In re Dorris, 4-14-0303

• Citation: 2015 IL App (4th) 140303 -U
• Decision Date: 24 February 2015
• Docket Number: NO. 4-14-0303,4-14-0303
• Parties: DAVID V. DORRIS and LEIGH ANNE DORRIS, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. STACEY LYNCH-F ORTIER, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

2015 IL App (4th) 140303-U

DAVID V. DORRIS and LEIGH ANNE DORRIS, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. STACEY LYNCH-F ORTIER, Defendant-Appellant.

NO. 4-14-0303

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FOURTH DISTRICT

February 24, 2015

NOTICE

This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

Appeal from Circuit Court of McLean County

No. 12LM348

Honorable Michael L. Stroh, Judge Presiding.

PRESIDING JUSTICE POPE delivered the judgment of the court.

Justices Turner and Steigmann concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶ 1 Held: The trial court did not err in allowing plaintiffs to recover unpaid rent as part of their complaint for possession brought pursuant to the Forcible Entry and Detainer Act.

¶ 2 In May 2012, plaintiffs, David V. Dorris and Leigh Anne Dorris, filed a complaint against defendant, Stacey Lynch-Fortier, pursuant to the Forcible Entry and Detainer Act (Act) (735 ILCS 5/9-101 to 5/9-321 (West 2012)), seeking (1) possession of a house they rented to defendant and (2) damages for unpaid rent. The trial court granted possession to plaintiffs and entered a judgment against defendant in the amount of $35,546.

¶ 3 Defendant appeals, arguing the trial court erred where (1) plaintiffs were barred from recovering rent under the Act and (2) it ignored the statute of frauds in awarding plaintiffs more than 12 months' rent. We affirm.

¶ 4 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 5 On July 1, 2009, David Dorris, an attorney and partner at the Dorris Law Firm, and his wife, Leigh Anne Dorris, purchased a house in Bloomington, Illinois. Defendant, who had been renting the house from its prior owner, is the sister of plaintiff Leigh Anne Dorris and the sister-in-law of plaintiff David Dorris. According to plaintiffs, on August 1, 2009, defendant entered into an oral lease agreement to rent the house from plaintiffs on a month-to-month basis at a rate of $2,539 per month. Defendant is an attorney and, at the time, worked as a partner at David's law firm.

¶ 6 On March 26, 2012, plaintiffs served defendant with a 30-day notice to terminate the parties' lease agreement. Defendant did not vacate the premises and on May 4, 2012, plaintiffs filed a complaint for forcible entry and detainer against defendant, seeking, inter alia, possession of the property and past-due rent. Plaintiffs alleged defendant "failed to pay rent in the amount of $2,539 per month, for June 2011, July 2011, August 2011, September 2011, October 2011, November 2011, December 2011, January 2012, February 2012, March 2012, April 2012, and May 2012." As of May 4, 2012, the amount of rent due and owing was $30,468. Plaintiffs requested a judgment against defendant for $30,468 plus any rent payments due after May 4, 2012.

¶ 7 On September 5, 2012, defendant filed her amended answer to plaintiffs' complaint, denying the existence of a lease agreement or that she failed to pay rent. According to defendant's answer, because "there was never a lease agreement, oral or written, between the parties," there could not be a lease violation. Defendant also argued the lack of any leaseagreement, as well as plaintiffs' failure to mitigate their damages, were affirmative defenses to plaintiffs' complaint.

¶ 8 On August 9, 2012, the trial court held a bench trial on the issue of possession. Following the presentation of evidence by both parties, the court found in favor of plaintiffs and ordered defendant to vacate the premises. The issue of possession is not at issue on appeal.

¶ 9 On June 12, 2013, the trial court held a bench trial on the issue of damages. During the hearing, Patrick D. Busch, the president of Heartland Bank and Trust Company, testified on plaintiffs' behalf. Busch testified defendant inquired about financing to purchase the house at issue, which she had been renting from Dr. Jerald Bratberg. Dr. Bratberg was selling the house and defendant did not want to move. However, Busch told defendant he could not provide her with financing due to her very poor credit score.

¶ 10 David Dorris, who had accompanied defendant to the bank, testified he was surprised by how harsh Busch had been with her. David told Busch they "had to do something. [Defendant] has got to have a place to live. She works for me. She is my sister-in-law. We have got to find a way to keep her in that house." After Busch advised David not to cosign a note for defendant, they discussed the possibility of plaintiffs purchasing the house and renting it to defendant. According to David, defendant could continue to live there until she was able to obtain financing to purchase it herself. Plaintiffs purchased the house for $345,000, with a down payment of approximately $69,000. David testified he believed Dr. Bratberg had been charging defendant $2,000 per month to rent the house. David told defendant he would "figure out a way" to increase her monthly partnership draw from the law firm to make up for the increase in rent. The monthly rent amount was set at $2,539, which was the approximate amount of the monthlymortgage. It is undisputed the parties did not have a written agreement memorializing this arrangement. However, plaintiffs introduced into evidence copies of a series of monthly checks written over a 19-month period from defendant to David for $2,539 each.

¶ 11 Jill Kallestad, an employee of the Dorris Law Firm, testified she would receive a check from defendant each month to give to David Dorris. According to Kallestad, defendant referred to those payments as "rent checks."

¶ 12 Plaintiffs also introduced into evidence defendant's April 26, 2011, application to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) to make installment payments for taxes she owed. The application listed defendant's various assets and expenses, including housing costs. Defendant's signature on the application appeared below a certification, which stated, "Under penalties of perjury, I declare that to the best of my knowledge and belief this statement of assets, liabilities, and other information is true, correct, and complete." Attached to that application was an affidavit signed by David Dorris stating the following regarding defendant's housing costs: "The agreement between [plaintiffs] and [defendant] is an oral month to month agreement and requires that [defendant] pay as rent the sum of $2,539.00 per month." The affidavit was admitted into evidence over defendant's objection.

¶ 13 At the close of plaintiffs' case, defendant filed a motion for a directed finding. Defendant argued section 9-201 of the Act sets forth the only five scenarios in which a landlord may recover unpaid rent in conjunction with a forcible entry and detainer complaint and none of those situations existed in this case. Plaintiffs responded a claim for rent may be joined in a complaint for forcible entry and detainer pursuant to section 9-106 of the Act. According to plaintiffs' argument, section 9-201 only applied to certain limited scenarios where a landownercould make a claim for rent in the absence of a specific agreement for payment. The trial court reserved its ruling on defendant's motion and allowed the parties to submit briefs on the issue at a later date. The parties had no objection to this procedure.

¶ 14 Defendant testified David had actually purchased the home for her as compensation for work she had performed for the firm. According to defendant's testimony, "[t]he $70,000 [(referring to the down payment amount)] was payment to me, but [David] was going to put it as a down payment on the house. But it was my understanding it was my money, my compensation, my house." Defendant explained David "didn't like my husband at all. And we were going through a divorce. So when—at some point when that was all said and done, we were going to put the house fully in my name. But this was Dave's way of protecting this $70,000 from my husband." Defendant admitted writing checks to David but maintained they were mortgage payments and not rent checks. Defendant also admitted submitting David's affidavit to the IRS as part of her application for installment payments but stated its contents were untrue and she only submitted it because David "forced" her to do so.

¶ 15 On rebuttal, David testified he encouraged defendant to work with the IRS regarding her tax debt. David explained he had his own tax issue and had also submitted an installment-payment application but emphasized defendant had her own personal responsibility to the IRS. According to David's testimony, he provided the affidavit for defendant after the IRS questioned the amount of rent defendant was actually paying per month. David testified defendant was present when he dictated the affidavit and "knew what it was." According to David, the affidavit was provided to protect defendant from the IRS and was of no benefit tohim. David also testified when defendant was able to obtain her own financing on the house, he did not plan to ask for his $70,000 down payment back.

¶ 16 In its detailed September 19, 2013, order, the trial court first addressed defendant's motion for a directed finding and found the following:

"The defendant relies on Section 9-201 of the [Act]. The defendant believes that section 9-201 sets forth the only instances when rent may be recovered. As the court inferred [during the hearing,] this interpretation seems to fly in the face of common practice under the Act. The court is more persuaded by the plaintiff[s'] argument that [section] 9-201 addresses additional circumstances beyond those addressed in section 9-106. *** Therefore, the defendant's motion for [a] directed [finding] is denied."

¶ 17 Turning to the merits, the trial court determined it was clear from the evidence presented an oral contract for a month-to-month lease of the house existed and the rental rate was $2,539 per month. The court found defendant had breached the parties' agreement by failing to pay rent for a period of 14 months. Accordingly, the court awarded pla...