In re Estate of Thomann

• Decision Date: 17 July 2002
• Docket Number: No. 01-0664.,01-0664.
• Citation: 649 N.W.2d 1
• Parties: In the Matter of the ESTATE OF Wilbur Dean THOMANN, Deceased. Lois Williams, Executor of the Estate of JoAnn Elizabeth Thomann, Deceased, Appellee, v. Dennis Thomann, Chris Shepard, Deanna Egbert, Teresa Woods and Beth Luke, Beneficiaries of the Estate of Wilbur Dean Thomann, Appellants.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

649 N.W.2d 1

In the Matter of the ESTATE OF Wilbur Dean THOMANN, Deceased.

Lois Williams, Executor of the Estate of JoAnn Elizabeth Thomann, Deceased, Appellee, v. Dennis Thomann, Chris Shepard, Deanna Egbert, Teresa Woods and Beth Luke, Beneficiaries of the Estate of Wilbur Dean Thomann, Appellants.

No. 01-0664.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

July 17, 2002.

David S. Gorham of Morrison, Lloyd, McConnell, Mullins, Davis & Gorham, L.L.P., Washington, for appellants.

John N. Moreland and Timothy J. McKay of Harrison, McKay, Moreland & Webber, P.C., Ottumwa, for appellee. TERNUS, Justice.

Wilbur (Dean) Thomann murdered his wife, JoAnn Thomann, and then committed suicide. At the time of their deaths, the couple held farmland and some bank accounts in joint tenancy. This case involves a dispute between Dean's heirs and the executor of JoAnn's estate with respect to inheritance of this property. The district court ruled that all the joint tenancy property, including the farm, passed to JoAnn's estate pursuant to Iowa's felonious death statute, Iowa Code section 633.535 (1999).

Dean's heirs appeal. Upon our review of the statute, we conclude section 633.535(2) effects a severance of the joint tenancy and creates a tenancy in common. Thus, each tenant's share passes to that tenant's heirs. We decline the invitation of JoAnn's estate to impose a constructive trust on Dean's share. Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the district court and remand the case for a determination of the extent and value of each tenant's undivided interest in the property.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

Dean and JoAnn Thomann were married in 1982. It was a second marriage for both; each had children from their prior marriages. During their marriage they resided on a farm owned by Dean's mother. In 1988, Dean's mother died. Dean then purchased the farm on which he and JoAnn resided with an inheritance he received from his mother's estate. In 1990, Dean executed a warranty deed that conveyed the property to both of them as joint tenants. The couple also held certain bank accounts in joint tenancy.

On August 14, 2000, Dean murdered JoAnn in their home and then killed himself. They died testate, each having executed a will in 1990. Under Dean's will, his property passed to JoAnn, if she survived him, and to his five children, if JoAnn did not survive him. JoAnn's will made a similar disposition of her property. If Dean survived her, he inherited her property; if he did not survive her, her property went to her children and stepchildren. (These stepchildren were not Dean's children.)

Both wills were admitted to probate. The executor of JoAnn's estate, appellee, Lois Williams, filed an application in Dean's estate requesting a determination that all jointly held property of the couple was the property of JoAnn's estate. Dean's heirs, appellants, Dennis Thomann, Chris Shepard, Deanna Egbert, Teresa Woods, and Beth Luke, resisted.

After a hearing, the district court found that Dean had intentionally and unjustifiably killed JoAnn. Relying on Iowa Code section 633.535(1), the court held that JoAnn was "to be recognized as the surviving owner of all jointly owned property." The post-trial motion of Dean's heirs was overruled and this appeal followed.

On appeal, Dean's heirs challenge the trial court's interpretation of the pertinent statute, Iowa Code section 633.535, as well as the constitutionality of the court's application of the statute, claiming that it worked an unauthorized forfeiture. We find it necessary to address only the issue of statutory interpretation, as our resolution of that issue renders the constitutional challenge moot.

II. Legal Principles Governing Our Review.

A. Standard of review. Because this action was tried in probate as a proceeding in equity, our review is de novo. See In re Estate of Gearhart, 584 N.W.2d 327, 329 (Iowa 1998)

; Iowa Code § 633.33. Although the trial court's findings of fact are not binding on us, see In re Estate of Gearhart, 584 N.W.2d at 329, we will not engage in any factual review here because neither party contests the trial court's factual determinations. Rather, the issue in dispute is one of statutory interpretation. Our review of questions of statutory interpretation is for the correction of legal error. See State v. Hippler, 545 N.W.2d 568, 570 (Iowa 1996). We are not bound by the trial court's legal conclusions. See State v. Francois, 577 N.W.2d 417, 417 (Iowa 1998).

B. Relevant principles of statutory construction. Our primary goal in interpreting a statute is to give effect to the legislature's intention. See State v. Iowa Dist. Ct. for Black Hawk County, 616 N.W.2d 575, 578 (Iowa 2000)

. We "construe statutes that relate to the same or a closely allied subject together so as to produce a harmonious and consistent body of legislation." State v. Casey's Gen. Stores, Inc., 587 N.W.2d 599, 601 (Iowa 1998). We presume the legislature intended a reasonable result, not an absurd one. Iowa Dist. Ct. for Black Hawk County,

616 N.W.2d at 578.

In the absence of a statutory definition or an established meaning in the law, words in a statute are given their ordinary and common meaning. See Iowa Code § 4.1(38). We also consider the context within which the words are used. See Id; State v. Carter, 582 N.W.2d 164, 166 (Iowa 1998)

. Moreover, it is presumed that the legislature inserted every part of a statute for a purpose. Miller v. Westfield Ins. Co., 606 N.W.2d 301, 305 (Iowa 2000). Therefore, we avoid interpreting a statute so as to render a portion of it redundant or irrelevant. T & K Roofing Co. v. Iowa Dep't of Educ., 593 N.W.2d 159, 162-63 (Iowa 1999).

Where a general statute and a special statute are relevant, we attempt to construe them so as to give effect to both. Iowa Code § 4.7; Citizens' Aide/Ombudsman v. Miller, 543 N.W.2d 899, 903 (Iowa 1996). When that is not possible, the provisions of the more specific statute control. Iowa Code § 4.7; Christenson v. Iowa Dist. Ct. for Polk County, 557 N.W.2d 259, 262-63 (Iowa 1996).

III. Felonious Death Statute and Contentions of Parties.

Through 1987, Iowa's felonious death statute was contained in one paragraph. It stated:

No person who feloniously takes or causes or procures another to take the life of another shall inherit from such person, or receive any interest in the estate of the decedent as surviving spouse, or take by devise or legacy from the decedent, any portion of the decedent's estate.

Iowa Code § 633.535 (1987). In 1987, the Iowa legislature amended the statute to substantially its current form, significantly broadening its scope. 1987 Iowa Acts ch. 9, § 1. Section 633.535 now provides:

1. A person who intentionally and unjustifiably causes or procures the death of another shall not receive any property, benefit, or other interest by reason of the death as an heir, distributee, beneficiary, appointee, or in any other capacity whether the property, benefit, or other interest passed under any form of title registration, testamentary or nontestamentary instrument, intestacy, renunciation, or any other circumstance. The property, benefit, or other interest shall pass as if the person causing death died before the decedent.

2. A joint tenant who intentionally and unjustifiably causes or procures the death of another joint tenant which affects their interests so that the share of the decedent passes as the decedent's property has no rights by survivorship.

This provision applies to joint tenancies and tenancies by the entireties in real and personal property, joint and multiple-party accounts in banks, savings and loan associations, credit unions, and other institutions, and any other form of co-ownership with survivorship rights.

3. A named beneficiary of a bond, life insurance policy, or any other contractual arrangement who intentionally and unjustifiably causes or procures the death of the principal obligee or person upon whose life the policy is issued or whose death generates the benefits under any other contractual arrangement is not entitled to any benefit under the bond, policy, or other contractual arrangement, and the benefits become payable as though the person causing death had predeceased the decedent.

Iowa Code § 633.535 (1999).

Whereas the prior statute applied only to inherited interests and interests passing through the decedent's estate, the new statute addresses three situations in which a murderer is denied the benefit of his felonious act. Specifically, subsection (1) prevents a murderer from receiving in any capacity "any property, benefit, or other interest by reason of the death" of the victim, regardless of how the property, benefit, or interest passes. Id. § 633.535(1). This subsection further provides that any such property, benefit, or interest passes as though the murderer died first. Id. Subsection (2) addresses joint tenancy property, and, stripped to its essentials, provides that when one joint tenant kills the other joint tenant the murderer "has no rights by survivorship" and the decedent's share of the joint tenancy property "passes as the decedent's property." Id. § 633.535(2). Finally, subsection (3) is concerned with bonds, life insurance policies or other contracts on which the slayer is a designated beneficiary; it prevents the slayer from receiving any benefit under such bonds, policies, or contracts by virtue of the victim's death.

Dean's heirs assert that subsection (2) governs the disposition of joint tenancy property, not subsection (1). They argue further that under subsection (2), only Dean's rights of survivorship are lost, not his undivided interest in the joint tenancy property. The heirs contend subsection (2) has the effect of terminating the joint tenancy, causing each tenant's undivided interest to pass through that tenant's estate. They ask this court to remand this case so the district court can determine the extent and value of each tenant's undivided...