In re Duran
| Decision Date | 25 September 2015 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:14-CV-2047 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Pennsylvania |
| Parties | THOMAS V. DURAN, Plaintiff v. COUNTY OF CLINTON, JEFFREY SNYDER, ROBERT SMELTZ, and JOEL LONG, Defendants |
(Chief Judge Conner)
Plaintiff Thomas V. Duran ("Duran") filed the above-captioned action alleging a retaliation claim under the Family and Medical Leave Act ("FMLA"), procedural due process claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and state law claims for wrongful termination, breach of contract, and tortious interference with contract. Presently before the court is a motion (Doc. 5) to dismiss filed by defendants County of Clinton, Jeffrey Snyder, Robert Smeltz, and Joel Long. For the reasons that follow, the court will grant the motion in part and deny it in part.
From 1993 to 1997, and from 2000 to 2012, Duran was employed by Clinton County, Pennsylvania ("the County") as Warden of the Clinton County Correctional Facility ("the Facility"). (Doc. 1 ¶¶ 6, 16). At all times relevant to the complaint, Jeffrey Snyder served as Prison Board Chairman and Vice-Chairman of the ClintonCounty Board of Commissioners. (Id. ¶ 9). Robert Smeltz was Chairman of the Clinton County Board of Commissioners and a member of the Clinton County Prison Board. (Id. ¶ 11). Joel Long was a member of both the Clinton County Board of Commissioners and the Clinton County Prison Board. (Id. ¶ 12). Duran avers that the County and the Board of Commissioners "were ultimately responsible for all hiring and firing decisions of any County employee." (Id. ¶ 7).
On December 7, 2007, the County entered into an employment contract with Duran. (Doc. 1-2). The employment contract contained the following pertinent provisions:
(Id. at 3-5). Duran contends that his employment contract was in force until November 4, 2012, and that it renewed on that day "for an additional five (5) year period." (Doc. 1 ¶¶ 44-45).
Between 2003 and 2012, Duran underwent a number of medical procedures for which he was provided accommodations by the County. (Id. ¶¶ 31, 35-37). These accommodations included permitting Duran "to periodically work from home" and"to take leave as necessary to receive medical care and treatment." (Id. ¶ 31). Shortly after Snyder's term on the Board of Commissioners commenced in January of 2012, Snyder questioned Duran about the amount of hours he worked on-site at the Correctional Facility. (Id. ¶ 33). Snyder then demanded Duran's physical presence there for at least eight hours per day. (Id.) Duran replied that he "would do his best" and that he could fulfill his duties from his nearby home. (Id. ¶ 33).
On October 5, 2012, Duran sent a memo to members of the Clinton County Prison Board requesting medical leave from October 29, 2012 through November 4, 2012. (Id. ¶ 39). "A few days" later, Duran was advised that he needed to attend a public prison board meeting on October 24, 2012. (Id. ¶ 40). Duran alleges that at the meeting, Snyder made or directed to be made a motion to suspend Duran's employment, effective on October 25, 2012, and to terminate Duran's employment on November 6, 2012. (Id. ¶ 42). Duran's termination was confirmed at the next scheduled Board of Commissioners meeting. (Id. ¶ 43). Duran's termination became effective on either November 5 or November 6. (Id. ¶¶ 26, 45).2
Duran avers that between 2000 and 2012, he "only received exemplary reviews of his performance" as Warden. (Id. ¶ 24). Duran asserts that his medical status "had not been a concern" prior to Snyder's election to the Board of Commissioners. (Id. ¶ 34). The County did not make a finding of Duran's dishonesty or gross malfeasance prior to his termination. (Id. ¶ 48). In his complaint, Duran alleges that his termination resulted from "Mr. Snyder's and or[sic] the Commissioners' disdain for" his health-related accommodations and request for medical leave. (Id. ¶ 30).
On October 23, 2014, Duran filed the complaint (Doc. 1) against the County and Snyder, Smeltz, and Long. Duran asserts against all defendants a retaliation claim under the FMLA, procedural due process claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and a wrongful termination claim. (Id.) Duran also asserts a state law claim for tortious interference with contract against Snyder, Smeltz, and Long, as well as a claim for breach of contract against the County. (Id.) On December 22, 2014, defendants filed the instant motion (Doc. 5) to dismiss all claims pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). The motion is fully briefed and ripe for disposition.
The court has jurisdiction over the instant matter because the complaint presents a question of federal law. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Duran alleges that defendants deprived him of his constitutional rights under color of state law. See 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(3). Duran also asserts a cause of action under federal statutory law. See 29 U.S.C. § 2617(a). The court exercises supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims for wrongful termination, breach of contract, and tortious interference with contract. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367. These claims are related to and share a "common nucleus of operative facts" with the federal law claims, thus forming part of the same case or controversy. Lyons v. Whisman, 45 F.3d 758, 759-60 (3d Cir. 1995) (quoting United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1996)).
Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides for the dismissal of complaints that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). When ruling on a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the court must "accept all factual allegations as true, construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and determine, whether under any reasonable reading of the complaint, the plaintiff may be entitled to relief." Gelman v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 583 F.3d 187, 190 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Phillips v. Cty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 233 (3d Cir. 2008)); see also Kanter v. Barella, 489 F.3d 170, 177 (3d Cir. 2007) (quoting Evancho v. Fisher, 423 F.3d 347, 350 (3d Cir. 2005)). In addition to reviewing the facts contained in the complaint, the court may also consider "matters of public record, orders, exhibits attached to the complaint and items appearing in the record of the case." Oshiver v. Levin, Fishbein, Sedran & Berman, 38 F.3d 1380, 1384 n.2 (3d Cir. 1994); Pension Ben. Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993).
Federal notice and pleading rules require the complaint to provide "the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Phillips, 515 F.3d at 232 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). To test the sufficiency of the complaint, the court must conduct a three-step inquiry. See Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 130-31 (3d Cir. 2010). In the first step, "the court must 'tak[e] note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim.' " Id. at 130 (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 675 (2009)). Next, the factual and legal elements of a claim should be separated; well-pleaded facts must be accepted as true, while mere legal conclusions may be disregarded. Id. at131; see also Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210-11 (3d Cir. 2009). Once the court isolates the well-pleaded factual allegations, it must determine whether they are sufficient to show a "plausible claim for relief." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556); Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (). A claim "has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. When the complaint fails to present a prima facie case of liability, courts should generally grant leave to amend before dismissing a complaint. See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002); Shane v. Fauver, 213 F.3d 113, 116-17 (3d Cir. 2000).
Defendants contend that Duran's factual averments, even accepted as true, are insufficient to establish his entitlement to relief under the FMLA, Section 1983 and the Fourteenth Amendment, and state law governing tortious interference with contract, wrongful termination, and breach of contract disputes. The court will address these issues seriatim.
Defendants argue that Duran has not set forth sufficient factual allegations to sustain a retaliation claim under the FMLA.3 (See Doc. 6 at 8-10). Specifically, defendants assert that Duran's complaint "fails to plead any facts giving rise to an inference of a causal link between his FMLA request and his separation of employment." (Id. at 10). Duran responds that he has adequately pleaded causation because his complaint shows the "unusually suggestive timing" of his suspension and termination in relation to his requested leave period. (Doc. 7-1 at 16-17).
The FMLA was designed in part "to balance the demands of the workplace with the needs of families." 29 U.S.C. § 2601(b)(1). Under the FMLA, an eligible employee is entitled to "12 workweeks of leave during any 12-month period" for certain qualifying events. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(D). Retaliation claims...
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