In re Estate of Judge
Decision Date | 11 January 1974 |
Docket Number | Civ. No. 72-59. |
Citation | 371 F. Supp. 716 |
Parties | In re ESTATE of Margaret Duer JUDGE, Deceased. Mildred M. JUDGE and Frank Kelley, Executors, Plaintiffs, v. UNITED STATES of America, Defendant. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Pennsylvania |
Joseph C. Kreder, Warren, Hill, Henkelman & McMenamin, Scranton, Pa., for plaintiffs.
S. John Cottone, U. S. Atty., Scranton, Pa., Scott P. Crampton, Asst. Atty. Gen., Donald R. Anderson, Robert J. Hipple, Attys., Dept. of Justice, Washington, D. C., for the Government.
In this action to recover estate taxes alleged to have been erroneously and illegally collected, the issue is whether the value of the remainder interest to charity in the residuary trust created by the will of Margaret Duer Judge was deductible under Section 2055 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, 26 U.S.C.A. § 2055. Specifically, the questions presented are: (1) whether the will provides a sufficiently definite standard limiting the extent of possible invasion for the benefit of non-charitable interests so that the value of the charitable remainder was "presently ascertainable" at the time of the testator's death; and if so, (2) whether the possibility that the charity would not take was so remote, at least as to a calculable portion of the corpus remainder, as to be negligible. The taxpayer is entitled to the charitable deduction only if both questions can be answered affirmatively. Ithaca Trust Co. v. United States, 1929, 279 U.S. 151, 49 S.Ct. 291, 73 L.Ed. 647; Merchants National Bank v. Commissioner, 1943, 320 U.S. 256, 64 S.Ct. 108, 88 L.Ed. 35; Henslee v. Union Planters Bank, 1949, 335 U.S. 595, 69 S.Ct. 290, 93 L.Ed. 259; Zentmayer's Estate v. Commissioner, 3 Cir. 1964, 336 F.2d 488; Berry v. Kuhl, 7 Cir. 1949, 174 F. 2d 565; Mercantile-Safe Deposit and Trust Co. v. United States, D.Md.1966, 252 F.Supp. 191; Kline v. United States, N.D.W.Va.1962, 202 F.Supp. 849.
Margaret Duer Judge died testate on December 9, 1964, and the plaintiffs are the duly qualified executors of her estate. The estate tax return was filed in March 1966. The estate claimed a charitable deduction of $182,213.27 as the value of the charitable remainder interest of the trust created under Item XX of the will of the decedent. Upon audit, the charitable deduction was disallowed and a deficiency in estate tax of $38,759.57 was assessed and paid in March of 1969, together with interest of $7,008.58. A claim for refund in the amount of $45,768.15 was timely filed in February 1971, the refund claim was denied in November 1971, and the instant suit was subsequently filed.
Item XX1 of decedent's will established a trust of the entire residue of her estate the gross amount of which was approximately $286,423. Item XX provides that the entire net income therefrom is to be paid to Mildred M. Judge, the daughter of the testatrix, for life and in the event that the income derived from the residue is insufficient to provide a monthly payment of $500 to the life beneficiary, the trustee is directed to invade the corpus to the extent necessary to provide such a monthly payment. In addition, the trustee is directed to pay from corpus all medical, hospital and nursing expenses incurred by the life beneficiary. The age of the life tenant, Mildred M. Judge, at the time of the death of the testatrix was 61.
This case is governed by Section 2055 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, 26 U.S.C.A. § 2055, which provides that for purposes of the estate tax, the value of the taxable estate shall be determined by deducting from the value of the gross estate the amount of all bequests, legacies and devises to or for the use of any corporation organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, literary or educational purposes, and all testamentary transfers to trustees for such purpose, with certain provisions and limitations not relevant to this case.2 Section 2055 of the 1954 Code is essentially the same as Section 812(d) of the 1939 Code, which was involved in many of the cases cited herein. Both the taxpayer and the government agree in the stipulation of facts that the named remaindermen are charitable organizations as defined in Section 2055 of the Code.
Treasury Regulations on Estate Tax (1954 Code), Section 20.2055-2, which has the effect of law,3 states the requirements for a charitable deduction when a trust is created for both a charitable and a private purpose. The material provisions are as follows:
These provisions are essentially the same as Sections 81.44 and 81.46 of Treasury Regulation 105, which dealt with the 1939 Code and were involved in many of the cases cited herein.
The first question is whether the trustee's power of invasion was limited by an ascertainable standard so that the charitable bequest, as of the testatrix's death, had a presently ascertainable value, or put another way, whether Item XX of decedent's will provides a sufficiently definite standard limiting the extent of possible invasion for the benefit of noncharitable interests. Under Item XX, the first power to invade corpus given the trustee is the one which directs it to invade the corpus to the extent the trust income is insufficient to pay the life tenant $500 per month. Both parties agree that this constitutes an ascertainable standard and the courts have so held. Bowers v. South Carolina National Bank of Greenville, 4 Cir. 1955, 228 F.2d 4; Estate of Helen Stow Duker, 1952, 18 T.C. 887. Item XX further provides that the trustee shall pay from the corpus all medical, hospital and nursing bills incurred by the life tenant, Mildred M. Judge. There is no doubt that this also constitutes an ascertainable standard. The Internal Revenue Service has ruled that a power of invasion to pay hospital and medical expenses is an ascertainable standard. Rev.Rul. 54-285, 1954-2 Cum.Bull. 302; Rev.Rul. 70-450, 1970-2 Cum.Bull. 195. And the courts have consistently held that the power to invade for such purposes constitutes a sufficiently definite standard "fixed in fact and capable of being stated in definite terms of money." Ithaca Trust Co. v. United States, 1929, 279 U.S. 151, 49 S. Ct. 291, 73 L.Ed. 647. For example, the courts have held that the standard is ascertainable where the will permits invasion for the beneficiary's "comfort and welfare," Blodget v. Delaney, 1 Cir. 1953, 201 F.2d 589; for support, care, and benefit of income beneficiary during incapacitation due to illness, age or other cause, Salisbury v. United States, 2 Cir. 1967, 377 F.2d 700; for "accident, sickness or other emergency or unusual condition of any kind," Nardi v. United States, 7 Cir. 1967, 385 F.2d 343; for "the upkeep of the homeplace and all necessary medical and hospital expenses in the case of the illness of either or both of the testator's sisters," Bowers v. South Carolina National Bank of Greenville, 4 Cir. 1955, 228 F.2d 4; to pay the life tenant a sum not exceeding $5,000 in any one year if "by reason of accident, illness or other cause" she "requires funds for this treatment, support or maintenance," Berry v. Kuhl, 7 Cir. 1949, 174 F.2d 565; for "sickness, accident, want or other emergency," Commissioner v. Wells Fargo Bank and Union Trust Co., 9 Cir. 1944, 145 F.2d 130; if life beneficiary's income from all sources was insufficient to provide her with the best medical, hospital or nursing care or treatment in case of sickness, trustee should apply such part of principal as in his absolute discretion he should deem necessary, Mercantile-Safe Deposit and Trust Co. v. United States, D.Md.1966, 252 F.Supp. 191; for "emergency, illness or necessity," Estate of Oliver Lee, 1957, 28 T.C. 1259.
However, the mere fact that Item XX fixes measurable limits on the power of invasion is not sufficient to justify the claimed deduction. Having concluded that the authorized invasion of corpus is limited by a presently ascertainable standard, ". . . it becomes necessary to examine the remoteness of invasion, or the extent of possible invasion, in terms of the standard, to determine the likelihood that the charity will take and the value of what it will receive." Newton Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 1 Cir. 1947, 160 F.2d 175, 178-79; see Lincoln Rochester Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 2 Cir. 1950, 181 F.2d 424, 427; Bowers v. South Carolina National Bank of Greenville, supra. It must appear as of the date of testator's death that the possibility of invasion of the charitable bequest, with its...
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