In re Dorrance's Estate

Decision Date26 September 1932
Docket Number41
Citation309 Pa. 151,163 A. 303
PartiesDorrance's Estate
CourtPennsylvania Supreme Court

Argued May 23, 1932

Appeal, No. 41, Jan. T., 1932, by Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, from decree of O.C. Delaware Co., March T. 1931, No. 120, setting aside appraisement for transfer inheritance tax purposes, in estate of John T. Dorrance deceased. Reversed.

Appeal from tax appraisement. Before HANNUM, P.J.

The opinion of the Supreme Court states the facts.

Exceptions to appraisement by the executors dismissed. Appeal by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.

Error assigned, inter alia, was decree, dismissing exceptions, quoting it.

The decree of the court below is reversed and the appraisement, subject to modifications indicated by the Commonwealth's stipulation as to the value of the estate, is reinstated; the costs to be paid by appellees.

Wm. A. Schnader, Attorney General, with him Francis T. Anderson, Wm. A. Gray and Herman J. Goldberg, Deputy Attorney General, for appellant. -- The sole question in this case is whether, after 1911, Dr. Dorrance again became domiciled in Pennsylvania, and whether at the time of his death, he was domiciled here. These questions must be decided under the law of Pennsylvania.

Domicile is the place at which a man has fixed his real family home and principal establishment for an indefinite time and not for a merely temporary purpose: Fry's Election, 71 Pa. 302; Carey's App., 75 Pa. 201; Hindman's App., 85 Pa. 466; Price v. Price, 156 Pa. 617; Lowry's Est., 6 Pa.Super. 143; Raymond v. Leishman, 243 Pa. 64; Winsor's Est., 264 Pa. 552; Blessing's Est., 267 Pa. 380; Barclay's Est., 259 Pa. 401.

The term "domicil" is derived from the Latin word meaning home, and the fundamental significance of home may be said to have fixed the fundamental meaning of domicile.

To acquire a domicile of choice, there must concur: (1) Physical presence in the place where the domicile is alleged to have been acquired; (2) Intent to make that place the home of the party. A domicile acquired by the concurrence of these two factors continues until a new one is acquired: Mitchell v. United States, 21 Wallace 350.

Declarations are decisive in determining domicile only if the declarant has two or more real family homes occupied at different seasons of the year: Winsor's Est., 264 Pa. 552; Graham v. Dempsey, 169 Pa. 460.

A domicile of choice once acquired cannot be lost by declarations alone: Dalrymple's Est., 215 Pa. 367; May v. May, 94 Pa.Super. 293.

An existing domicile is presumed to continue until a new one is shown to have been adopted, facto et animo, and, where a change is alleged, the burden of proving it rests upon whoever makes the allegation: Carey's App., 75 Pa. 201; Ennis v. Smith, 14 Howard 400; Mitchell v. U.S., 21 Wallace 350.

The burden of proving a change of domicile rests upon him who asserts it; but the burden shifts when it has been shown that the real family home has been moved: Price v. Price, 156 Pa. 617; Raymond v. Leishman, 243 Pa. 64; Williamson v. Osenton, 232 U.S. 619.

Robert von Moschzisker, with him John B. Hannum, Jr., of Hannum, Hunter, Hannum & Hodge, Schofield Andrews and Ellis Ames Ballard, of Ballard, Spahr, Andrews & Ingersoll, for appellee. -- An established domicile is presumed to continue until its abandonment is proved.

The burden of proving the abandonment of an established domicile and the acquisition of a new one is upon the person asserting the change: Price v. Price, 156 Pa. 617, 626; Barclay's Est., 259 Pa. 401.

A new domicile can be acquired only by physical presence at a new residence plus intent to make that new residence the principal home; but an established domicile can be retained without physical presence or residence, until it be proved that a new domicile has been acquired: Price v. Price, 156 Pa. 617; Barclay's Est., 259 Pa. 401; Lowry's Est., 6 Pa.Super. 143; Matter of Martin, 173 A.D. 1; Hindman's App., 85 Pa. 466; Dalrymple's Est., 215 Pa. 367.

A person is free to choose his domicile effectively provided the requisites of domicile exist in relation to the place of his choice. His choice of a new domicile will not be effective unless and until he establishes, through physical presence in the new locality, a residence with intent to make it his principal home. His choice to keep an established domicile will be effective, without physical presence or residence in that locality, up to the time, if ever, that he is proved to have abandoned it: Barclay's Est., 259 Pa. 401; Lowry's Est., 6 Pa.Super. 143.

An intention to stay at a given place indefinitely may fix that place, as one's domicile, but this depends upon other attending circumstances, which are absent in this case.

Before FRAZER, C.J., SIMPSON, KEPHART, SCHAFFER, MAXEY, DREW and LINN, JJ.

OPINION

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE FRAZER:

This case comes before us on appeal by the Commonwealth from a decree of the Orphans' Court of Delaware County setting aside an appraisement of the estate of John T. Dorrance for transfer inheritance tax purposes. The decree of the court below was based upon a finding, after hearing, that decedent was domiciled in Cinnaminson Township, Burlington County, New Jersey, and not in Pennsylvania.

The appeal was taken under provisions of the Act of June 20, 1919, P.L. 521, and a preliminary question arises as to the scope of review in cases of this character. Appellees, who are executors of Dorrance's Estate, contend that although, under the Act of April 18, 1919, P.L. 72, the testimony becomes part of the record, upon an appeal on certiorari "we cannot weigh conflicting evidence further than to determine whether the decree appealed from is supported by any evidence and whether the court or judge had jurisdiction or authority to do the act complained of." Citing Walker's App., 294 Pa. 385, 389. While, in appeals on certiorari, this court will not usually overrule findings of fact which have evidence to support them, nevertheless we will review conclusions of law based upon undisputed facts: Hand's Case, 266 Pa. 277. The determination of decedent's domicile in this appeal is a conclusion of law, based upon facts, most of which are undisputed. Furthermore, this case falls within the rule stated in Hindman's App., 85 Pa. 466, 470, that where a finding of fact is simply a deduction from other facts reported by the tribunal under review, and the ultimate fact in question is purely the result of reasoning, we are competent to judge of its correctness and will draw our own conclusions from the facts as reported.

Dr. John T. Dorrance was born November 11, 1873, in Bristol, Bucks County, Pennsylvania, where he spent the early years of his life with his parents. In 1895 he graduated from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, after which he attended the University of Gottingen in Germany, where he took his doctor's degree in chemistry. In 1897 he entered the employ of the Joseph Campbell Preserve Company in Camden, New Jersey, in which company his uncle, Arthur Dorrance, had a substantial interest. He remained with that firm and its corporate successor, the Campbell Soup Company, until his death.

At the start of his business career he established his residence at a boarding house in Camden, living there until 1905, when he moved to the Robeson Apartments in the same city. In 1906 he married Miss Ethel Mallinckrodt of Baltimore, Maryland, who survives him as his widow. Dorrance and his wife made their home at the Robeson Apartments until 1908, at which time they moved to Philadelphia and remained in that city until 1911. In 1909 Dorrance purchased a country place known as Pomona Farms in Cinnaminson Township, Burlington County, New Jersey. He later conveyed the title to this property to the Campbell Preserve Company and thereafter leased the premises from that company. Upon completion of alterations to the leased property, Dorrance and his family entered into possession on May 7, 1911, and the Commonwealth concedes that from this date until November 14, 1925, decedent's domicile was in New Jersey.

During the years which passed from the time of his first association with the Campbell Company, Dorrance rose rapidly in the management and control of the business. The company itself grew into one of the largest canning and preserving enterprises in this country. At the time of Dorrance's death in September, 1930, it employed between four and five thousand persons, and annually consumed in the business enormous quantities of vegetables and other farm products. Dorrance became the head of the company and from 1915 until his death was the owner of all its capital stock. In 1922 the company was reorganized as the Campbell Soup Company, a New Jersey corporation with offices in Camden. At the time of his death Dorrance had amassed an immense fortune, which both parties agree is to be estimated at a figure exceeding one hundred fifteen million dollars.

In 1925 he purchased a large and attractive estate known as "Woodcrest" located in Radnor, Delaware County, Pennsylvania, in the suburbs of Philadelphia. The property was taken in the joint names of Doctor and Mrs. Dorrance, and, including subsequent additions of surrounding acreage and furnishing of the mansion, the cost was approximately a million dollars. Speaking of the purchase of the Radnor Estate, Mrs. Dorrance, the widow, testified as follows:

"It was purchased so that our children would be more in contact with children and where they could go to school more easily with children with their prospects in life, and where we could do some entertaining for my oldest daughter who was then coming of age and who mingled with the world; and where I . . . would be nearer my associates." In 1925 the children comprised four...

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