In re Epting

• Decision Date: 28 December 2012
• Docket Number: 1–12–0068.,Nos. 1–11–3727,s. 1–11–3727
• Parties: In re Marriage of Brenda C. EPTING, Petitioner–Appellee, and Pedro A. Epting, Respondent–Appellant.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

2012 IL App (1st) 113727
994 N.E.2d 535
373 Ill.Dec. 766

In re Marriage of Brenda C. EPTING, Petitioner–Appellee,
and
Pedro A. Epting, Respondent–Appellant.

Nos. 1–11–3727, 1–12–0068.

Appellate Court of Illinois,
First District.

Dec. 7, 2012.
Rehearing Denied Dec. 28, 2012.

[994 N.E.2d 536]

Paul L. Feinstein, Paul L. Feinstein, Ltd., Chicago, for appellant.

Joseph G. Phelps, Rinella & Rinella, Ltd., Chicago, for appellee.

OPINION
Justice R. GORDON delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

[373 Ill.Dec. 767]¶ 1 On March 3, 2009, petitioner Brenda Epting filed a petition for dissolution of marriage in the circuit court of Cook County. The Eptings' two children were both emancipated. On July 13, 2011, the parties entered into an oral marital settlement agreement which was included in the prove-up for the dissolution. That same day, the parties reduced the oral marital settlement agreement to writing and signed it. The written settlement agreement provided that respondent Pedro Epting would pay $3,967 per month for maintenance payments, based in part on Pedro's annual income of $119,678 and Brenda's annual income of $12,840. The [373 Ill.Dec. 768]

[994 N.E.2d 537]

written settlement agreement included a 50% income-sharing plan, suggested by the trial court during a pretrial conference.

¶ 2 A month after signing the written settlement agreement, Pedro filed a motion on August 11, 2011, to “vacate the prove-up and other relief,” which the trial court denied. On October 11, 2011, the trial court entered a judgment dissolving the parties' marriage and incorporating the written marital settlement agreement. The dissolution judgment was signed by each party's attorney. Pedro's attorney then filed a motion to withdraw, and on October 27, 2011, Pedro filed a pro se motion to reconsider the denial of Pedro's previous motion to vacate the prove-up. The trial court denied Pedro's pro se motion to reconsider on November 17, 2011, after holding a hearing on the motion.

¶ 3 Pedro now appeals, claiming: (1) that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to dissolve the marriage and (2) that even if the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction, it erred in denying his motion to reconsider. For the following reasons, we affirm.

¶ 4 BACKGROUND ¶ 5 I. Pleadings

¶ 6 Brenda filed her petition for dissolution of marriage on March 3, 2009. In her petition, she alleges that she and Pedro resided in Berkeley, Illinois, at the time she filed the petition and that they had both continuously resided in the State of Illinois for at least 90 days preceding the filing of the petition. She alleges that there were two children born to the marriage and none have been adopted, that both children have been emancipated, and that she is not presently pregnant.

¶ 7 Pedro filed a pro se appearance on April 8, 2009, but he did not file an answer. On November 19, 2009, Pedro's first attorney ¹ filed an appearance on behalf of Pedro, but he also did not file an answer on Pedro's behalf.

¶ 8 II. Marital Settlement Agreement and Testimony

¶ 9 On April 4, 2011, this case was set for a trial on July 13, 2011. On the trial date, the trial court conducted a pretrial conference and made a recommendation for maintenance based on a model income-sharing plan, which equalized the parties' annual incomes by calculating each party's tax liabilities, medical insurance premiums, the tax benefits to Pedro resulting from his maintenance payments, and the tax liabilities to Brenda resulting from the maintenance payments she received. Later that same day, the trial court held an oral prove-up hearing in which both parties testified and agreed to the terms of the marital settlement agreement.

¶ 10 At the prove-up hearing, Brenda testified that the parties were married in Maywood, Illinois, that the marriage license was registered in Cook County, and that Brenda and Pedro had been residents of Cook County for at least 90 days prior to the date of the hearing for dissolution. Brenda and Pedro then agreed to an oral settlement agreement, requiring Pedro to pay Brenda $3,976 per month in maintenance payments. The payments were [373 Ill.Dec. 769]

[994 N.E.2d 538]

based on $2,820 for permanent maintenance with a 50% income-sharing plan designed to place the parties “in the same position as a couple.” The income-sharing plan was based on Pedro's annual income of $119,678 and Brenda's income of $12,840. If the parties' financial picture changed, the agreement provided that the income-sharing plan would be adjusted accordingly.

¶ 11 During the prove-up, Brenda acknowledged in Pedro's presence that the amount she receives from Pedro would decrease if her income increased, and that she would cease receiving payments from Pedro if she were to enter into a continuing, conjugal relationship with another adult or if she or Pedro passed away. During the prove-up, Brenda acknowledged that she understood the oral marital settlement agreement, and entered into it freely and voluntarily, and agreed to be bound by the terms of the agreement.

¶ 12 Pedro testified that he heard “the agreement that was stated by Brenda's attorney” and that he understood the terms of the agreement. Pedro testified as follows:

“Q. And has anyone forced or coerced you into agreeing to this settlement today?

A. No.

Q. And are you doing this freely and voluntarily?

A. Kind of, sort of, yeah.

Q. Well, you can't say kind of, sort of. Because if you aren't doing it freely and voluntarily, that means—

A. Yes.

Q. —someone has forced you to do it.

A. Well, I did agree to the terms, yes.

Q. So you're doing it freely and voluntarily?

A. Yes.”

¶ 13 Following the parties' testimony, the trial court found that the trial court had both personal and subject matter jurisdiction over the parties, that the residency requirement had been satisfied, that the grounds of irreconcilable differences had been satisfied, and that all other statutory requirements had been met. Brenda's attorney agreed to draft the judgment for dissolution of the marriage, and that same day, the parties signed a written settlement agreement, which was to be incorporated into the judgment for dissolution of the marriage.

¶ 14 III. Motions

¶ 15 Pedro's first attorney withdrew as counsel on August 8, 2011. On August 11, 2011, four days after Pedro's first maintenance payment to Brenda was due, Pedro obtained new counsel, who filed a motion to “vacate the prove-up and other relief.” In the motion, Pedro alleges that the financial calculations used during the prove-up were incomplete and inaccurate, and that the disposition of the property was based upon these incomplete and inaccurate calculations. However, Pedro's allegations did not show how the financial calculations were incomplete and inaccurate. The trial court entered an order setting a hearing date to hear the motion and to present the written judgment for dissolution of marriage and any petitions for fees.

¶ 16 During the motion hearing on October 11, 2011, the following discussion was had on the record:

“THE COURT: Do you understand that if I vacate [the prove-up] you are on trial now? Do you understand that?

PEDRO'S ATTORNEY: Yes, absolutely.

THE COURT: You have your party here, your case is here.

[994 N.E.2d 539]

[373 Ill.Dec. 770]PEDRO'S ATTORNEY: Yes. Absolutely. We are in the process of hopefully settling the case.

THE COURT: There's no hopefully. I mean now. You are on trial. Do you still want to go ahead?

PEDRO'S ATTORNEY: Your Honor, we would like to talk with regard to the settlement.

THE COURT: You know what happened the last time your client backed out of it? We went to trial, and all of a sudden miraculously then he went back to the agreement.

* * *

THE COURT: Motion to vacate is denied. We are done here.

PEDRO'S ATTORNEY: Your Honor, I think we should be given the chance for oral arguments prior to—

THE COURT: Really? You haven't read my standing orders then. Your motion to vacate, I read it. I heard it was being objected to. I am intimately familiar with this case. I am not going to put up with the shenanigans any more. We are done here. Take it to post-decree or take it to the Appellate Court. You are done in front of me.

PEDRO'S ATTORNEY: Your Honor, if you—

THE COURT: Part of it you don't understand?

PEDRO'S ATTORNEY: Your Honor, if you were to look over the fin [ sic ] plans with regard to the—

THE COURT: I don't need to look over them. If you were properly prepared when you came to trial the last time, and you step into the shoes, you should have had them then, or maybe you did, I don't know.

PEDRO'S ATTORNEY: Your Honor, with all due respect, there was a different attorney—

THE COURT: Too bad. Goodbye. Thank you. Thank you.

* * *

PEDRO'S ATTORNEY: [Brenda's] [c]ounsel and I are actually in agreement with regards to a new fin [ sic ] plan that actually has the correct numbers in it.

THE COURT: You can say anything you like after I have already ruled. I don't know. If [Brenda's] counsel wants to do some kind of modification with you, then that is what he will do, but it will not be with my participation.”

That same day, the parties and their attorneys signed a written stipulation to hear the matter as an uncontested case, and the trial court entered a judgment dissolving the parties' marriage, which incorporated the written settlement agreement. Pedro's second attorney then filed a motion to withdraw from the case.

¶ 17 Over a month later, Pedro, pro se, then filed his own motion to reconsider the trial court's denial of his prior motion to vacate the prove-up, claiming that he did not have a “total understanding” of the marital settlement agreement when he agreed to it, and that he acted pursuant to his attorney's advice and felt “threatened by repercussions of not agreeing to the prove up and then not signing the [marital settlement agreement].” Pedro further claimed that his attorney told him that the trial court had stated that it would rule in Brenda's favor if the...