In re Estate of Bergquist
| Decision Date | 08 August 2014 |
| Docket Number | No. 2012–754,2012–754 |
| Citation | 166 N.H. 531,100 A.3d 510 |
| Parties | IN RE ESTATE OF Jack Michael BERGQUIST |
| Court | New Hampshire Supreme Court |
166 N.H. 531
100 A.3d 510
IN RE ESTATE OF Jack Michael BERGQUIST
No. 2012–754
Supreme Court of New Hampshire.
Argued: February 12, 2014
Opinion Issued: August 8, 2014
Waystack Frizzell, Trial Lawyers, of Colebrook (Erin S. Meenan and Jonathan S. Frizzell on the brief, and Ms. Meenan orally), for the petitioner.
Parnell & McKay, PLLC, of Londonderry (Rory J. Parnell on the brief and orally), for the respondent.
LYNN, J.
The petitioner, Eddie Nash & Sons, Inc., appeals an order of the Circuit Court—Lancaster Probate Division (Hampe, J.) ruling that the respondent, the Estate of Jack Michael Bergquist (the estate), owes the petitioner $544.21 and excluding the petitioner's claim for post judgment interest. We reverse and remand.
The parties either do not dispute, or the record establishes, the following facts. In November 2001, the petitioner brought a small claim complaint against the decedent in Colebrook District Court for $5,000.00 owed pursuant to an agreement to purchase logging equipment. In February 2002, the court entered a default judgment for the petitioner for $5,136.99,
including costs and interest. After the decedent failed to make any payment on the judgment, the petitioner filed a motion for periodic payments in the district court pursuant to RSA 524:6–a (2007) (amended 2009). In 2003, the court entered a periodic payment order requiring monthly payments of $50 to begin in May 2003 until the "judgment and all costs are paid in full." The order listed the total due as $5,394.26, but did not indicate why that total had increased more than $250 in the thirteen months following entry of the original judgment. Neither the 2002 judgment nor the 2003 order made explicit reference to the petitioner's entitlement to continuing post-judgment interest.
The decedent made payments under the order each month until May 2011; the petitioner was made aware of his death in June 2011. The petitioner filed a creditor's claim against the estate that included $3,697.57 for "Balance of Court Judgment," and requested the total claim "Plus Interest." The estate objected to the claim, which the petitioner later amended to consist only of the $3,697.57 for the remaining balance on the court judgment, "plus statutory post[-]judgment interest on that amount." At a hearing on the objection, Susan Nash represented the petitioner and stated her belief, based on her own extensive experience in small claims court, that judgments in small claims actions always included continuing post-judgment interest. The estate agreed that the petitioner was owed $544.21 as the remaining balance due on the $5,394.26 specified in the periodic payment order, but argued that post-judgment interest had not been awarded, and should be excluded from the claim, because the periodic payment order was silent on the subject. The probate division agreed, and entered judgment for the petitioner for $544.21.
On appeal, the petitioner argues that the probate division erred when it excluded its claim for statutory post-judgment interest. The estate counters that the petitioner's claim for post-judgment interest is barred by the doctrine of res judicata and is an attempt to retroactively modify the 2003 periodic payment order. Alternatively, the estate contends that an award of post-judgment interest is contrary to the purpose of RSA 524:6–a.
The probate division based its ruling on the fact that the 2002 judgment did not explicitly call for an award of continuing post-judgment interest. However, we have held that plaintiffs can receive post-judgment interest by statute even when
the original judgment is silent on that matter. See Nault v. N&L Dev. Co., 146 N.H. 35, 36, 39, 767 A.2d 406 (2001) ; see also Lombard v. Company, 78 N.H. 280, 283, 99 A. 295 (1916) (referring to this state's long and
uninterrupted practice of allowing post-judgment interest). In addition, by statute, interest shall be awarded to a prevailing plaintiff in a small claim action. See RSA 503:7 (2010).1
Indeed, in this case, the district court apparently found that its initial judgment against Bergquist included continuing post-judgment interest: The order for payments, issued thirteen months after the court's initial entry of judgment, listed $5,394.26 as the total due to the petitioner, an increase of $257.27 from the $5,136.99 default judgment. Because the petitioner was entitled, as a matter of law, to continuing post-judgment interest, the probate division erred in excluding its claim for that interest.
The estate contends that the petitioner is not entitled to continuing post-judgment interest because it did not specifically request such interest in the district court. This argument is based on an incorrect reading of the facts in Nault. The estate asserts that Nault involved a request for post-judgment interest, which it contends is lacking here. However, the plaintiffs in Nault requested post-judgment interest in their new action to recover a deficiency on the original judgment, not in the civil action in which...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Finn v. Ballentine Partners, LLC
...termination. A "cause of action" is "the underlying right that is preserved by bringing a suit or action." In re Estate of Bergquist, 166 N.H. 531, 535, 100 A.3d 510 (2014) (quotation omitted). It encompasses "all theories upon which relief could be claimed on the basis of the factual trans......
-
Tarnawa v. Goode
...from relitigating matters actually litigated and matters that could have been litigated in the first action." In re Estate of Bergquist, 166 N.H. 531, 534-35, 100 A.3d 510 (2014) (quotation omitted). "The doctrine applies if three elements are met: (1) the parties are the same or in privity......
-
McLaughlin v. Bank Am., N.A.
...was before the court in bothinstances; and (3) the first action ended with a final judgment on the merits." Id. In re Estate of Bergquist, 166 N.H. 531, 534-35 (2014). McLaughlin concedes that the first requirement for res judicata is established, argues that the second has not, and appears......
-
Merriam Farm, Inc. v. Town of Surry, 2014–0702
...of claim preclusion, otherwise known as res judicata, applies here, we employ the familiar three-part test. See In re Estate of Bergquist, 166 N.H. 531, 535, 100 A.3d 510 (2014) ; Gray v. Kelly, 161 N.H. 160, 164, 13 A.3d 848 (2010). This doctrine prevents parties from relitigating matters ......