In re Dyer's Estate, 22763.

Citation297 P. 196,161 Wash. 498
Decision Date30 March 1931
Docket Number22763.
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of Washington
PartiesIn re DYER'S ESTATE. v. ROBERTS. DYER

Department 1.

Appeal from Superior Court, King County; Chester R. Hovey, Judge pro tem.

Petition by James Eugene Dyer against John W. Roberts, administrator with will annexed of the estate of Mary Y. Dyer, deceased, to compel the administrator to make an additional inventory and administer additional property and to have order approving final account and decreeing final distribution vacated. From the decree, both parties appeal.

Affirmed in part and remanded with directions.

Kahin &amp Carmody and Orlo B. Kellogg, all of Seattle, for appellant dyer.

Roberts Skeel & Holman, of Seattle, for respondent Roberts.

MITCHELL J.

Mary Y Dyer died leaving a will which was duly admitted to probate. John W. Roberts was appointed by the court, qualified, and is acting as administrator with the will annexed. In the course of the administration he filed a final account and petition for distribution, and, on the day fixed for the hearing, of which statutory notice was given, the court made and entered an order approving the final account and decreeing distribution of the property. Within a reasonable time thereafter James Eugene Dyer, a son of the testatrix and a beneficiary under her will, filed in the probate cause a petition, which was later amended, to compel the administrator to make an additional inventory and administer upon certain two hundred shares of the capital stock of the Puget Sound Bridge & Dredging Company, a corporation, as he (the petitioner) had requested and demanded of the administrator at a time prior to the filing of the final account and petition for decree of distribution. The petitioner also sought to have the order approving the final account and decreeing distribution, theretofore made, vacated, and later, before the trial of the present controversy, the petitioner filed a motion on statutory grounds to vacate the decree of distribution. By the answer of the administrator with the will annexed it was admitted that the two hundred shares of stock referred to had not been inventoried nor administered upon, certain allegations of the petition were denied, and then affirmatively it was alleged that the petitioner was estopped by certain specified conduct set out in the answer from questioning the inventory that had been filed, and, further that the order approving the final account and decreeing distribution constituted a bar to the present proceeding on behalf of the petitioner.

Upon the trial the court decided that the two hundred shares of stock in controversy had not been mentioned in the prior proceedings and that the decree of distribution did not, and does not, purport to deal with them; that prior to the filing of the final account the present petitioner informed the administrator that the two hundred shares of stock should be inventoried, to which the administrator replied that he would not do so; that thereafter, and during the absence of the petitioner from the state, the final account and petition for distribution were heard and disposed of, it appearing that there was, without fault, a misunderstanding on his part as to what, if any, proceedings would be had in the estate during his absence, and that he had no actual notice of the hearing; and the court further decided that there was no controversy between the parties over the distribution of any of the property mentioned in the decree of distribution. The trial court was also of the opinion that the petitioner was not estopped from maintaining these proceedings. These findings, we think, were sustained by a preponderance of the evidence. The court's written conclusion was followed by a judgment that was entered to the same effect that the motion and petition to vacate the decree of distribution 'be and it is hereby denied for the reason that the said decree of distribution does not attempt in any manner to dispose of the title of the two hundred shares of stock in the controversy between the parties, and it is further adjudged that sufficient cause exists for the vacation of...

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6 cases
  • Hilton v. Mumaw
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit
    • 4 de agosto de 1975
    ...102 P.2d 219, 224, 225 (1940); Rosenberg v. Rosenberg, 141 Wash. 86, 91-92, 250 P. 947, 949 (1926); See In re Estate of Dyer, 161 Wash. 498, 500-02, 297 P. 196, 197-98 (1931). As will subsequently appear, See section I.C.1. Infra, it may be reasonably inferred that W. C. Mumaw never had not......
  • Mason v. Pelkes
    • United States
    • Idaho Supreme Court
    • 23 de julho de 1936
    ... ... 10. A ... decree in probate, distributing an estate, is a final ... adjudication, subject to appeal, of the rights of the ... distributees to receive ... ...
  • In re Christianson's Estate
    • United States
    • Washington Supreme Court
    • 31 de dezembro de 1942
  • Phillips' Estate, In re, 32812
    • United States
    • Washington Supreme Court
    • 6 de janeiro de 1955
    ...117, 248 P. 386. It is not conclusive, however, as to property which has been fraudulently withheld from administration (In re Dyer's Estate, 161 Wash. 498, 297 P. 196); and, of course, when it is entered upon stipulation or agreement, it may be attacked for fraud inducing the agreement.' (......
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