In re Estate of Meek
| Decision Date | 04 June 2014 |
| Docket Number | No. M2013-01070-COA-R3-CV,M2013-01070-COA-R3-CV |
| Court | Tennessee Court of Appeals |
| Parties | IN RE ESTATE OF BETTY D. GENTRY MEEK |
Appeal from the Chancery Court for Montgomery County
Laurence M. McMillan, Chancellor
The surviving husband who was excluded from his wife's will filed a petition for elective-share, year's support, exempt property, and homestead. The executors of her estate opposed the petition claiming the marriage was void ab initio because it was procured by fraud and misrepresentations, specifically alleging that he lied on the marriage license about his age and number of prior marriages. Alternatively, if he is the surviving spouse, they contend he is equitably estopped to assert such claims for the same underlying reasons. The trial court summarily dismissed the petition finding "(1) the marriage between [Plaintiff] and the Decedent was void ab initio due to the fraud perpetrated by [Plaintiff] in connection with false information supplied by him on the application for the parties' marriage license; and (2) equitably estopped as a matter of law." Based on these findings the trial court dismissed all claims. We have determined the marriage was not void ab initio; whether the marriage was voidable is now moot for any right to avoid the marriage abated upon the wife's death. As for equitable estoppel, we have determined that summary judgment was inappropriate because essential facts are either disputed or not in the record, including whether the decedent relied on the misrepresentations to marry him. Accordingly, we reverse the award of summary judgment and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court
Reversed and Remanded
Patrick Matthew Potempa, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellant, The Estate of Paul H. Meek, Sr.
Larry B. Watson, Clarksville, Tennessee, for the appellees, John L. Mitchell and Katherine Young.
Paul H. Meek, Sr. ("Plaintiff") was born on November 27, 1927. Betty D. Gentry Meek ("the decedent") was born on June 5, 1930. They both grew up in Clarksville, Tennessee and, although Plaintiff was two years older than the decedent, they attended Clarksville High School at the same. It is undisputed that they were friends at the time but it is disputed whether they were sweethearts in high school. She graduated in 1947; whether he graduated is not in the record.
Thereafter, the decedent married Charles C. Gentry, Sr., with whom she had four children; they remained in the Clarksville area throughout their marriage of more than fifty years. Mr. Gentry died in February 2002.
The record suggests that Plaintiff and the decedent had little if any contact until 2005, with the exception of the decedent's fiftieth high school reunion in 1997, when the decedent was accompanied by her husband Charles Gentry, and Plaintiff was accompanied by his wife. The reason the decedent and Plaintiff seldom if ever saw each other after high school is that Plaintiff spent most of his adult life in Florida.
As noted above, Charles Gentry, the decedent's husband of fifty years, died in 2002. Some three years later, after learning of Mr. Gentry's death, Plaintiff appeared at the decedent's home in 2005 and proclaimed his love for the decedent. He stated that he had waited all of his life to be with her. The decedent was obviously moved by such proclamation, because she and Plaintiff began spending a lot of time together, courting so-to-speak, a term that was popular in their youth.1
Early in the relationship, Plaintiff proposed marriage but before they got married, the decedent discovered that Plaintiff was married to Sharon Pitts who, at the time, was residing in California. Although the decedent was initially most upset, she obviously forgave him for not only did the decedent remain in the relationship, she allowed Plaintiff to reside with her in her home in Clarksville.
While still married to Ms. Pitts, Plaintiff asked the decedent to buy a home for them in Florida, where he had been living for years, so they could live together part of the year in Florida and the rest of the year in Clarksville; however, he also recommended that she put the title to the Florida home in her name only until he could divorce Ms. Pitts so Ms. Pittswould have no claim to that house. Using her own funds, the decedent purchased a home in Florida, which was initially titled in her name only; the house cost $323,000 and the decedent purchased it with a down payment of $101,580.78.
Plaintiff divorced Ms. Pitts on July 10, 2006. Five weeks after divorcing Ms. Pitts, Plaintiff and the decedent applied for their marriage license. Although Plaintiff had been married seven previous times, he wrote on the marriage application that he had three prior marriages. He also listed his birth date on the marriage license as "11-18-34", and his age as "71", although he was born on November 27, 1927, and was 78 years old at the time.
Four days later, on August 19, 2006, the decedent and Plaintiff got married in Clarksville; several of the decedent's friends and relatives attended the wedding.
After the marriage, the decedent executed a deed to convey joint title to the Florida home in both her name and Plaintiff, with the right of survivorship. The record also shows that the decedent purchased a vehicle for Plaintiff, the title to which was put in his name only. Plaintiff also purchased another vehicle using the decedent's credit card. The title to this vehicle was in both names with right of survivorship.
Other than the undisputed fact that the decedent and Plaintiff held themselves out as being a happily married couple, the record is relatively silent concerning what occurred during the rest of the marriage, which lasted five years and seven months.
The decedent died on March 12, 2012, approximately two weeks after undergoing back surgery. Although it is not clear, it appears from the record that at the time of decedent's death, Plaintiff was incapacitated and living with his family in Florida.
The affidavit of the decedent's daughter reveals that immediately after her mother's death, she contacted Plaintiff asking him to sign the Consent Order for the disposition of her remains, which was necessary as he was the surviving spouse. He either refused to consent or failed to sign the form; in any event, the decedent's children were forced to have the funeral without her ashes or body. Plaintiff subsequently signed the Consent Order and the decedent's remains were cremated eleven days after her death.
The decedent's Last Will and Testament, which expressly excluded Plaintiff as a beneficiary, was admitted to probate on March 20, 2012, in the Montgomery County Chancery Court; John L. Mitchell and Katherine Young ("the Executors") were appointed co-executors of her estate.
On March 28, 2012, Plaintiff filed a petition for Elective-Share, Year's Support, Exempt Property, and Homestead; he filed an amended petition on April 18, 2012.2 The Executors filed an answer to the Amended Petition denying all claims and asserting that the purported marriage was void ab initio and Plaintiff should be estopped from asserting his claims. The Executors contended Plaintiff had a history of lies and deception that repeated itself with his pursuit of the decedent.3
The Executors subsequently filed a Motion for Summary Judgment seeking to dismiss all claims on the following grounds: the marriage was void ab initio as a result of Plaintiff providing intentionally false, misleading, and fraudulent information on the marriage application in violation of Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-3-104, which they contend constitutes a Class C misdemeanor under Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-3-112; and based upon equitable estoppel.
The motion for summary judgment was heard on April 5, 2013. In an order entered on April 16, 2013, the trial court summarily dismissed the petition on two grounds, finding the marriage was void ab initio, due to fraud perpetrated by Plaintiff in connection with the false information on the marriage application, and equitable estoppel.
Plaintiff appeals contending the marriage was not void, merely voidable. Plaintiff also contends that the right, if any, the decedent may have had to avoid the marriage abated at her death. Plaintiff also contends the trial court erred in finding that he was equitably estopped to assert his claims.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
This appeal arises from the grant of summary judgment. Summary judgment is appropriate when a party establishes that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that a judgment may be rendered as a matter of law. Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56.04; Stovall v. Clarke, 113 S.W.3d 715, 721 (Tenn. 2003). It is appropriate in virtually all civil cases that can be resolved on the basis of legal issues alone. Byrd v. Hall, 847 S.W.2d 208, 210 (Tenn. 1993); Pendleton v. Mills, 73 S.W.3d 115, 121 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001). It is not appropriate when genuine disputes regarding material facts exist. See Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56.04.
To be entitled to summary judgment, the moving party who does not bear the burden of proof at trial shall prevail if it submits affirmative evidence that negates an essential element of the nonmoving party's claim or demonstrates that evidence provided by the nonmoving party is insufficient to establish an essential element of the nonmoving party's claim. Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-16-101.
Summary judgments do not enjoy a presumption of correctness on appeal. BellSouth Adver. & Publ'g Co. v. Johnson, 100 S.W.3d 202, 205 (Tenn. 2003). The resolution of a motion for summary judgment is a matter of law, thus, we review the trial court's judgment de novo with no presumption of correctness. Martin v. Norfolk Southern Ry. Co., 271 S.W.3d 76, 84 (Tenn. 2008). The appellate court makes...
To continue reading
Request your trial