In re Estate of Brown

• Citation: 402 S.W.3d 193
• Decision Date: 22 March 2013
• Docket Number: No. E2011–00179–SC–R11CV.,E2011–00179–SC–R11CV.
• Court: Supreme Court of Tennessee
• Parties: In re ESTATE OF Ina Ruth BROWN.

402 S.W.3d 193

In re ESTATE OF Ina Ruth BROWN.

No. E2011–00179–SC–R11CV.

Supreme Court of Tennessee,
at Knoxville.

Sept. 4, 2012 Session at Knoxville.¹
March 22, 2013.

[402 S.W.3d 195]

Mark E. Brown and Maurice W. Gerard, Knoxville, Tennessee, for the appellant, Rockford Evan Estes.

William L. Waters, Knoxville, Tennessee, for the appellees, Roy E. Brown III, Joan Brown Moyers, and Donna Brown Ellis.

OPINION WILLIAM C. KOCH, JR., J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which JANICE M. HOLDER, CORNELIA A. CLARK, and SHARON G. LEE, JJ., joined.

WILLIAM C. KOCH, JR., J.

This appeal involves the validity of a will executed in contravention of an earlier contract to make mutual wills. A husband and wife signed a contract to make mutual wills and then executed those wills. Soon after the husband's death, the wife executed a new will that was inconsistent with her previous will. Following the wife's death, her son of an earlier marriage sought to probate his mother's last will in the Chancery Court for Knox County. In response, the children of the husband's earlier marriage filed an action in the Chancery Court for Knox County asserting (1) that their stepmother's last will had been procured by undue influence, (2) that this will was invalid because it breached the contract to prepare mutual wills, and (3) that the will prepared by their stepmother pursuant to the contract to make mutual wills should be admitted to probate. The wife's son asserted that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate his stepfather's children's claims and that the contract to make mutual wills was void for lack of consideration. Following a hearing on the parties' cross-motions for a summary judgment, the trial court determined (1) that the husband's children had failed to prove that their stepmother's will had been procured through undue influence, (2) that it had subject matter jurisdiction to hear the claims asserted by the husband's children, (3) that the contract to make mutual wills was supported by adequate consideration, and, (4) that the wife's last will, therefore, was null and void. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court. In re Estate of Brown, No. E2011–00179–COA–R3–CV, 2011 WL 4552281 (Tenn.Ct.App. Oct. 4, 2011). We affirm.

I.

Roy E. Brown Jr. and Ina Ruth Brown were married in the early 1980s. Both of their previous marriages had ended in divorce, and each of them had children from these marriages. In 1982, Ina Brown executed a deed creating a tenancy by the entireties with Roy Brown Jr. in regard to real property on Irolla Road in Knoxville. While they resided on Irolla Road on several occasions during their marriage, by the 1990s, Roy Brown Jr. and Ina Brown were living on Brown Gap Road ² in Knoxville in a house that had been built for them by Roy E. Brown III, Roy Brown Jr.'s son.

[402 S.W.3d 196]

By 1999, Roy Brown Jr. was having respiratory problems caused by his smoking and exposure to asbestos. In October 1999, Roy Brown Jr. and Ina Brown signed a contract to make mutual wills “to insure the inheritance rights of all their issue after the death of the survivor of the two of them.” At the same time, each of them executed a will. In his will, Roy Brown Jr. provided Ina Brown with a life estate in the Brown Gap Road property and then directed that the property pass to his three surviving adult children.³ In her will, Ina Brown provided Roy Brown Jr. with a life estate in the Irolla Road property and then directed that the property pass to her two surviving sons.⁴

By 2002, Roy Brown Jr. had been diagnosed with cancer, and his physical condition was deteriorating. In April 2002, he required surgery after he fell and broke his hip. Roy Brown III and his wife moved into the house on Brown Gap Road to take care of his father because Ina Brown was unable to do so.

On May 7, 2002, Roy Brown Jr. and Ina Brown executed a warranty deed conveying the Brown Gap Road property to Roy Brown III and his wife. Although this deed was recorded on June 18, 2002, none of the other children of either Roy Brown Jr. or Ina Brown were aware of the conveyance. Roy Brown III later testified that the only consideration for this conveyance was his construction of the house on the Brown Gap Road property.

On June 13, 2002, Roy Brown Jr. and Ina Brown signed a new contract to make mutual wills. Like their earlier contract, this contract recited that the parties “wish to insure the inheritance rights of all their issue after the death of the survivor of the two of them.” In this contract, the parties agreed that

in the event of the death of one of them, the surviving party shall have no right to change his or her Will dated the [13th] day of June, 2002, nor shall the surviving party have the right to dispose of any property ... except as permitted under the terms of the other's Will.

Their new wills, also signed on June 13, 2002, gave each party a life estate in the real property they owned jointly or separately and provided that after the death of the survivor, all their real property would pass in equal shares to their four surviving children.⁵

Roy Brown Jr. died on June 19, 2002. Ina Brown was hospitalized at the time of Mr. Brown's death. When Ina Brown was released from the hospital, she did not return to the house on Brown Gap Road because of a disagreement between Roy Brown III and her son, Rockford Evan Estes. Despite the provisions of her June 13, 2002 contract with her now deceased husband, Ina Brown executed a new will on June 28, 2002, leaving her entire estate to Mr. Estes. Ina Brown died on February 1, 2003, at the age of seventy. None of Roy Brown Jr.'s surviving children were aware that she had executed a new will on June 28, 2002.

On March 25, 2003, Mr. Estes filed a petition in the Chancery Court for Knox County to probate his mother's June 28, 2002 will. While Mr. Estes published the

[402 S.W.3d 197]

required notice to creditors, he did not inform Roy Brown Jr.'s surviving children that he was proceeding to probate his mother's June 28, 2002 will. The trial court entered an order on March 31, 2003, admitting Ina Brown's June 28, 2002 will to probate.

In late 2003, when Roy Brown Jr.'s children attempted to probate Ina Brown's June 13, 2002 will, they discovered not only that Ina Brown had executed another will on June 28, 2002, but also that Mr. Estes had filed that will for probate. On February 10, 2004, they filed a complaint in the Chancery Court for Knox County in the pending proceeding to probate Ina Brown's June 28, 2002 will, contesting that will and seeking a declaratory judgment that the contract to make the wills that Roy Brown Jr. and Ina Brown executed on June 13, 2002 was valid and enforceable. The complaint alleged that Mr. Estes had exerted undue influence on Ina Brown to procure her June 28, 2002 will and that Ms. Brown's June 13, 2002 will should be admitted to probate and enforced.

In response, Mr. Estes denied exerting undue influence on his mother. He also moved for a summary judgment on the ground that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear a will contest based on the alleged breach of the June 13, 2002 contract to make mutual wills. Later, he insisted that the June 13, 2002 contract to make mutual wills was unenforceable against his mother because it lacked consideration.

In orders entered on June 11, 2010 and January 3, 2011, the trial court determined (1) that Roy Brown Jr.'s children had failed to prove that Mr. Estes had procured his mother's June 28, 2002 will using undue influence, (2) that it had subject matter jurisdiction over the claims by Roy Brown Jr.'s children based on the June 13, 2002 contract to make mutual wills, (3) that the June 13, 2002 contract to make mutual wills was supported by adequate consideration, and, therefore, (4) that Ina Brown's June 28, 2002 will was null and void.

Mr. Estes appealed. In the Court of Appeals, Mr. Estes took issue with the trial court's decision that it had subject matter jurisdiction over the challenge of Roy Brown Jr.'s children to Ms. Brown's June 28, 2002 will based on the breach of the June 13, 2002 contract to make mutual wills. He also asserted that the trial court erred by finding that the June 13, 2002 contract to make mutual wills was supported by adequate consideration. In an opinion filed on October 4, 2011, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment. In re Estate of Brown, No. E2011–00179–COA–R3–CV, 2011 WL 4552281, at *9 (Tenn.Ct.App. Oct. 4, 2011). We granted Mr. Estes's application for permission to appeal.

II.

Summary judgments are appropriate in virtually any civil case that can be resolved solely on issues of law. Hughes v. New Life Dev. Corp., 387 S.W.3d 453, 471 (Tenn.2012); Fruge v. Doe, 952 S.W.2d 408, 410 (Tenn.1997). Genuine disputes involving material facts or genuine disputes regarding the inferences reasonably drawn from the facts prevent disposing of a case as a matter of law. See Green v. Green, 293 S.W.3d 493, 513–14 (Tenn.2009). Thus, not every case that involves cross-motions for summary judgment can be resolved on issues of law because the courts must rule on each motion independently and must determine, with regard to each motion, whether genuine disputes of material fact with regard to that motion exist and, if not, whether the party filing the motion has satisfied Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56's standards for summary judgment.

[402 S.W.3d 198]

CAO Holdings, Inc. v. Trost, 333 S.W.3d 73, 83 (Tenn.2010).

There are indeed no genuine disputes regarding the facts that are material to the disposition of this case. Accordingly, the trial court correctly decided this case based on the legal issues alone. Because the trial court's judgment involved only issues of law, we will review its ruling de novo without a presumption of correctness, Bailey v. Blount Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 303 S.W.3d 216, 226 (Tenn.2010), and we will make a fresh determination...