In re Edwards, 85 B 10104 (PBA).
Decision Date | 05 July 1985 |
Docket Number | No. 85 B 10104 (PBA).,85 B 10104 (PBA). |
Citation | 50 BR 933 |
Parties | In re Clarence C. and Michelle A. EDWARDS, Debtors. |
Court | U.S. Bankruptcy Court — Southern District of New York |
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Clarence C. and Michelle A. Edwards, pro se.
Budget and Credit Counseling Services, Inc., New York City (James Bickford, New York City, of counsel), for debtors.
Ira S. Greene, New York City, Trustee.
Pursuant to the order to show cause a hearing was held on March 20, 1985. The Debtors appeared at the hearing and submitted two affidavits. No testimony was taken at the hearing. At the hearing's conclusion, the court took the matter under advisement. Based upon the supplemental information provided by the two affidavits and for the reasons which follow, the court has determined that the Debtors' petition is not a substantial abuse of Chapter 7 within the meaning of Code § 707(b) and that the petition should not be dismissed.
Code § 707(b) was added by the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984 ("BAFJA").1 It provides as follows:
This section inferentially imposes a duty on the bankruptcy court to review petitions filed under Chapter 7 to determine whether the granting of a discharge would be a "substantial abuse of the provisions of this chapter".2
The phrase substantial abuse is not defined in the Bankruptcy Code. Resort to dictionary definitions is therefore appropriate and helpful. The term "abuse" has been defined as:
"To make excessive or improper use of a thing, or to employ it in a manner contrary to the natural or legal rules for its use; to make an extravagant or excessive use, as to abuse one\'s authority." Black\'s Law Dictionary (1968).
The term "substantial" includes among its meanings real, not seeming or imaginary, that of moment or important. See Webster's New International Dictionary (2d Edition).
In this court's view, Congress intended the courts to apply Code § 707(b) as a type of motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim for relief. It is to be used to deny Chapter 7 relief to those persons whose pleadings in the form of the petition, schedules, statement of affairs and statement of income and expenses fail to reflect a need for the relief being sought because they do not reflect that the debtor is now suffering or will suffer in the near future from any meaningful economic hardship. The "substantial abuse" provision of Code § 707(b) is in the nature of a threshold predicate to entitlement to Chapter 7 relief.
To date there is apparently only one reported case considering Code § 707(b), In re Bryant, 47 B.R. 21 (Bankr.W.D.N.C. 1984). Cf. In re Wright, 48 B.R. 172 (Bankr.E.D.N.C.1985) ( ). In Bryant, the bankruptcy judge dismissed Bryant's Chapter 7 petition upon finding that Bryant had failed to list a number of credit card debts, misstated or misrepresented his expenses and could, with "only a modicum of restraint," 47 B.R. 23, have made payments of at least $800.00 per month under a Chapter 13 plan (totalling $28,000.00 over 3 years or 67% of his unsecured obligations).
"This case was brought, not because of the Debtor\'s unemployment or an inability to pay on his part, but because he simply desired to shuck a couple of his debts. His testimony was that he had previously guaranteed a number of business debts and he filed this bankruptcy in order to `get rid\' of the same. * * * "* * * While Congress intended to give Debtors relief in such cases, it was not the design of the Bankruptcy laws to allow the Debtor to lead the life of Riley while his creditors suffer on his behalf. "Therefore, in light of the Debtor\'s purpose in filing this petition; his fraudulent and misleading omissions in his petition; his attempts to pad his expenses statement in order to misrepresent his financial position; and the relatively exorbitant lifestyle which he seeks to maintain while taking shelter from his creditors under the Bankruptcy provisions, the court concludes that to allow this petition would be a substantial abuse of the provisions of Chapter 7." 47 B.R. at 24, 26.
In adopting a bankruptcy law pursuant to the authority granted to it by the United States Constitution, Congress has concluded that no abuse exists when an honest debtor seeks to avail himself of a fresh start without the encumbrance of life-long debt through obtaining a bankruptcy discharge. The matter was well put by the United States Supreme Court in Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 245, 54 S.Ct. 695, 699, 78 L.Ed. 1230 (1934):
This court has determined that it is reasonable to conclude that a debtor whose income and reasonable expenses indicate that he could pay over three years an amount equal to 100% of the principal owed to his creditors is not suffering from sufficient economic hardship to warrant use of Chapter 7.3 That debtor ought to use either Chapter 13 or forego bankruptcy relief and rely on the protections afforded under the state and federal wage garnishment and other laws.4
The court has concluded that it should set this rather high screening standard for a debtor's entitlement to Chapter 7 relief for several reasons. Firstly, even a debtor who can pay 100% of the principal of his debts over three years is not making a 100% payment to his creditors since their claims no doubt include interest at rate that may be as high as 20%. Any payments made under a Chapter 13 plan would be further diminished by the amount of the trustee's fees. Secondly, at the time of initiating any inquiry, the court can only make preliminary estimates that reflect the possibility of such a payment. Further information received will refine the picture, generally by increasing expenses and reducing income. Thus, if a lower threshold inquiry level is set, the court is likely to find itself dismissing most of its inquiries as the debtor's future ability to pay becomes entirely problematic. Futile inquiries are a burden on the court, an imposition on the debtor and his counsel, and unlikely to encourage greater respect for the bankruptcy system by creditors, or debtors. Thirdly, the presumption in favor of granting the relief sought by the debtor which Congress incorporated into Code § 707(b) means that, although the court should examine all the facts, including the reasons why the debtor has chosen to file, the court should accord great weight to the debtor's own assessment of his financial condition. Fourthly, and perhaps as significantly, the so-called Purdue Study used by the consumer credit industry in lobbying Congress for bankruptcy reform concluded that 30% of all Chapter 7 debtors could have repaid their debts in full over 3 years.5 This standard should thus cause inquiry to be made into a substantial number of Chapter 7 filings. The 100% of principal standard would...
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