In re Estate of Bohl

• Decision Date: 22 February 2016
• Docket Number: CA2015–01–006.,Nos. CA2015–01–005,s. CA2015–01–005
• Citation: 60 N.E.3d 511
• Parties: In re ESTATE OF Ruby BOHL a.k.a. Ruby Lee Bohl.
• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals

60 N.E.3d 511

In re ESTATE OF Ruby BOHL a.k.a. Ruby Lee Bohl.

Nos. CA2015–01–005

CA2015–01–006.

Court of Appeals of Ohio, Twelfth District, Brown County.

Feb. 22, 2016.

T. David Burgess, Williamsburg, OH, for appellant/cross-appellee, Larry Bohl, Executor.

John Woliver, Batavia, OH, for appellee/cross-appellant, Pamela Throckmorton.

OPINION

RINGLAND, J.

{¶ 1} Appellant/cross-appellee, Larry Bohl (“Larry”), appeals from the judgment of the Brown County Court of Common Pleas, Probate Division, denying his claim for reimbursement of certain expenses against the estate of his deceased mother, Ruby Bohl (“Ruby”). Appellee/cross-appellant, Pamela Throckmorton (“Pamela”), who is one of Larry's two sisters, cross-appeals from the same judgment that allowed some of the claims made by Larry and their sister, Shirley Mardis (“Shirley”), for reimbursement of certain expenses against Ruby's estate. For the reasons that follow, we affirm in part and reverse in part the judgment of the probate court, and remand the matter for further proceedings.

{¶ 2} Ruby and her husband, Clarence Bohl (“Clarence”), owned a 115–acre farm in Georgetown, Ohio. They had four children: Larry, Shirley, Pamela, and Roger Bohl (“Roger”). All of the children eventually moved away from the farm except Larry, who, except for a brief stint in the service, has lived and worked at the farm all of his life. In addition to helping his parents with farm-related duties, Larry also worked full-time at Cincinnati Milacron until 2007, at which time he took early retirement.

{¶ 3} The total income from the farm that Ruby and Clarence received during Clarence's lifetime came from raising tobacco and selling it during the fall, or selling cattle or hogs periodically during the year. Money was always an issue for Clarence and Ruby, and neither of them paid enough into Social Security to entitle them to any payments from that program at the time of their retirement.

{¶ 4} Clarence passed away in September 2004. At the time of his death, the last two cows had been sold and there were no hogs. Larry raised the tobacco crop that year, but the crop would not be sold until the following year. The only income that Ruby received following Clarence's death came from a “tobacco buyout” program funded by major tobacco companies at the government's behest, which was designed to encourage tobacco farmers like the Bohls not to raise tobacco. From 2005 until 2011, Ruby received a total of $12,370.53 as a result of the tobacco buyout, giving her a monthly average payment of $128.86.

{¶ 5} Ruby died in July 2012 at the age of 93. Ruby's will named Larry as her executor, and directed that her estate, which consisted primarily of the 115–acre farm, be divided equally among Larry, Pamela, Shirley, and Roger. Larry was formally appointed by the probate court as executor of Ruby's will on August 15, 2012. In November 2012, Larry submitted a claim for reimbursement against the estate for $101,084.20. The amount consisted of $45,556.32 in medical bills for Ruby, from 2004 to 2011; $38,218.22 in “farm maintenance bills,” from 2004 to 2012; $8,329 in farm insurance, from 2004 to 2012; and $8,980.66 in real estate taxes, from 2005 to 2012. In January 2013, Shirley submitted a claim for reimbursement against Ruby's estate for $32,600 that she paid to Larry to help him pay for a home caregiver, Lugene Teal, whom Larry hired for Ruby prior to her death. Pamela objected to Larry's and Shirley's claims against the estate.

{¶ 6} A hearing was held by a magistrate on Pamela's objections over two days. Near the start of the first day of the hearing, Larry moved to amend his claim, pursuant to Civ.R. 15(B) and (C), to seek an additional $17,170.55 in reimbursement against Ruby's estate for paying for a portion of the expense of Ruby's home caregiver. Larry made the motion to amend his claim after noticing that while he had paid Ruby's home caregiver a total of $49,770.55, Shirley was making a claim for reimbursement of only $32,600 for helping him pay for the home caregiver. Upon realizing that the $17,170.55 difference between these two amounts came out of his own pocket, Larry moved to amend his claim against Ruby's estate for this amount.

{¶ 7} During the hearing, Larry was permitted to testify, over the continuing objection of Pamela's attorney, that he had an “understanding” or “agreement” with his parents that since he had always lived at the farm and would continue to do so, he would “maintain the farm” and “take care of [his parents] * * * until they passed,” and “would file a claim against the estate when the time arose[,]” and that he would “be reimbursed for those expenses.” Later, when Pamela's attorney asked Larry on cross-examination, “What was your prior testimony about filing a claim?” Larry answered as follows:

[M]y mom, my dad, and myself had an agreement that I could stay there on the farm as long as—and you know, they knew it was going to cost money to keep the farm up. They knew that they were going to incur medical costs. That I would pay their—their bills and I would pay to maintain the farm in its present condition, and when they were gone that I would present a claim to be reimbursed those expenses.

{¶ 8} The magistrate found that Larry's claim for reimbursement of $101,084.20 was based on an “understanding” he had with Ruby that he would pay Ruby's expenses “due to her lack of financial resources and would make a claim against her estate after her passing[,]” and that Larry's claim was “for the preservation of the assets of the estate, namely, the farm.” The magistrate determined that the “understanding” between Larry and Ruby constituted an “express contract,” for purposes of Hinkle v. Sage, 67 Ohio St. 256, 65 N.E. 999 (1902). The magistrate also determined that Shirley was entitled to her claim for reimbursement of the $32,600 she paid to Larry to help pay for Ruby's home caregiver. Lastly, the magistrate determined that Larry was permitted, under Civ.R. 15(B) and (C), to amend his claim to seek an additional $17,170.55 in reimbursement that he paid to Ruby's home caregiver out of his own pocket and that Larry was entitled to be reimbursed for that additional amount.

{¶ 9} Pamela filed objections to the magistrate's decision. The probate court overruled Pamela's objections to Larry's claim for reimbursement of $45,556.32 for paying Ruby's medical bills and to Shirley's claim for reimbursement of $32,600 for helping pay for Ruby's home caregiver. However, the probate court sustained Pamela's objection to Larry's claim for reimbursement for farm maintenance expenses, farm insurance, and real estate taxes. The probate court noted that Larry had claimed the farm expenses as tax deductions while he lived at the family farm, rent free, and had claimed Ruby as a dependent on his income tax returns. The probate court concluded that “[t]o permit [Larry] those claims would be enforcing an agreement he says took place for which the court has no written evidence and for which there is case law directly on point.” The probate court also sustained Pamela's objection to Larry's claim for reimbursement of $17,170.55 for paying a portion of the cost of Ruby's home caregiver, because the claim was presented “past the allowable time.”

{¶ 10} Larry now appeals, raising the following assignments of error:

{¶ 11} Assignment of Error No. 1:

{¶ 12} THE COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW BY REQUIRING THE APPELLANT TO PRODUCE A WRITTEN AGREEMENT WHERE THE CLAIM WAS NOT FOR SERVICES BUT FOR REIMBURSEMENT FOR FUNDS EXPENDED ACCORDING TO THE AGREEMENT.

{¶ 13} Assignment of Error No. 2:

{¶ 14} THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO RECOGNIZE THE CLAIMS BY THE APPELLANT WERE NOT FOR SERVICES PROVIDED TO A FAMILY MEMBER BUT WERE FOR EXPENSES PAID ACCORDING TO AN AGREEMENT AND CONTRACT PRINCIPLES.

{¶ 15} Assignment of Error No. 3:

{¶ 16} THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE AMENDMENT OF THE APPELLANT'S CLAIM FOR REIMBURSEMENT OF MONEY PAID FOR HOME CARE TO A THIRD PARTY.

{¶ 17} Pamela cross-appeals, assigning the following as error:

{¶ 18} THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN BY [sic ] ALLOWING THE CLAIMS

FOR MEDICAL BILLS PAID BY APPELLANT LARRY BOHL AND THE CLAIM FOR CARE SERVICES PAID BY APPELLEE SHIRLEY MARDIS.

{¶ 19} In his first assignment of error, Larry argues the probate court erred by requiring him to produce a written agreement to prove his claim for reimbursement of certain expenses against Ruby's estate, because, contrary to what the probate court found, Hinkle does not require that such an agreement be in writing.

{¶ 20} In Hinkle, 67 Ohio St. 256, 65 N.E. 999, paragraphs one and two of the syllabus, the Ohio Supreme Court discussed the effect of the “family member” or “family relationship” rule in actions brought by one family member to recover compensation for services provided to another family member, as follows:

1. In an action to recover compensation for services, when it appears that the plaintiff was a member of the family of the person for whom the services were rendered, no obligation to pay for the services will be implied; and the plaintiff cannot recover in such case unless it be established that there was an express contract upon the one side to perform the services for compensation, and upon the other side to accept the services and pay for them.

2. Such contract may be in writing or it may rest entirely in parol, and it may be proved by direct or indirect evidence; but to entitle the plaintiff to recover, the contract must be established by clear and unequivocal proof.

(Emphasis added.) Thirteen years later, in Merrick v. Ditzler, 91 Ohio St. 256, 110 N.E. 493 (1915), paragraph two of the syllabus, the court modified the standard of proof needed to prove an express contract in cases where the family member rule applied, from “clear and unequivocal” to “clear and convincing.”

{¶ 21} Under the family member rule, “the general inference or presumption that the rendering of services brings forth an obligation to pay compensation...