In re Enright

• Decision Date: 31 January 1887
• Parties: In re ENRIGHT.
• Court: Vermont Supreme Court

37 A. 1046

69 Vt. 317

In re ENRIGHT.

Supreme Court of Vermont. Chittenden.

Jan. Term. 1887.

Petition to the supreme court to set aside its judgment of disbarment against John J. Enright. Dismissed.

Roberts & Roberts, for petitioner.

R. E. Brown, State's Atty.

ROSS, C. J. This is a petition of John J. Enright, praying this court to set aside its judgment of disbarment rendered against him at its January term, 1895. In it he sets forth the judgment of disbarment, and refers to it, as found in 67 Vt. 351, 31 Atl. 786, and says "that he has realized and appreciated, to the fullest extent, and with the most intense feeling, all the grave consequences of his removal; that he has suffered greatly from loss of business and the consequent taking from him of his means of livelihood that has been the result of it; * * * that to continue his punishment would be unnecessary to his discipline, or for public example, and would be unnecessarily severe for the offense charged." This is the only ground for relief set forth in his petition. In support of his petition he has filed petitions signed by a majority of the bar in every county of the state, and in many instances by nearly the entire bar of the county. These petitions are Identical in form and language, and state as the reason for supporting his petition that they believe that he "has been sufficiently punished for the cause for which he was removed, and that the ends of justice will be met if he is reinstated in said office." These petitions of the bar, so numerously signed, demand, and have received, the careful consideration of this court. It is to be observed that the petition of Mr. Enright. and the petitions of the bar in support of it, all proceed upon the ground that the judgment of disbarment had for its sole object the punishment of Mr. Enright for the offense found against him as an attorney, and that the punishment has been sufficiently severe for that single offense. The argument in the petitioner's behalf by the oldest practicing member of the bar has proceeded upon that ground alone. We do not doubt but that this court has the power, on a proper cause shown, to set aside the judgment of disbarment. To determine whether a proper cause is shown to set that judgment aside, we must consider the object and purpose of admission to the bar, and the scope and end to be accomplished by a judgment of disbarment. By admission to the bar the applicant becomes an officer of the court endowed with certain peculiar privileges, which amount to a sacred trust...