In re Emoni W. Et Al.*, s. 32453
Decision Date | 28 June 2011 |
Docket Number | Nos. 32453,32454.,s. 32453 |
Citation | 129 Conn.App. 727,21 A.3d 524 |
Court | Connecticut Court of Appeals |
Parties | In re EMONI W. et al.* |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Michael F. Miller, for the appellants (minor children in AC 32453).Don M. Hodgdon, New London, for the appellant (respondent father in AC 32454).Tammy Nguyen–O'Dowd, assistant attorney general, with whom, on the brief, were George Jepsen, attorney general, Richard Blumenthal, former attorney general, and Susan T. Pearlman, assistant attorney general, for the appellee (petitioner in both cases).Sarah Healy Eagan filed a brief for the Center for Children's Advocacy, Inc., et al., as amici curiae.BISHOP, LAVINE and BEACH, Js.**LAVINE, J.
The respondent father (respondent) and his minor children (children),1 Emoni W. and Marlon W., appeal from the judgments of the trial court finding that the requirements of the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children (compact), General Statutes § 17a–175, apply to the placement of a child with an out-of-state, noncustodial parent. On appeal, the respondent and the children argue that the court erred in finding that, pursuant to § 17a–175,2 it could not place the children with the respondent without an approved compact study from the commonwealth of Pennsylvania, the permanent residence of the respondent.3 Because we conclude that the respondent's and children's claims are moot and do not fall under any exceptions to the mootness doctrine, we lack subject matter jurisdiction to address their claims on appeal.
The following facts and procedural history are relevant to these appeals. The petitioner, the commissioner of children and families, became involved with the children because on April 28 and May 19, 2010, their mother 4 failed to provide adequate supervision of them. On July 9, 2010, the mother was arrested and charged with four counts of risk of injury to a child, possession of crack cocaine with intent to sell, possession of marijuana with intent to sell, possession of a hallucinogenic with intent to sell and operating a drug factory. Also on July 9, 2010, the children were removed from the mother's home under a ninety-six hour hold pursuant to General Statutes § 17a–101g.
On July 12, 2010, the court granted the petitioner's ex parte motions for orders of temporary custody as to the children. On this date, the petitioner, for the first time, became aware of the respondent. The petitioner learned that the respondent was living in Pennsylvania and that he previously had been responsible for the children's care for extended periods of time during school holidays. The petitioner also became aware that the respondent wanted to have the children live with him after their mother had been arrested.
On July 16, 2010, a preliminary hearing was held concerning the petitioner's orders for temporary custody. At this hearing, the respondent argued that § 17a–175 did not apply to him as a noncustodial parent and requested that the court allow him to take custody of the children. The court did not rule in response to the respondent's request but, instead, scheduled oral argument on the issue of whether § 17a–175 applied to an out-of-state, noncustodial parent. On July 23, 2010, the court concluded that § 17a–175 does apply to the placement of children with out-of-state, noncustodial parents. The children and the respondent filed separate appeals from this decision on July 30 and August 5, 2010, respectively.5
At a hearing on September 16, 2010, the court reported that it received the results of the compact study, authorizing placement of the children with the respondent in Pennsylvania on the condition that the court order six months of protective supervision. On this same date, the court adjudicated the children neglected and granted joint legal custody of the children to the respondent and the mother with physical custody in the respondent. The court also ordered protective supervision for a period of six months with the respondent.6 At the time of oral argument in this court, the children were living with the respondent.7
Before we may address the respondent's and children's claims that § 17a–175 does not apply to out-of-state, noncustodial parents, we must first address whether we are precluded from reviewing their claims because they are moot. The issue of mootness was not addressed by the parties in their initial briefs or at oral argument. We ordered, sua sponte, the parties to submit supplemental briefs addressing whether the claims were moot and, if so, whether review was still permissible under the “capable of repetition, yet evading review” exception to the mootness doctrine.
The parties all agree that the claims are moot; however, they also all contend that the claims ought to be reviewed because they are capable of repetition, yet evading review. See Loisel v. Rowe, 233 Conn. 370, 382–83, 660 A.2d 323 (1995). Notwithstanding the parties' common position, we must conduct our own independent analysis. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) D'Auria v. Solomine, 107 Conn.App. 711, 714–15, 947 A.2d 345 (2008).
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 714, 947 A.2d 345.
We agree with the parties that the respondent's and children's claims are moot because the compact study, recommending placement of the children with the respondent, was completed and the court granted the respondent legal and physical custody of the minor children during the pendency of these appeals. Furthermore, as noted, the period of protective supervision ordered by the court as a result of the compact study expired on March 18, 2011. There is, therefore, no practical relief that we can provide to the respondent or the children. We recognize, however, that review of the claims is still possible if they meet the requirements of an exception to the mootness doctrine. The respondent and the children argue that their claims can be reviewed under the “capable of repetition, yet evading review” exception. We disagree.
Loisel v. Rowe, supra, 233 Conn. at 382–83, 660 A.2d 323.
“[A] party typically satisfies [the first] prong if there exists a ‘functionally insurmountable time [constraint]’ ”; Dutkiewicz v. Dutkiewicz, 289 Conn. 362, 367, 957 A.2d 821 (2008); or “the challenged action had an intrinsically limited lifespan.” Loisel v. Rowe, supra, 233 Conn. at 383, 660 A.2d 323. In other words, “[t]his requirement is satisfied when there is a strong likelihood that the inherently limited duration of the action will cause a substantial majority of cases raising the same issue to become moot prior to final appellate resolution.” Burbank v. Board of Education, 299 Conn. 833, 840, 11 A.3d 658 (2011).
We conclude that the first prong of Loisel is not satisfied because the challenged action here, the application of § 17a–175 to out-of-state, noncustodial parents, is not inherently limited in duration and will not cause a substantial majority of cases raising the same issue to become moot prior to final appellate resolution. An order requiring that a compact study must be completed before a child can be placed with an out-of-state, noncustodial parent has an indefinite lifespan every time the receiving state disapproves of the transfer. Compare In re Fabian A., 106 Conn.App. 151, 155–56, 941 A.2d 411 (2008) ( ).
The respondent and the children argue that the first prong of Loisel is satisfied because orders of temporary custody are, by their very nature, limited in duration. The respondent and the children mischaracterize the challenged action that we must review under the first prong of Loisel. Although the court granted the petitioner's ex parte motions for orders of temporary custody as to the children on July 12, 2010, that is not the challenged action before this court. We are being asked to address whether the court's conclusion that § 17a–175 applies to the placement of children with...
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In re Emoni W., No. 18841.
...concluded that the appeals were moot and, accordingly, dismissed them for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. In re Emoni W., 129 Conn.App. 727, 736, 21 A.3d 524 (2011). This court then granted the respondent's petition for certification to appeal to this court, limited to the following is......
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In re Emoni W.
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