In re Enlarging, Extending & Defining the Corporate Limits & Boundaries of Canton Madison Cnty.
| Decision Date | 06 May 2021 |
| Docket Number | NO. 2019-AN-00733-SCT,2019-AN-00733-SCT |
| Court | Mississippi Supreme Court |
| Parties | In the MATTER OF the ENLARGING, EXTENDING AND DEFINING the CORPORATE LIMITS AND BOUNDARIES OF the CITY OF CANTON MADISON COUNTY, Mississippi In the Matter of the Incorporation of the City of Gluckstadt, Mississippi: Peco Foods, Inc., Kingston Place, LLC, Kingston Place II, LLC, RCT, LLC, Lula B. Covington, LP, and LLM, Inc. v. City of Canton, Mississippi and Ron Hutchinson v. Gluckstadt Incorporators |
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANTS: JOHN PRINCE MARTIN, Canton, SHELDON G. ALSTON, Jackson, C. R. MONTGOMERY, WILLIAM DEMENT DRINKWATER, Canton, OHN ERNEST WADE, JR.
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES: J. CHADWICK MASK, JERRY L. MILLS, Ridgeland, JOHN PRESTON SCANLON, Ridgeland, KIMBERLY CELESTE BANKS, Jackson, ACOB THOMAS EVANS STUTZMAN, Jackson
EN BANC.
BEAM, JUSTICE, FOR THE COURT:
¶1. This appeal arises from two cases filed in the Chancery Court of Madison County, consolidated by the chancery court on its own order. Petitioners from the community of Gluckstadt sought incorporation of approximately 10.8 square miles of incorporated territory in Madison County. The City of Canton petitioned for annexation of approximately 6.7 square miles of unincorporated territory in Madison County, consisting of five proposed areas (Areas 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5). The chancery court entered a final decree, granting, in part, the Gluckstadt Incorporators’ petition. The decree granted Canton's proposed annexation of Areas 1 and 2 but denied Canton's proposed annexation of Areas 3, 4, and 5.
¶2. Canton and Ron Hutchinson (Incorporation Objectors) appeal the chancery court's grant of incorporation, claiming the chancery court lacked jurisdiction over the incorporation petition because it did not include two-thirds of the signatures of the qualified electors residing in the proposed incorporation area. Various citizens (Annexation Objectors) appeal the chancery court's grant of annexation of Areas 1 and 2. Canton cross-appeals the chancery court's denial of annexation as to Areas 3, 4, and 5.
¶3. Finding no manifest error with the chancery court's final decree in both cases, we affirm.
¶4. On January 31, 2017, the Gluckstadt Incorporators filed a petition seeking to incorporate a new City of Gluckstadt. Subsequently, Canton filed its own petition for annexation on February 13, 2017. There was some overlap between the territory sought to be incorporated as Gluckstadt and the territory sought for annexation by Canton. The proposed incorporation area (PIA) consists of 10.8 square miles in Madison County, 1.1 square miles of which Canton also sought to annexed.
¶5. The chancellor consolidated the cases and then bifurcated the matter into two separate trials, the first trial for purely jurisdictional purposes related to the incorporation and the second on the merits of both the incorporation petition and the annexation petition.
¶6. The chancellor found that the jurisdictional requirements were met and that the City of Gluckstadt should be incorporated, but he reduced the total amount of territory sought by the Incorporators. The chancellor also awarded Canton annexation in Areas 1 and 2 but denied annexation as to Areas 3, 4, and 5.
¶7. The Incorporation Objectors appeal the chancery court's grant of incorporation. The Annexation Objectors appeal the chancery court's annexation of Areas 1 and 2, and Canton cross-appeals the chancery court's denial of annexation as to Areas 3, 4, and 5.
¶8. "This Court reviews the chancellor's findings for manifest error as to whether a petition for incorporation is legally sufficient." City of Jackson v. Byram Incorporators , 16 So. 3d 662 (Miss. 2009) (citing City of Pascagoula v. Scheffler , 487 So. 2d 196, 199 (Miss. 1986) ). "In explaining the standard of review, this Court has stated that it ‘cannot overturn the decree of a chancellor unless it finds with reasonable certainty that the decree is manifestly wrong on a question of law or interpretation of facts pertaining to legal questions.’ " Id. (quoting Scheffler , 487 So. 2d at 200 ).
¶9. "Petitioners for incorporation have the burden to prove sufficiency of the petition." Fletcher v. Diamondhead Incorporators , 77 So. 3d 92, 95 (Miss. 2011) (citing Boling v. City of Jackson (In re City of Pearl) , 279 So. 2d 590, 592 (Miss. 1973) ). The requirements of Mississippi Code Section 21-1-13 "must be strictly complied with." Myrick v Incorporation of Stringer , 336 So. 2d 209, 210 (Miss. 1976) (citing City of Jackson v. Boling , 241 So. 2d 359 (Miss. 1970) ).
Whether the Gluckstadt Incorporators’ petition contained the signatures of two-thirds of the qualified electors residing in the proposed incorporation area as required by Mississippi Code Section 21-1-13.
¶10. Mississippi Code Section 21-1-13 sets forth eight jurisdictional requirements for a petition seeking the incorporation of a new municipality. Miss. Code Ann. § 21-1-13 (Rev. 2015). Specifically at issue in this appeal is that a petition for incorporation "shall be signed by at least two-thirds of the qualified electors residing in the territory proposed to be incorporated." Miss. Code Ann. § 21-1-13(3) (Rev. 2015).
¶11. The chancellor noted in his order that all other requirements were not actively contested by the Incorporation Objectors, and, thus, the requirement primarily disputed was the signatures of two-thirds of the qualified electors residing in the PIA as of the date of the filing of the initial petition on January 31, 2017. The chancellor ultimately found, however, that all statutory requirements for the trial court's jurisdiction were proved by the Incorporators by a preponderance of the evidence.
¶12. Canton and Mac Haik (who is no longer a party to these proceedings) sought interlocutory appeal and a stay of the remaining merits trial. This Court denied both, and the matter proceeded to trial on the merits. The Incorporation Objectors now appeal as to jurisdiction with regard to the incorporation.
¶13. The Incorporation Objectors present three arguments that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to hear the incorporation matter. First, the Incorporation Objectors argue that the amended petition is not signed by any qualified electors because the signatures were not attached to the amended complaint. Second, the Incorporation argue, even if the Court looks to the original petition, the Incorporators failed to capture a complete January 31, 2017 voter roll, so it is unknown how many qualified electors resided in the PIA as of the petition date. Last, the Incorporation Objectors argue that the chancellor wrongly concluded that 140 voters appearing on the Madison County voter rolls had moved, died, or otherwise were unqualified to vote. We address each argument in turn.
¶14. First, the Incorporation Objectors contend that the Incorporators’ petition is not signed by any qualified electors. The Incorporators first filed their petition, which had attached numerous pages of signatures, on January 31, 2017. The City of Canton filed a motion to dismiss the Incorporators’ initial petition on the basis that the metes-and-bounds legal description did not match their own map or accurately reflect the boundaries proposed to constitute the new city. The Incorporators filed a motion to amend, which the chancellor granted, and the Incorporators then filed their amended petition.
¶15. The Incorporation Objectors contend that the amended petition is flawed because it did not contain signatures. Further, the amended petition does not refer to, adopt, or incorporate by reference the original petition, and the amended petition is not signed by any qualified electors. The Incorporation Objectors quote the following: "[A]n amended complaint superseded the original complaint and renders it of no legal effect unless the amended complaint specifically refers to and adopts or incorporates by reference the earlier pleading." Sledge v. Grenfell Sledge & Stevens, PLLC , 263 So. 3d 655, 661 (Miss. 2018) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting King v. Dogan , 31 F.3d 344, 346 (5th Cir. 1994) (per curiam)).
¶16. In Sledge , Sledge was dismissed from his firm and sued. Id. at 659. After Sledge filed his original complaint, the firm moved to dismiss under Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which the court granted. Id. at 661. Sledge then filed an amended complaint, which the parties litigated and was the subject of the appeal. Id. at 662. On appeal, Sledge argued the trial court erred by dismissing his original complaint. Id.
¶17. This Court held that the dismissal of Sledge's original complaint was not proper for appeal. Id. Sledge filed an amended complaint, which contained an identical request and proceeded to fully litigate the amended complaint. Id. He never attempted to file an appeal of the dismissal of the original complaint. Id. Further, he fully acquiesced to the dismissal and filed his amended complaint. Id. "Since Sledge filed an amended complaint and since his original complaint was superseded by his amended complaint, the issue is moot because nothing exists for the Court to reinstate should the trial court have erroneously dismissed the complaint." Id. at 661-62.
¶18. Here, the Incorporators did not abandon the first complaint. The Incorporators brought a motion for leave of court under Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) to amend their petition for the sole and limited purpose of correcting the legal description to match the map. The chancellor's order granting the Incorporators’ motion specified that limited purpose of the amendment.
¶19. This Court has held that corrections that were at best technical deficiencies were amendable in accordance with Rule 15(a). Schmidt v. City of Jackson (In re City of Ridgeland) , 494 So. 2d 348, 354 (Miss. 1986). The rule provides that an amendment relates back to the original pleading. Miss. R. Civ. P. 15(c).
¶20. In Byram Incorporators , the...
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