In re Dow Corning Corp.
Decision Date | 30 July 1999 |
Docket Number | Bankruptcy No. 95-20512. |
Citation | 237 BR 380 |
Parties | In re DOW CORNING CORPORATION, Debtors. |
Court | U.S. Bankruptcy Court — Eastern District of Michigan |
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Barbara J. Houser, Craig J. Litherland, David Ellerbe, Sheinfeld, Maley & Kay, P.C., Dallas TX, for debtor.
Ogden N. Lewis, Donald S. Bernstein, Michael S. Flynn, Davis Polk & Wardwell, Sheryl L. Toby, Michael J. Friedman, Honigman, Miller, Schwartz & Cohn, New York City, for the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors.
David S. Rosner, Kasowitz, Benson, Torres & Friedman LLP, for Creditors Angelo, Gordon & Co., Appaloosa Management, L.P., Franklin Mutual Advisors, New York City, for Creditors.
Ralph R. Mabey, LeBoeuf, Lamb, Greene & MacRae, L.L.P. Management Co. LLC and Halcyon Offshore Management Co. LLC, Kenneth H. Eckstein, Jeffrey S. Trachtman, Kramer Levin Naftalis & Frankel LLP, Salt Lake City, UT, for the Official Committee of Tort Claimants.
Mark I. Bane, Kelley Drye & Warren LLP, New York City, for Chase Manhattan Bank.
Patrick A. Murphy, Murphy Sheneman, Julian & Rogers P.C., New York City, for Bank of America NT & SA.
Alan M. Gelb, Jones Hirsch Connors & Bull P.C., New York City, for Bear, Stearns Investment Products, Inc.
Robert S. Hertzberg, Hertz, Schram & Saretsky, P.C., Bloomfield Hills, MI, for
Davidson Kempner International Advisors, L.L.C. and M.H.M. Davidson Co., Inc.
Glenn E. Siegel, Winthrop, Stimson, Putnam & Roberts, New York City, for Bank of New York.
The Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors ("U/S CC") and certain creditors holding general unsecured claims of a commercial nature objected to confirmation of the plan of reorganization filed jointly by the Debtor and the Official Committee of Tort Claimants (the "Proponents").1 One of the objections turns on the interpretation of the term "interest at the legal rate" found in 11 U.S.C. ? 726(a)(5). Because the Court agrees with the Proponents that the term refers to the federal judgment rate, 28 U.S.C. ? 1961(a), this objection is overruled.
The U/S CC and a number of its constituents assert that the Joint Plan cannot be confirmed because it fails to satisfy ? 1129(a)(7)'s "best-interest-of-creditors" test. This section reads as follows:
11 U.S.C. ? 1129(a)(7). Under this statute the bankruptcy court must compare what a dissenting claimant would receive if the estate were liquidated under the provisions of chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code with what the claimant would receive under the plan. If the creditor would get more in a chapter 7 liquidation, then the plan cannot be confirmed. See 7 Collier on Bankruptcy ? 1129.037b (15th ed. rev.1999). The Commercial Creditors base their assertion that the plan fails this test on the chapter 7 distribution statute, which states:
11 U.S.C. ? 726(a) (emphasis added). The parties assume, as does the Court for purposes of this opinion, that there will be sufficient funds on hand to pay interest under the fifth paragraph. While the parties agree that ? 1129(a)(7) requires the plan to provide interest on unsecured creditors' claims at the legal rate, they disagree over what such compliance entails.
The Proponents argue that ? 726(a)(5) calls for interest at the rate determined under 28 U.S.C. ? 1961(a). The Commercial Creditors vehemently disagree, arguing instead that the correct post-petition interest rate is the rate provided for in the contract or, if no contract rate exists, at the otherwise applicable statutory rate.
In resolving this conflict, there are two ways to proceed. One is to begin with 28 U.S.C. ? 1961(a), and decide whether that statute governs allowed claims in bankruptcy. See Part II. The alternative is to focus on ? 726(a)(5) and consider whether that statute incorporates 28 U.S.C. ? 1961(a). See Part III. But regardless of the road traveled, the destination is the same ?€” ? 726(a)(5) requires post-petition interest to be calculated pursuant to 28 U.S.C. ? 1961(a).
Section 1961 provides that "interest shall be allowed on any money judgment in a civil case recovered in a district court." 28 U.S.C. ? 1961(a). The "interest shall be calculated from the date of the entry of the judgment, at a rate equal to the coupon issue yield equivalent . . . of the average accepted auction price for the last auction of fifty-two week United States Treasury bills settled immediately prior to the date of the judgment." Id.
As indicated, the Commercial Creditors argue that the post-petition interest rate should be determined by some source other than this statute, such as state law or the terms of the parties' contract. Courts, however, must invoke ? 1961(a) in those circumstances in which the statute applies. See Bricklayers' Pension Trust Fund v. Taiariol, 671 F.2d 988, 989 (6th Cir.1982) (). Therefore, the Court may consider "alternatives" to ? 1961(a) only if the claims of the Commercial Creditors are not governed by the statute. And, as will be explained, we believe that the statute is in fact controlling.
Section 1961 does not specifically mention the "Bankruptcy Court." But "bankruptcy judges . . . constitute a unit of the district court" for the judicial district in which they serve. 28 U.S.C. ? 151. Thus it would seem that the reference in ? 1961(a) to the "district court" includes bankruptcy courts as well. In re Goldblatt Bros., Inc., 61 B.R. 459, 466 n. 4 (Bankr. N.D.Ill.1986).
Noteworthy in this regard is subsection (c) of ? 1961, which limits the statute's applicability with respect to certain judgments, and provides that certain other types of judgments are excluded from ? 1961 altogether. Since judgments issued by bankruptcy courts are not mentioned in this subsection, the logical inference to draw is that they are subject to the full thrust of the statute. Cf. Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 188, 98 S.Ct. 2279, 57 L.Ed.2d 117 (1978) (). That inference is particularly appropriate here since there is no apparent reason why a judgment creditor's right to interest should turn on whether the judgment issued in the district court or a unit thereof. Cf. United States v. Ron Pair Enters., 489 U.S. 235, 243, 109 S.Ct. 1026, 103 L.Ed.2d 290 (1989) .
And in fact, bankruptcy cases routinely hold that "? 1961(a) applies to bankruptcy proceedings." In re Pester Refining Co., 964 F.2d 842, 849 (8th Cir. 1992); Ocasek v. Manville Corp. Asbestos Disease Compensation Fund, 956 F.2d 152, 154 (7th Cir.1992); In re Resyn Corp., 945 F.2d 1279, 1284 (3d Cir.1991); Grant v. George Schumann Tire & Battery Co., 908 F.2d 874, 883 (11th Cir.1990); In re Thrall, 196 B.R. 959,...
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