In re Ebiala

Decision Date08 January 2020
Docket NumberCivil Action No. 19-mc-00070-KLM
PartiesIN RE MICHAEL OBERE EBIALA
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Colorado
ORDER

ENTERED BY MAGISTRATE JUDGE KRISTEN L. MIX

This matter is before the Court on Michael Obere Ebiala's ("Ebiala") Motion to Correct Year of Birth on Certificate of Naturalization [#1]1 (the "Motion"). Mr. Ebiala is a naturalized United States citizen who is originally from Nigeria. Proceeding pro se, he is seeking to amend his birth year on his Certificate of Naturalization from 1954 to 1950 and has provided some evidence in support in connection with his Motion [#1] opening the case.

Here, the Court addresses three preliminary issues: (1) whether the Court has jurisdiction over Mr. Ebiala's request; (2) whether Mr. Ebiala is required to serve a respondent/defendant before the Court may take action on his request; and (3) whether this case was properly filed as a "miscellaneous" action rather than as a "civil action."

I. Factual Background

Mr. Ebiala was born in Nigeria, a country which did not have a birth registry at the time when he was born. See Aff. of Ebiala [#1-1] at 2. Mr. Ebiala was naturalized as a United States citizen on July 15, 1988. See Certificate of Naturalization [#1-2]. Hebelieved for his entire life that his birth year was 1954, but through discussion with his younger brother in May of 2019, he realized that his belief might have been incorrect. Id. at 2. After additional research, Mr. Ebiala now believes that his birth year was 1950, and he has provided the evidence he has gathered to that effect. See [#1-1, #1-3, #1-4, #1-5, #1-6].

Mr. Ebiala first made the request to amend his Certificate of Naturalization with the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services ("USCIS"), which responded by letter directing him to file a motion to amend his Certificate of Naturalization with the United States District Court for the District of Colorado. Despite Mr. Ebiala's Florida residency, amendment of naturalization certificates issued by the federal courts based on naturalization petitions filed prior to October 1, 1991 (i.e., before the effective date of the Immigration Act of 1990), must be made by the issuing court. See Certificate of Naturalization [#1-2] (dated July 15, 1988); 8 C.F.R. § 338.5(b); see [#1-7]. In this case, the District of Colorado was the issuing court.

The letter to Mr. Ebiala first quotes § 340(j) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended (1986), which provides:

Nothing contained in this section shall be regarded as limiting, denying, or restricting the power of any naturalization court, by or in which a person has been naturalized, to correct, reopen, alter, or vacate its judgment or decree naturalizing such person, during the term of such court or within the time prescribed by the rules of procedure or statutes governing the jurisdiction of the court to take such action.

8 U.S.C. § 1451(j) (1986); see [#1-7] at 2. The letter then quotes 8 C.F.R. § 338.5(b):

Court-issued certificates. If the certificate was originally issued by a clerk of court under a prior statute . . . , USCIS will authorize the issuing court to make the necessary correction and to place a dated endorsement of the court on the reverse of the certificate explaining the correction. Theauthorization will be filed with the naturalization record of the court, the corrected certificate will be returned to the naturalized person, and the duplicate will be endorsed to show the date and nature of the correction and endorsement made, and then returned to USCIS. No fee will be charged the naturalized person for the correction.

8 C.F.R. § 338.5(b) (2011).2 The letter then directed Mr. Ebiala to "file a motion with [the United States District Court for the District of Colorado] and then if the judge deems it proper, they may issue an order making this change." Id. Mr. Ebiala followed these instructions by filing the Motion [#1] in this District.

II. Legal Authority

"For most of the Country's history, the authority to naturalize aliens belonged to the state and federal courts." Manoukian v. Sec. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Security, No. 6:13-cv-1422-Orl-31TBS, 2013 WL 8635081, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 15, 2013) (citing Holmgren v. United States, 217 U.S. 509, 516-17 (1910)); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1421(a) (1988) (stating that the federal courts had "[e]xclusive jurisdiction to naturalize persons as citizens of the United States"). Under the process in effect when Mr. Ebiala was naturalized, "an immigrant who wished to become a United States citizen had to file a petition in federal district court or a state court of general jurisdiction." Manoukian, 2013 WL 8635081, at *2. "If the court decided to grant the petition, the petitioner would appear before an open session of the court and take the oath of renunciation and allegiance." Id. "The court would then find that the petitioner resided within its territorial jurisdiction and met the requirements to be naturalized, and order that the petitioner be admitted as a citizen." Id.Thus, "naturalization orders . . . were unquestionably court orders." Id. (citing Tutun v. United States, 270 U.S. 568, 577 (1926) (a naturalization petition is a "case" within the meaning of Article III of the Constitution)). "Following the proceeding, the clerk of the court would issue the newly-admitted citizen a certificate of naturalization." Manoukian, 2013 WL 8635081, at *2; 8 U.S.C. § 1449 (1988) (stating that a newly-admitted citizen "[was] entitled upon such admission to receive from the clerk of such court a certificate of naturalization").

The naturalization process changed with the Immigration Act of 1990. As part of that Act, Congress transferred "[t]he sole authority to naturalize persons as citizens of the United States" from the judicial branch to the executive branch, effective for all petitions filed on or after October 1, 1991. 8 U.S.C. § 1421(a). As a result, "the federal courts effectively lost jurisdiction over naturalization proceedings." Teng v. USCIS, 820 F.3d 1106, 1109 (9th Cir. 2016).

III. Analysis
A. Jurisdiction

The Court first addresses whether it may exercise jurisdiction over Mr. Ebiala's request to amend his Certificate of Naturalization. 1mage Software, Inc. v. Reynolds & Reynolds Co., 459 F.3d 1044, 1048 (10th Cir. 2006) ("Federal courts have an independent obligation to determine whether subject-matter jurisdiction exists, even in the absence of a challenge from any party, and thus a court may sua sponte raise the question of whether there is subject matter jurisdiction at any stage in the litigation." (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 506 (2006)). The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals does not appear to have addressed the jurisdictional issue presented here in the precise circumstances underlying this case.

1. 8 U.S.C. § 1451(j) (1986)3

Prior to amendment via enactment of the Immigration Act of 1990, which went into effect on October 1, 1991, 8 U.S.C. § 1451(i) (1988) provided:

Power of court to correct, reopen, alter, modify or vacate judgment or decree: Nothing contained in this section shall be regarded as limiting, denying, or restricting the power of any naturalization court, by or in which a person has been naturalized, to correct, reopen, alter, modify, or vacate its judgment or decree naturalizing such person, during the term of such court or within the time prescribed by the rules of procedure or statutes governing the jurisdiction of the court to take such action.

Thus, prior to amendment of 8 U.S.C. § 1451(i), "district courts had jurisdiction to naturalize citizens and also had statutory authority to amend naturalization orders." Matter of Shrewsbury, 77 F.3d 490, 1996 WL 64988, at *1 (9th Cir. 1996). The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Matter of Shrewsbury held that this authority under the former statute continued after the effective date of the Immigration Act of 1990: "Because the order naturalizing [a] petitioner was a court order, the [district] court had jurisdiction under the prior statute to amend it." Id. A number of other courts to consider the issue have also determined that the courts retain authority under former 8 U.S.C. § 1451(i) to amend a naturalization certificate that was issued by court order. See, e.g., Ampadu v. USCIS, 944 F. Supp. 2d 648, 653-56 (C.D. Ill. 2013); Kennedy v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., 871 F. Supp. 2d 996, 1007 (N.D. Cal. 2012); In re Chehrazi, No. C 12-80110 WHA, 2012 WL 3026537, at *23 (N.D. Cal. July 24, 2012); Kouanchao v. U.S. Citizenship &Immigration Servs., 358 F. Supp. 2d 840, 843 (D. Minn. 2005).

At least one judge in the District of Colorado has held similarly. In Boiko v. Holder, No. 12-cv-02541-JLK, 2013 WL 709047, at *1 (D. Colo. Feb. 26, 2013), the Court held that "[t]he Immigration Act of 1990 transferred the power to naturalize from the judiciary to the executive branch, but nowhere in this shift did the Immigration Act eradicate a court's essential authority to deal with orders it issued under the prior scheme." Therefore, the Court held that "we have jurisdiction to amend naturalization certificates that this court issued before October 1991 . . . ." Boiko, 2013 WL 709047, at *1;4 see also McKenzie v. USCIS, 761 F.3d 1149, 1156 (10th Cir. 2014) ("[T]he predicate for [federal courts'] authority to correct or modify naturalization documents was eliminated by the removal of jurisdiction to enter naturalization judgments (except, of course, for those persons who had filed for naturalization before October 1, 1991)."). Accordingly, the Court determines at this early, preliminary stage of the case that it has jurisdiction to amend a certificate of naturalization that was issued by court order pursuant to former statute 8 U.S.C. § 1451(j) (1986).5

2. 8 C.F.R. § 334.16(b)

The Court must briefly address one additional issue here, the repeal of 8 C.F.R. § 334.16(b) and its effect on jurisdiction, because some cour...

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