In re EState of Cairns
| Court | California Court of Appeals |
| Writing for the Court | DONDERO |
| Citation | In re EState of Cairns, 188 Cal.App.4th 937, 115 Cal.Rptr.3d 735, 10 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 12, 409 (Cal. App. 2010) |
| Decision Date | 15 September 2010 |
| Docket Number | No. A125736.,A125736. |
| Parties | ESTATE OF Margaret CAIRNS, Deceased. Kenneth G. Cairns, Trustee, et al., Petitioners and Respondents, v. Kenneth S. Cairns, Objector and Appellant. |
Foley McIntosh Frey & Claytor, James D. Claytor, Lafayette, for Objector and Appellant Kenneth S. Cairns.
Zeller, Hoff & Zeller, Inc., Paul M. Hoff, Dickenson, Peatman & Fogarty, David A. Diamond, Napa, for Petitioners and Respondents Kenneth Grant Cairns and Glenn Ellwood Cook.
John A. Hartog, Inc., John A. Hartog, Orinda, for Petitioners and Respondents Kenneth G. Cairns and Nancy C. Pace.
*939 In a proceeding on a probate petition filed by the trustees of a testamentary trust, the court interpreted a provision—known as the "five-or-five" provision—for annual distribution of principal to a life beneficiary, and found that the provision authorized the distribution to include an interest in real property in addition to money. In this appeal, a remainder beneficiary argues that the trial court's interpretation of the trust document was erroneous, and complains that he was improperly denied an evidentiary hearing. We conclude that the trial court's interpretation of the "five-or-five" provision was consistent with the testator's intent, and no evidentiary hearing was required. We therefore affirm the judgment.
Margaret Cairns, the decedent, executed a will in 1975, and died in 1977. A judgment of final distribution of her estate was entered in Napa County Superior Court in December of 1980, which, pursuant to the terms of the will, created a testamentary trust (Trust). Decedent's only child, respondent Kenneth Grant Cairns (Grant), was appointed sole trustee and was an income beneficiary of the Trust.1 The will specified that Grant was to receive the "entire net income of the [T]rust," and "such amounts of [the] principal as are necessary" to provide for his health and "support in his accustomed manner of living." 2 In addition, the five-or-five provision of the will in paragraph 3 of article Fourth specified: "The Trustee shall also pay to my son during his lifetime, from the principal of the trust, such amounts as he may from time to time request in writing, not exceeding in any calendar year, non-cumulatively, the greater of the following amounts: Five Thousand Dollars ($5,000.00) or Five Per Cent (5%) of the value of the principal of the trust, determined as of the end of the calendar year." Grant's two children, appellant Kenneth S. Cairns (Kenneth) and respondent Nancy Christine Pace (Nancy), were designated the remainder beneficiaries of the Trust. According to the terms of the will and the final distribution order, upon Grant's death the remaining balance of the trust estate "shall be distributed free of trust in equal shares" to Kenneth and Nancy.
Grant thereafter served as sole trustee of the Trust until 2005, and in each year he filed annual accounting reports approved by the trial court that specified the amounts of trust principal he received through the exercise of his five-or-five election. In a few of those years, Grant received shares of stock from the Trust rather than cash as his annual income distribution. In June of 2005, at Grant's request the court appointed respondent Glenn Cook to serve as co-trustee of the Trust. Subsequently the annual accounts and reports were filed jointly by Grant and Cook as co-trustees.
On August 29, 2007, the trustees filed a petition for approval of the 23d annual account and report (the 23d report) for the calendar year 2006. The Petition stated that for the calendar year 2005, Grant elected to receive only $5,000, which was paid to him on December 19, 2006, rather than five percent of the value of the principal of the Trust, which was $55,505.05. The value of the Trust assets reported by the trustees for the calendar year that ended December 31, 2006 was $1,078,123.44; five percent of the value was $53,906.17. Grant had not yet elected to exercise his five-or-five distribution of principal, but declared that he would determine "on or before December 31, 2007, the amount of principal, up to $53,906.17, that he will request as a distribution of the principal from the trust, if any." The report did not list the market value of the real property assets of the Trust, but rather only the "carrying value" of the property. The petition to approve the 23d report for the calendar year 2006 was granted on October 2, 2007. On December 31, 2007, Grant delivered a letter to the trustees in which he stated that pursuant to the order approving the 23d report, "I hereby request that the Trustees distribute to me as beneficiary, 5% of the principal assets of the trust as of December 31, 2006, the sum of $53,906.17."
A petition for approval of the 24th annual account and report (the 24th report) was filed by the trustees on June 18, 2008. The 24th report specified that the Trust estate had a fiduciary accounting value of $805,042.19 at the beginning of the accounting period, January 1, 2007. Based on appraisals obtained by the trustees, as of December 31, 2007, the fair market value of the Trust's real property was reported as $14,260,000; the fair market value of the trust estate was $14,591,173.57. The trustees reported a net profit during the year of $7,679.90 on the Trust's Yolo County ranch, but a net loss of $147,557.08 on the Trust's Napa County ranch. No "net distributable fiduciary accounting income," which under the Trust is to be paid to Grant, was earned during the period of the accounting. Grant made personal loans to the Trust, both before and during the accounting period, and the 24th report stated that the Trust owed him a total of $117,120.05.
The 24th report did not specify that Grant made a request for a distribution of principal in 2007 pursuant to the five-or-five provision. Nor did the report indicate that any distribution of principal or income was made to Grant, although the report listed as one of the disbursements for the year 2007 a partial satisfaction of the 2006 principal withdrawal in the amount of $5,906.17 paid to Grant on December 31, 2007—of the total requested amount of $53,906.17 for the year 2006, leaving a balance due to him of $48,000. The petition for approval of the 24th report was granted after Kenneth requested dismissal of his objections to the account and report without prejudice.
In a letter to co-trustee Cook dated September 15, 2008, Grant requested his five percent distribution of principal of the Trust for the year that ended December 31, 2007. He noted that according to the 24th report the Trust assets had a fair market value of $14,591,173.57, and requested a "principal distribution equal to 5% of that fair market value—$729,558.68." He further requested that the distribution take the form of a conveyance to him of "an undivided [5.325 percent] fractional interest in real property commonly known as 3683 Silverado Trail, St. Helena," which according to the 24th report had a fair market value of $13,700,000, and "the balance in cash." Grant sent another letter to co-trustee Cook dated November 18, 2008, in which he explained that the prior request for principal distribution pursuant to the five-or-five provision "was for the calendar year 2007." He added: "I reserve my right to exercise the power for year 2008 when the property on hand is determined at the end of the current calendar year."
The trustees did not accept Grant's request for a principal distribution for 2007, and instead on November 21, 2008, filed a petition for construction of trust and for instructions authorizing co-trustees to distribute 5 percent of principal assets of trust to beneficiary (the petition). Specifically, the petition sought instructions on several matters related to distribution of Trust principal pursuant to the five-or-five provision: whether the non-cumulative withdrawal must be requested and exercised in the same discrete calendar year; whether Grant's letters of September 15 and November 18, 2008, were "a valid election" for distribution of 5 percent of the fair market value of the principal of the Trust for the calendar year 2007; whether the "valuation date" of the distribution "is December 31 of the year to which the request for distribution" is to be applied; and whether the Trust, which did not "currently have liquid assets" to satisfy "in cash" Grant's 5 percent request for 2007, was allowed to make the distribution with "each and every asset of the Trust," including a partial tenant in common interest in real property, as requested by Grant. A valuation of the principal of the Trust as of December 31, 2007, was also requested.
Kenneth answered and submitted objections to the petition and the 24th report filed by the trustees. Among other contentions Kenneth protested that any " 'in-kind' distribution of 5% of each asset that comprises the Trust principal" to Grant was unauthorized by the Trust. He asserted that as properly construed the will of Margaret Cairns requires that the exercise of the power to withdraw principal under the five-or-five provision "and the payment must be made in the same calendar year," and failure to do so "constitutes a waiver on the part of the beneficiary to receive a payment of the specified amount of principal in a subsequent year." He also alleged that the Trust is entitled "to a set-off" pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 431.70 "as against any amounts of principal that income beneficiary" Grant may receive. In his answer Kenneth further requested an "evidentiary hearing" on his objections to the petition and the 24th report.
Grant filed a reply in which he suggested an interpretation of the five-or-five provision—that is, Paragraph 3 of Article Fourth—of the Trust to mean that the beneficiary's right to an...
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