In re Estate of Nash, No. 05-0538.

CourtSupreme Court of Texas
Writing for the CourtJefferson
Citation220 S.W.3d 914
PartiesIn re ESTATE OF Marvin NASH, Deceased.
Docket NumberNo. 05-0538.
Decision Date20 April 2007
220 S.W.3d 914
In re ESTATE OF Marvin NASH, Deceased.
No. 05-0538.
Supreme Court of Texas.
Argued September 28, 2006.
Decided April 20, 2007.
Rehearing Denied June 1, 2007.

[220 S.W.3d 915]

John W. Tunnell, Tunnell & Cox, L.L.P., Lufkin, TX, for Petitioner.

Thomas W. Deaton, Deaton Law Firm, Lufkin, TX, for Respondents.

Chief Justice JEFFERSON delivered the opinion of the Court.


While death is certain, divorce is not. In this case, the testator anticipated the former but did not prepare for the latter. His will — executed while he was married and designating his then-spouse as primary beneficiary — remained unchanged when he died, notwithstanding his divorce some two years earlier. The Legislature addressed devises in favor of former spouses by enacting Probate Code section 69, which provides that if a testator divorces after executing a will, provisions that favor the former spouse must be read as if the former spouse predeceased the testator. The question presented here is whether a contingent bequest to the testator's former stepdaughter is a provision favoring his former spouse. We conclude it is not and affirm the court of appeals' judgment.

I
Background

Marvin and Vicki Nash were married at the time he executed his will in 1994.

220 S.W.3d 916

Vicki was named the primary beneficiary, and Shelley Tedder (Vicki's daughter and Nash's then-stepdaughter) was named contingent beneficiary. The relevant provisions of Nash's will are set out below:

Disposition of Residue

I give, devise and bequeath all of the rest and residue of my estate, of every kind and character, real, personal and mixed, but not including any property over which I have a power of appointment, unto my beloved wife, VICKI LYNN NASH, in fee simple forever, if she survives me by thirty (30) days.

First Alternate Disposition of Residue

In the event that my wife and I die at the same time or in the event that she does not survive me by thirty (30) days or in the event that my wife should predecease me, then and in either of these events, I give, devise and bequeath all of the rest and residue of my estate, of every kind and character, real, personal and mixed, but not including any property over which I have a power of appointment unto my beloved step-child, SHELLEY RENE TEDDER.

Marvin and Vicki Nash divorced on July 8, 2002. When Nash died on April 29, 2004, he had made no changes to the will he executed some ten years earlier. Both Vicki Nash and Shelley Tedder survived Marvin Nash.

Nash's nephew, Russell Nash, filed an application for independent administration, stating that Marvin died intestate and providing the names of Marvin's two other heirs at law: Marvin's brother, Leroy Nash; and Marvin's mother, Pat Nash.1 The application stated that Nash and Vicki were divorced at the time of Nash's death, that Nash never adopted Tedder, and that the trial court should therefore partition Nash's estate among his heirs.

On May 25, 2004, the trial court granted Russell's application and ordered the clerk to issue letters of independent administration to Russell. Two days later, Tedder opposed Russell's application and sought to probate Nash's will herself. Tedder claimed that Nash left a valid will that had never been revoked and that she, as the contingent beneficiary, was the alternate independent executrix. After a hearing, the trial court stayed the letters of administration. Russell, Pat, and Leroy Nash opposed the probate of Nash's will and sought a declaratory judgment that Tedder take nothing. The trial court admitted Nash's will to probate, issued letters testamentary to Tedder, and declared that Tedder was entitled to Nash's entire estate.2 Pat and Leroy Nash appealed. The court of appeals reversed the trial court's judgment in part, holding that Marvin Nash's estate descends to his heirs at law because the requisite condition precedent for Shelley Tedder to inherit under Nash's will never occurred. 164 S.W.3d 856, 857. We granted Tedder's petition for review. 49 Tex. Sup.Ct. J. 509 (Apr. 21, 2006).

II
Discussion

Before 1997, Probate Code section 69(a) provided:

(a) If, after making a will, the testator is divorced or the testator's marriage is annulled, all provisions in the will in favor of the testator's former spouse, or appointing such spouse to any fiduciary

220 S.W.3d 917

capacity under the will or with respect to the estate or person of the testator's children, shall be null and void and of no effect unless the will expressly provides otherwise.

Act of May 24, 1995, 74th Leg., R.S., ch. 642, § 2, 1995 Tex. Gen. Laws 3516, 3516, amended by Act of May 22, 1997, 75th Leg., R. S., ch. 1302, § 5, 1997 Tex. Gen. Laws 4954, 4955-56. In 1997, the Legislature added the phrase "must be read as if the former...

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110 practice notes
  • Entergy Gulf States, Inc. v. Summers, No. 05-0272.
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Texas
    • April 3, 2009
    ...864, 866 (Tex.1999). Only when those words are ambiguous do we "resort to rules of construction or extrinsic aids." In re Estate of Nash, 220 S.W.3d 914, 917 With these principles in mind, we examine what the Legislature meant by the term "general contractor" in the workers' compensation st......
  • Serafine v. Blunt, NO. 03–12–00726–CV
    • United States
    • Court of Appeals of Texas
    • June 26, 2015
    ...from the same controversy or those merely responding to a prior claim.152 Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code § 27.007.153 In re Estate of Nash, 220 S.W.3d 914, 918 (Tex.2007) (citing In re City of Georgetown, 53 S.W.3d 328, 336 (Tex.2001) (“The only reasonable explanations for the redundancies ... ......
  • Ojo v. Farmers Grp., Inc., No. 10–0245.
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Texas
    • May 27, 2011
    ...and yield a single inescapable interpretation, the judge's inquiry is at an end.” (citation omitted)). FN15. In re Estate of Nash, 220 S.W.3d 914, 917 (Tex.2007) (“If a statute is clear and unambiguous, we apply its words according to their common meaning without resort to rules of construc......
  • Kueber v. City of San Antonio, No. 5:15-CV-382-DAE
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 5th Circuit. Western District of Texas
    • July 13, 2016
    ...of construction or extrinsic aids.' " Entergy Gulf States, Inc. v. Summers, 282 S.W.3d 433, 437 (Tex.2009) (quoting In re Estate of Nash, 220 S.W.3d 914, 917 (Tex.2007) ). In Texas, statutory interpretation is a question of law. City of Rockw a ll, 246 S.W.3d at 625. Here, it is undisputed ......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
107 cases
  • Entergy Gulf States, Inc. v. Summers, No. 05-0272.
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Texas
    • April 3, 2009
    ...864, 866 (Tex.1999). Only when those words are ambiguous do we "resort to rules of construction or extrinsic aids." In re Estate of Nash, 220 S.W.3d 914, 917 With these principles in mind, we examine what the Legislature meant by the term "general contractor" in the workers' compensation st......
  • Serafine v. Blunt, NO. 03–12–00726–CV
    • United States
    • Court of Appeals of Texas
    • June 26, 2015
    ...from the same controversy or those merely responding to a prior claim.152 Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code § 27.007.153 In re Estate of Nash, 220 S.W.3d 914, 918 (Tex.2007) (citing In re City of Georgetown, 53 S.W.3d 328, 336 (Tex.2001) (“The only reasonable explanations for the redundancies ... ......
  • Ojo v. Farmers Grp., Inc., No. 10–0245.
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Texas
    • May 27, 2011
    ...and yield a single inescapable interpretation, the judge's inquiry is at an end.” (citation omitted)). FN15. In re Estate of Nash, 220 S.W.3d 914, 917 (Tex.2007) (“If a statute is clear and unambiguous, we apply its words according to their common meaning without resort to rules of construc......
  • Kueber v. City of San Antonio, No. 5:15-CV-382-DAE
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 5th Circuit. Western District of Texas
    • July 13, 2016
    ...of construction or extrinsic aids.' " Entergy Gulf States, Inc. v. Summers, 282 S.W.3d 433, 437 (Tex.2009) (quoting In re Estate of Nash, 220 S.W.3d 914, 917 (Tex.2007) ). In Texas, statutory interpretation is a question of law. City of Rockw a ll, 246 S.W.3d at 625. Here, it is undisputed ......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

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