and again no objection or reply was made. On June 30, 1993, final judgment was entered by the court, dismissing Quinlan's claim.

The respondent's failure to take any action to prevent the dismissal of his client's case was compounded by his failure to advise the client of the status of the proceedings. Quinlan was not made aware that his case was in jeopardy for failure to respond to discovery, and respondent did not advise Quinlan that his case had been dismissed. It was not until three years later that Quinlan learned from a third party that his case was disposed of by order of the court. His learning of this fact led to his filing of the instant disciplinary complaint.

The respondent was charged with violating Article V, Rules 1.3 and 1.4(a)³ of the Supreme Court Rules of Professional Conduct as a result of his ineffective representation of Quinlan. Rule 1.3 provides that "[a] lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client." In his representation of Quinlan, respondent failed to abide by the obligations imposed under Rule 1.3. His neglect of the client's case, and his failure to respond to motions filed by the neighbor and orders issued by the court led to the dismissal of his client's cause of action. Accordingly, we have no choice save to conclude that respondent has violated this rule.

Then existing Rule 1.4(a), now codified as Rule 1.4(b), provides that "[a] lawyer shall keep a client reasonably informed about the status of a matter and promptly comply with reasonable requests for information." The respondent clearly violated this rule by not advising his client of pending discovery issues that affected his cause of action. At a minimum, he was obligated to inform his client that his case was in jeopardy at a time when corrective action could be taken. His failure to inform him of the dismissal was inexcusable. Quinlan was entitled to receive this information from his own attorney, and not a third party unrelated to the action, years after the fact.

The respondent provided testimony in mitigation at the hearing on the Quinlan matter. Among his stated reasons for not aggressively pursuing the case was his belief that Quinlan's injuries were relatively minor; that Quinlan had been the original aggressor in the altercation which led to his injuries. The respondent also expressed a reluctance to forcing a sale of the neighbor's home to satisfy any judgment that might be obtained on Quinlan's behalf. We agree with the hearing judge that these are not mitigating factors. If respondent believed the client's case had limited merit he should have declined the representation or withdrawn from the case pursuant to Rule 1.17 of the Rules of Professional Conduct. The decision to pursue a case to conclusion rests with the client, not the attorney. An attorney cannot simply abandon litigation without the knowledge and consent of his or her client.

The second complaint before the board was filed by Glenn Sousa (Glenn). In September 1980, Irving Sousa (Irving), Glenn's father, was involved in a motor vehicle accident with a bus operated by the Rhode Island Public Transit Authority (RIPTA). Irving retained respondent to represent him in a claim for damages, and suit was filed on Irving's behalf in the Superior Court in 1982. Irving died in 1985 and Glenn was substituted as the party plaintiff. In January 1988, the Superior Court entered a conditional order of default for plaintiffs failure to provide answers to interrogatories. There was no further activity in the case until 1992.

In 1992, RIPTA assigned new counsel to defend the case. Upon taking over the case, counsel for RIPTA spoke to respondent regarding the purportedly unanswered interrogatories, and also requested copies of medical reports and bills. The respondent verbally agreed to provide the requested information, although he advised counsel that he believed the medical records had previously been provided.

The requested documents were not forwarded to counsel. On August 26, 1992, counsel for RIPTA made a written request to respondent for the written interrogatory answers and also submitted a request for the production of documents pursuant to Super.R.Civ.P. 34. The respondent did not object to the request for production, a lapse that set in motion a chain of events which led to the dismissal of the Sousa case.

On November 20, 1992, RIPTA filed a motion to compel the production of documents. Only at that point did respondent object, and by then it was too late. Under Rule 34, a party who fails to object to a discovery request becomes obligated to comply and may not challenge the propriety of the discovery request when an order to compel compliance is sought.

The respondent's objection to the motion was scheduled to be heard on January 13, 1993. However, he did not appear. RIPTA's motion to compel was granted on that date, and on January 14, 1993, a copy of a proposed order was forwarded to respondent. On January 15, 1993, the order was entered by the court. On March 5, 1993, RIPTA filed a motion to dismiss the Sousa complaint, and sent a copy of the dismissal motion to respondent. No objection was filed, and on April 19, 1993, the Superior Court entered an order dismissing the Sousa complaint.

There was a great deal of testimony elicited at the disciplinary hearing regarding the circumstances leading up to the dismissal of the Sousa case and subsequent actions of respondent to vacate that order of dismissal. The respondent testified that he was not present for the January 13, 1993 hearing because he had been called before another court on a different matter. He testified that when he called the clerk to notify the court that he could not be present, he realized the judge presiding over the calendar could not hear the motion as that judge recused herself from hearing all of respondent's matters. He assumed the case would be passed.

We agree with the hearing justice that respondent assumed too much. Whether or not he believed that the motion justice would not hear the matter, he had a duty to his client to insure the client's interests were adequately protected. However, respondent demonstrated his lack of concern for his client when he testified that he did not learn that the motion to compel had been granted until almost one year after the order had been entered. At a minimum, he should have inspected the record or communicated with the clerk to determine the court's decision in respect to the motions.

The respondent also testified that he did not receive copies of the subsequent motions filed by RIPTA which inexorably led to dismissal of the case. This testimony was contradicted by counsel...