In re Erickson, Bankruptcy No. WF7-85-02259.
| Decision Date | 17 March 1986 |
| Docket Number | Bankruptcy No. WF7-85-02259. |
| Citation | 80 BR 119 |
| Parties | In re Marie ERICKSON, Debtor. |
| Court | U.S. Bankruptcy Court — Western District of Wisconsin |
Terrence J. Byrne, Wausau, Wis., for debtor.
J.R. Tlusty, Abbotsford, Wis., for Dorchester State Bank.
The debtor, by Terrence J. Byrne, has made an application to avoid liens on certain property pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(2) and Wisconsin Statute § 815.18(6). The Dorchester State Bank, by J.R. Tlusty, objects to the lien avoidance with respect to two assets: a New Holland 479 Haybine and a New Holland 68 Baler. A hearing was held in this matter on January 15, 1986, and briefs have been submitted.
The Wisconsin Statutes provide that certain property is exempt from execution. Listed among such exempt property are one mower and one hay loader. Wis.Stat. § 815.18(6). The debtor maintains that the haybine and baler are the technological successors to the mower and hay loader, respectively, and as such are exempt property.
Traditionally, "hay loader" is the term used to describe the machine that loads hay, after it is dry, from the windrow to the wagon as part of the hay harvesting process. A baler performs this same function and, in addition, compacts and ties the hay into a bale. The traditional "hay loader" is obsolete and is not used in modern farming. The baler has entirely replaced the "hay loader" and might be considered the new and improved hay loader.
The term "mower" is traditionally used to describe the machine that is used to cut hay. A haybine performs this same function of cutting hay and, in addition, conditions the hay. The haybine is often referred to as a mower-conditioner. The mower is considered an obsolete piece of machinery. The haybine is the technological successor to the mower and has entirely replaced the mower in modern farming.
The court must decide the issue of whether the Wisconsin exemption statutes allow the debtor to exempt the particular items in dispute. It is a principle of statutory interpretation that "a statute is to be interpreted, not only by its exact words, but also by its apparent general purpose." Dielectric Corporation v. Labor and Industry Review Commission, 111 Wis.2d 270, 330 N.W.2d 606, 610 (1983); Davis v. State, 134 Wis. 632, 643, 115 N.W. 150, 155 (1908). It is apparent that the purpose of this legislation was to make the machine used to cut hay and the machine used to load hay exempt from execution. The fact that the machines used for these functions have been technologically improved does not alter the purpose of this legislation.
When interpreting exemption laws, a construction should be used that will allow the debtor to utilize the full benefit of the law. Opitz v. Brawley, 10 Wis.2d 93, 102 N.W.2d 117 (1960). "It is well settled that exemption laws must have a liberal construction, within the limits contemplated by the Legislature, so as to secure their full benefits to the debtor." Julius v. Druckrey, 214 Wis. 643, 649, 254 N.W. 358, 361 (1934). If the court were to interpret the exemptions as the bank suggests, the debtor would be deprived of the benefits that the Legislature intended to provide.
Another principle of statutory interpretation is that courts should avoid interpreting statutes so as to render the statute meaningless. State v. DILHR, 101 Wis.2d 396, 304 N.W.2d 758, 762 (1981). "A construction of a statute rendering a portion of it meaningless must be avoided." Id. If the court were to interpret the exemption laws as the bank suggests, the statute would become meaningless as to anything but antiquated machinery.
The bank alleges that the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous and only refers to a mower and a hay loader. The bank cites case law supporting the proposition that when the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous it is the duty of the court to give the words their obvious and ordinary meaning. Midland Financial Corporation v. Wisconsin Department of Revenue 116 Wis.2d 40, 341 N.W.2d 397, 399 (1983); Julius v. Druckrey, 214 Wis. 643, 254 N.W. 358, 361 (1934); City of Sheboygan v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission, 125 Wis.2d 1, 370 N.W.2d 800, 802 (Wis.App.1985). The court disagrees with the bank's assertion that the language of this statute is clear and unambiguous.
The language of the exemption statute might have...
To continue reading
Request your trial