In re Estate of Quirin
| Decision Date | 19 May 2015 |
| Docket Number | No. DA 14–0394.,DA 14–0394. |
| Citation | 2015 MT 132,379 Mont. 173,348 P.3d 658 |
| Parties | In the Matter of the ESTATE OF Violet H. QUIRIN, a/k/a Vi Quirin, Deceased. |
| Court | Montana Supreme Court |
For Appellant: Linda Osorio St. Peter, St. Peter Law Office, P.C.; Missoula, Montana.
For Appellee: Harold V. Dye, Dye & Moe, PLLP; Missoula, Montana.
¶ 1 Mavoureen Speiser (Speiser) appeals from the order of the Montana Fourth Judicial District Court, Missoula County, confirming probate of Violet Quirin's June 23, 2010 will. We affirm.
¶ 2 We review the following issues:
1. Did the District Court err when it confirmed probate of the 2010 will?
2. Did the District Court err by issuing an order inconsistent with its pretrial order?
¶ 3 Violet Quirin (Quirin) died on January 10, 2011. She was survived by two adult daughters, Speiser and Cathie Schmiedeke (Schmiedeke). Prior to her death, Quirin had executed three wills. The first was signed on November 16, 2005, the second was signed on March 1, 2007, and the third was signed on June 23, 2010. In the 2005 and 2007 wills Quirin divided her property equally between her daughters. However, in the 2010 will, Quirin wrote, “I acknowledge my love and respect for my daughters, [Speiser] and [Schmiedeke], but make no provision for them in this will,” and she instead divided her estate among several friends and charitable organizations.
¶ 4 The 2010 will was the product of Quirin's interactions with attorney Nancy Moe. Quirin contacted Moe on June 2, 2010, and asked her to draft a new will for Quirin. Moe met with Quirin for around an hour and a half on June 4, 2010. Quirin told Moe that her daughters were the current beneficiaries of her will and that she no longer wished for them to benefit from her estate. She told Moe that she would like to change her will to benefit organizations and individuals with whom she had long, trusting relationships. Moe advised Quirin that a will contest might result from such a change, but Quirin persisted, stating that she and her daughters were “not close.” Quirin told Moe that she wanted to leave her house to her church, to leave the money in her bank accounts to Missoula Aging Services, and to dispose of certain personal property to several friends. Quirin also told Moe that she had given her friend Kristine Fankell $100,000 to use for Quirin's benefit, and that she wished for Fankell to keep any portion of the $100,000 that remained at the time of Quirin's death.
¶ 5 Moe concluded that Quirin intended to make a new will, understood that she was making a new will, understood her assets, and otherwise understood the consequences of what she was doing. Moe, therefore, drafted a will based on her June 4 discussion with Quirin. She mailed a draft of the will to Quirin on June 18, 2010. On June 23, 2010, Moe, accompanied by two paralegals from her office, visited Quirin's home. Moe and the paralegals observed that Quirin was dressed and articulate and that there was nothing to suggest that Quirin did not have testamentary capacity. Quirin and Moe spoke about the will and their June 4 conversation. Quirin signed the will prepared by Moe during this visit. The paralegals signed the will as witnesses.
¶ 6 When Fankell visited Quirin several months later, Quirin discussed the 2010 will and told Fankell that she was adamant about keeping the will as it was. Quirin also told Fankell that the 2010 will named Fankell personal representative of Quirin's estate.
¶ 7 On January 18, 2011, following Quirin's death, Fankell submitted the 2010 will for informal probate and asked that, according to the terms of the will, she be appointed personal representative of Quirin's estate. The Clerk of the District Court granted these requests, ordering informal probate and appointing Fankell personal representative. On May 3, 2011, Speiser petitioned for formal probate of the will Quirin executed on March 1, 2007. She claimed that Quirin lacked testamentary capacity when she signed the 2010 will and that Quirin's estate should be distributed according to the terms of the 2007 will.
¶ 8 Prior to the matter going to trial, the parties agreed and stipulated to numerous facts and to admission of several exhibits. The parties also quoted language from In re Estate of Lightfield, 2009 MT 244, 351 Mont. 426, 213 P.3d 468, and stipulated that the language provided the test for determining testamentary capacity. The court entered a pretrial order on April 10, 2014, that listed the stipulated facts, exhibits, and test for testamentary capacity. The order also identified fourteen issues of fact that remained to be litigated and specified that no issues of law were contested.
¶ 9 On June 20, 2014, following a trial, the District Court issued findings of fact, conclusions of law, and an order. The District Court ultimately decided that Speiser failed to show that Quirin lacked testamentary capacity, and it confirmed probate of the 2010 will. Speiser appeals.
¶ 10 We review a district court's findings of fact to determine if they are clearly erroneous. In re Estate of Lambert, 2006 MT 229, ¶ 9, 333 Mont. 444, 143 P.3d 426. A court's findings are clearly erroneous if they are not supported by substantial evidence, the court misapprehended the effect of the evidence, or we are convinced by our review of the record that the district court made a mistake. Lambert, ¶ 9. We review a district court's conclusions of law for correctness. Lambert, ¶ 9.
¶ 11 1. Did the District Court err when it confirmed probate of the 2010 will?
¶ 12 Speiser contends that Quirin lacked testamentary capacity to execute the 2010 will. She contends that the District Court erred when it found otherwise, arguing that it applied an incorrect standard of law and that its finding was clearly erroneous. We disagree.
¶ 13 Proponents of a will have the burden of establishing prima facie proof of its due execution. Once a duly executed will is submitted for probate, the testator's competence is presumed, and any contestants have the burden of establishing lack of testamentary capacity. Lightfield, ¶ 28. Here, the District Court decided that the 2010 will was duly executed. Speiser does not contest this decision, and she, therefore, had the burden to establish lack of testamentary capacity.
¶ 14 For over fifty years, we have stated that the test for determining testamentary capacity is:
[A] testator is competent if he is possessed of the mental capacity to understand the nature of the act, to understand and recollect the nature and situation of his property and his relations to persons having claims on his bounty whose interests are affected by his will.... The testator must have sufficient strength and clearness of mind and memory to know, in general, without prompting, the nature and extent of the property of which he is about to dispose, and the nature of the act which he is about to perform, and the names and identity of the persons who are to be the objects of his bounty, and his relation towards them.
E.g., Lightfield, ¶ 27; In re Estate of Prescott, 2000 MT 200, ¶ 34, 300 Mont. 469, 8 P.3d 88 ; In re Estate of Lien, 270 Mont. 295, 299, 892 P.2d 530, 532 (1995) ; In re Estate of Bodin, 144 Mont. 555, 560, 398 P.2d 616, 619 (1965). In more recent cases, we have retained this test while restating it as “testamentary capacity requires that the testator be aware of three elements: (1) the nature of the act to be performed, (2) the nature and the extent of the property to be disposed of, and (3) the objects of his or her bounty.” Lightfield, ¶ 28; In re Estate of Harms, 2006 MT 320, ¶ 14, 335 Mont. 66, 149 P.3d 557 ; Prescott, ¶ 34.
¶ 15 Speiser contends that awareness of these three elements is an additional component rather than a restatement of the test for testamentary capacity. Speiser, therefore, argues that the District Court erred when it based its testamentary capacity finding solely on Quirin's awareness of the three elements. She states that before reaching such a decision, the District Court was also required to consider whether Quirin possessed the “mental capacity to understand” and “sufficient strength and clearness of mind and memory to know” the elements.
¶ 16 This is incorrect. In Prescott, we affirmed the decision of a district court granting summary judgment on the question of whether the testator lacked testamentary capacity. Prescott, ¶¶ 20, 34, 39, 42, 46, 48. In that case, we limited our analysis to evidence concerning the testator's awareness of the three elements. We did not independently consider the testator's mental capacity to understand the elements. We also did not independently consider the testator's strength and clearness of mind and memory to know the elements. We concluded that the District Court did not err by granting summary judgment based solely on uncontroverted evidence of the testator's awareness of the three elements. Prescott, ¶¶ 35–48. Similarly, the District Court in this case did not err by basing its testamentary capacity finding solely on Quirin's awareness of the three elements.
¶ 17 Speiser also contends that the District Court's testamentary capacity finding was incorrect. Whether a testator has testamentary capacity is a question of fact, which we review for clear error. Lightfield, ¶¶ 24, 29. We will only reverse a district court's finding regarding testamentary capacity if it is not supported by substantial evidence, the court misapprehended the effect of the evidence, or we are convinced by our review of the record that the district court made a mistake. Lambert, ¶ 9. Here, the District Court's testamentary capacity finding was supported by substantial evidence, the effect of which the District Court did not misapprehend.
¶ 18 As discussed above, testamentary capacity exists if, at the time the will is executed, a testator is “aware...
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...the effect of the evidence, or if we are convinced by our review of the record that the district court made a mistake. In re Estate of Quirin, 2015 MT 132, ¶ 10, 379 Mont. 173, 348 P.3d 658. We review a district court's conclusions of law to determine whether the court's interpretation of t......