In re Estate of Lasater, 88,218.
Decision Date | 06 September 2002 |
Docket Number | No. 88,218.,88,218. |
Citation | 30 Kan. App.2d 1021,54 P.3d 511 |
Parties | IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF RUTH I. LASATER, DECEASED. STATE OF KANSAS, DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL AND REHABILITATION SERVICES, Appellant, v. E. BRUCE LASATER, Appellee. |
Court | Kansas Court of Appeals |
Brian M. Vazquez, of Kansas Department of Social and Rehabilitation Services, for appellant.
Timothy P. O'Sullivan, Jason P. Lacey, and Carolyn L. Rumfelt, of Foulston Siefkin, L.L.P., of Wichita, for appellee.
Before GREEN, P.J., WAHL, S.J., and JOHN J. BUKATY, JR., District Judge, assigned.
The trial court determined that title to Ruth Lasater's home passed to her son outside her probate estate by virtue of his right of survivorship as a joint tenant. The Estate Recovery Unit of the Department of Social and Rehabilitation Services (SRS) appeals. The case was submitted to the trial court on an agreed stipulation of facts, which reads:
The deed conveying these interests reads:
"QUIT CLAIM DEED RUTH I. LASATER, a single person QUIT CLAIMS
to
RUTH I. LASATER and E. BRUCE LASATER
Prior to Ruth's death, she received $5,703.41 in Medicaid assistance as a result of her last illness. SRS initiated a creditor's administration of Ruth's estate making claim for reimbursement of her final medical expenses. At the time of her death, Ruth's home was her only significant asset.
Deciding the case on stipulated facts, the trial court found that the quitclaim deed of September 28, 2000, established a joint tenancy with right of survivorship, and the title to Ruth's home passed to her son as surviving joint tenant at the time of her death.
The question before this court is identical to that before the trial court. On the record of stipulated facts, the parties seek interpretation of the legal effect of Ruth's quitclaim deed. The interpretation and legal effect of written documents are matters of law upon which our standard of review is unlimited. City of Topeka v. Watertower Place Dev. Group, 265 Kan. 148, 152-53, 959 P.2d 894 (1998). Where the controlling facts are based on written or documentary evidence or stipulations, this court has as good an opportunity to examine and consider the evidence as did the court below. Heimann v. Parrish, 262 Kan. 926, 927, 942 P.2d 631 (1997).
SRS claims the trial court erred in determining Ruth's deed created a joint tenancy and contends Ruth's interest in her home should have been administered in her estate subject to the claims of creditors rather than passing directly to her son outside of probate. SRS claims Ruth's intent to create a joint tenancy was insufficiently clear to satisfy statutory requirements. Further, her deed created different percentage interests in Ruth and her son, violating the unity of interest required of joint tenants. Due to these flaws, SRS claims Ruth created a tenancy in common.
Lasater contends the trial court was correct and that Ruth clearly created a joint tenancy and that Ruth's interest passed to him upon her death.
When construing the meaning of a deed, the intention of the grantor, as gathered from examination of the instrument as a whole, is the primary consideration. Bennett v. Humphreys, 159 Kan. 416, 419, 155 P.2d 431 (1945). The meaning of a document and the intent of the parties is determined...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
State v. Smith
...this court has as good an opportunity to examine and consider the evidence as did the court below." In re Estate of Lasater , 30 Kan. App. 2d 1021, 1023, 54 P.3d 511 (2002). We apply this standard here." ‘When sufficiency of the evidence is challenged in a criminal case, the standard of rev......
-
M & I Marshall & Ilsley Bank v. Higdon
...this presumption is rebuttable by either party by proving the debtor owns more or less than half the account. In re Estate of Lasater, 30 Kan.App.2d 1021, 1024, 54 P.3d 511 (2002). But the parties agreed neither could rebut this presumption here. Accordingly, the parties contend, and we agr......
-
Reicherter v. McCauley
...at the time the transaction is initiated. Winsor v. Powell, 209 Kan. 292, 299, 497 P.2d 292 (1972). Then, in In re Estate of Lasater, 30 Kan.App.2d 1021, 1023–25, 54 P.3d 511 (2002), this court noted that a decedent's quitclaim deed created a joint tenancy. Logically, we see no reason for a......
-
Davis v. Hoa Thi Pham (In re Tung Thanh Nguyen)
...benefit of an insider, under an employment contract and not in the ordinary course of business.3 Pham points to In re Estate of Lasater, 30 Kan.App.2d 1021, 54 P.3d 511 (2002), for the proposition that “there is no requirement of unity of equality of interest” in a joint tenancy and thus it......
-
Medicaid Long-term Care Update Basics Review, Estate Recovery and the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005
...§ 5721(4). 57. KEESM § 5721(6). 58. 42 U.S.C § 1396p(d)(4)(A) & (C). 59. But see K.S.A. 39-709(e)(2) and In re Estate of Lasater, 30 Kan. App. 2d 1021, 54 P.3d 511 (2002). 60. The value of the gift is determined by the fair market value less the value of the retained life estate. See 26 C.F......
-
Evolution of Joint Tenancy Law in Colorado: Changes to Crs Section 38-31-101
...Planning Answer Book Q2:47: What is a convenience only or nominal joint tenancy? (CCH, Inc., 2006). 34. In Re Estate of Lasater, 54 P.3d 511 (Kan.App. 2002). 35. Blackstone, supra note 5 at 181. 36. Arizona, Massachusetts, Wisconsin, Michigan, and Missouri have recognized unequal equitable ......
-
Chapter 7 - § 7.3 • THE 2008 JOINT TENANCY ACT
...Tenancy Law in Colorado: Changes to CRS § 38-31-101," 38 Colo. Law. 65 (Apr. 2009). In the latter article, Stevens cites In re Lasater, 54 P.3d 511 (Kan. App. 2002), for the proposition that other states have allowed unequal interests in joint tenancy. But In re Lasater is demonstrably an e......