In re Estate of Krasinski

• Decision Date: 31 October 2019
• Docket Number: No. 41 WAP 2018,No. 40 WAP 2018,40 WAP 2018,41 WAP 2018
• Citation: 218 A.3d 1246
• Parties: IN RE: ESTATE OF Sophia M. KRASINSKI, a/k/a Sophia Krasinski a/k/a Sofia Krasinsky, Late of Morrisdale, (Cooper Township) Clearfield County, Pennsylvania Deceased on 11/04/2006 Appeal of: Patricia Krasinski-Dunzik In re: Estate of Sophia M. Krasinski a/k/a Sophia Krasinski a/k/a Sophia Krasinsky Late of Morrisdale (Cooper Township), Clearfield County, Pennsylvania Deceased November 4, 2006 Appeal of: Patricia Krasinski-Dunzik
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

218 A.3d 1246

IN RE: ESTATE OF Sophia M. KRASINSKI, a/k/a Sophia Krasinski a/k/a Sofia Krasinsky, Late of Morrisdale, (Cooper Township) Clearfield County, Pennsylvania Deceased on 11/04/2006

Appeal of: Patricia Krasinski-Dunzik

In re: Estate of Sophia M. Krasinski a/k/a Sophia Krasinski a/k/a Sophia Krasinsky Late of Morrisdale (Cooper Township), Clearfield County, Pennsylvania Deceased November 4, 2006

Appeal of: Patricia Krasinski-Dunzik

No. 40 WAP 2018

No. 41 WAP 2018

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

Argued/Submitted: April 9, 2019

Decided: October 31, 2019

OPINION

JUSTICE DONOHUE

This discretionary appeal presents the Court with an opportunity to clarify the proper scope of Rule 342(a)(6) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure, which provides for an appeal as of right from an order of the Orphans' Court Division that "determin[es] an interest in real or personal property." Pa.R.A.P. 342(a)(6). Pa.R.A.P. 342(c) further provides that the failure of a party to immediately appeal an order appealable under, inter alia, Rule 342(a)(6), constitutes a waiver of all objections to the order. Pa.R.A.P. 342(c).¹ Applying these rules to the case at bar, we conclude that Appellant Patricia Krasinski-Dunzik ("Dunzik") waived all objections to the orphans' court's order dated April 30, 2013 approving a private sale of land. Accordingly, we affirm the Superior Court's decision.

Sophia M. Krasinski (the "Decedent") died testate on November 4, 2006. Her will named Edward Krasinski (the "Executor")² as the executor of her estate. The Executor is one of the Decedent's four children, who also include Eleanor Krasinski ("Eleanor"), James Krasinski ("James"), and Dunzik. Decedent's will directed that each of her four children were equal beneficiaries of the residue of the estate after debts and funeral expenses were paid. Eleanor relinquished her twenty-five percent interest to Dunzik on January 9, 2013. The primary assets of the estate included three parcels of real estate: (1) twenty acres of property with an appraised value of $55,000 ("Johnny Hoover Place"); (2) a barn and ninety-five acres of property, including sixty-eight acres of coal rights, with an appraised value of $230,000 ("Wicks' Place"); and (3) a house, buildings, and approximately ninety-nine acres with an appraised value of $200,000 ("Homestead Place"). Dunzik and her husband constructed a residence, a barn, and appurtenances on Homestead Place and had lived there for many years at the time of Decedent's death.

On July 7, 2010, the Executor filed a petition to permit the private sale of real estate to heirs. In that petition, the Executor averred that Dunzik was objecting to the distribution of all three properties because it was her position she already owned them based on a prior oral agreement between herself and the Decedent. After argument and briefing, on March 22, 2011 the orphans' court granted the Executor's petition to permit the private sale of all of the real estate. Specifically, the orphans' court concluded, inter alia, that Dunzik had not produced a writing that satisfied the statute of frauds and thus lacked the legally required proof to support her claim that she owned the properties.

Dunzik and her husband then filed a civil complaint against the estate based upon the alleged oral contract with the Decedent. On December 24, 2012, after a nonjury trial, the trial court ruled that there was no enforceable oral contract between Dunzik and Decedent and dismissed the case. This trial court's order also lifted a stay on the orphans' court's prior order approving the private sale of the Decedent's lands. Dunzik did not appeal the trial court's rulings.

On February 8, 2013, the estate's attorney sent a letter to the four heirs explaining the process by which the private sale would occur. With respect to the Homestead Place property, the letter stated that if Dunzik and her husband did not purchase all of the property of Homestead Place, steps would be taken to ensure they could maintain ownership of the home and barn on the property. Specifically, the letter provided that "[t]his sale does not include the home and barn ... and if [Dunzik] does not purchase [Homestead Place] an adjustment in real estate will have to be made to allow for the ground under those two buildings to be separately owned and assessed to [Dunzik and her husband]." Orphans' Court Opinion, 4/22/2015, at 9. The bidding took place one week later, on February 15, 2013. The Executor, James and his wife, and Dunzik attended, at which time Dunzik stated that she would not be bidding because she believed that she already owned the properties. She then left the meeting. In her absence, James and his wife bid $230,000 for Wicks' Place. Edward bid $55,000 for Johnny Hoover Place. Edward, James and his wife jointly bid $120,000 for Homestead Place.

On March 7, 2013, the Executor petitioned the orphans' court to approve the sale of these properties to the residuary heirs for these amounts, attaching the proposed deeds to the three properties as exhibits. Contrary to the representation in the February 8, 2013 letter from the estate's attorney, the deed for Homestead Place did not include any provision permitting Dunzik and her husband to retain ownership of the house and barn. On March 14, 2013, Dunzik filed pro se objections to the petition, which did not include any objection relating to the sale of the properties. On April 30, 2013, the orphans' court, after argument, entered an order approving the sales of the three properties and authorizing the estate to issue the three deeds to the purchasers at the private sale.³

On May 30, 2014, the Executor filed a first and final accounting. Dunzik, through counsel, filed six objections, four of which related to the sales of real property approved pursuant to the April 30, 2013 order. Dunzik first objected to the manner in which the private sale was conducted, including a claim that the Executor and his brother James conspired to purchase the properties for themselves without competitive bidding, thus suppressing the sales prices. Dunzik requested the filing of an amended final accounting that set forth the true value of the real estate. Second, Dunzik objected to the failure to include a limiting condition regarding Petitioner's home, barn, and underlying land in the Homestead Place deed, as promised in the February 8, 2013 letter from the estate's attorney, and that the Executor and James had changed the terms of the sale without proper notice. Dunzik demanded that the estate provide her and her husband with a deed securing their ownership of the lands underneath their house and barn and all surrounding lands appurtenance to the same. Third, Dunzik objected to the placement of a right of way easement over the Homestead Place tract in favor of the Johnny Hoover Place tract, which she claimed increased the value of the Johnny Hoover property (purchased by the Executor). Dunzik insisted that a revised final accounting be prepared that included the correct values for the two properties. Fourth, Dunzik claimed that the Executor had sold lands to himself at artificially reduced prices, which were based upon faulty appraisals that, inter alia, did not include the value of the timber, subsurface rights and Marcellus Shale gas. As with the first and third claims, Dunzik requested that a revised final accounting include the true values of the properties for distribution purposes. Id. at 5-7.

By order and opinion dated April 22, 2015, the orphans' court denied these four objections,⁴ concluding that pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 342, Dunzik had waived them because she had not filed an appeal in the Superior Court from the April 30, 2013 order (approving the completion of the proposed sales) within thirty days of its entry.

Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 342, entitled Appealable Orphans' Court Orders, clearly states that an order from a decree of the [o]rphans' [c]ourt determining an interest in real property is immediately appealable. Failure to appeal such an order constitutes a waiver of all objections to such order and any objections may not be raised in a subsequent procedure. See Rule of Appellate Procedure 342(a)(6) and (c). Therefore, the claims set forth in the first four objections have been waived by [Dunzik] through her failure to file an appeal of this [c]ourt's [o]rder of April 30, 2013.

Id. at 8.

The orphans' court so ruled despite its acknowledgement that the estate had not followed "acceptable and legal process in conducting the sales" with respect to the Dunzik's house and barn. Orphans' Court Opinion, 4/22/2015, at 8. The court indicated that the excuses given by the Executor and the estate's attorney for not including language in the Homestead Place deed providing for the Dunziks' continued ownership of the land under their house and barn were "woefully inadequate."⁵ The court insisted that the Executor had acted in his own interests as co-purchaser of Homestead Place, an act that "some may construe ... to be fraud." Id. at 10. Nevertheless, although the orphans' court was of the view that "fundamental fairness dictates a different result," it held that Pa.R.A.P. 342 compelled it to conclude that Dunzik's four objections to the private sale had been waived for her failure to timely appeal.⁶

By fiduciary deed executed, acknowledged and recorded on May 31, 2013, the Executor conveyed the Homestead tract to himself, James and his wife. In August, 2013, these three individuals joined in the filing of an action in ejectment against Dunzik, her husband and Eleanor (who has resided on Decedent's property her entire life). This action, seeking the removal of the two sisters from their residences, remains pending.

On appeal, the Superior Court issued an en banc decision on May 15, 2018 in which it, inter alia, affirmed the orphans' court's ruling that Dunzik had waived all objections to the estate's private sale of real estate by failing to appeal...