In re Estate of Hardy
Decision Date | 24 January 2002 |
Docket Number | No. 2000-CA-01558-SCT.,2000-CA-01558-SCT. |
Citation | 805 So.2d 515 |
Parties | In the Matter of the ESTATE OF Martha R. Seay HARDY: Maynette Seay, Annette Seay Hines and Elizabeth Seay Self v. James Seay. |
Court | Mississippi Supreme Court |
Jerry P. `Jay' Hughes, Jr., Oxford, for Appellants.
Kenneth E. Stockton, Hernando, for Appellee.
Before PITTMAN, C.J., SMITH, P.J., and WALLER, J.
WALLER, Justice, for the Court.
¶ 1. Three sisters, Maynette Seay, Annette Seay Hinds, and Elizabeth Seay Self, seek review of the DeSoto County Chancery Court's finding that their claims were barred under the general three-year statute of limitations found in Miss.Code Ann. § 15-1-49 (1995). We find that the attempted conveyances of the sisters' interest in certain real property were not valid, and were, in fact, void ab initio. An action to set aside the conveyances was therefore unnecessary, and no statutory limitation of action applies hereto.
FACTS
¶ 2. Martha R. Seay Hardy, a resident of Southaven, DeSoto County, Mississippi, died on April 19, 1994, leaving four children, Appellants Elizabeth Seay Self, Martha Seay Hines and Maynette Seay ("the sisters") and Appellee James Seay ("James"). Mrs. Hardy's Last Will and Testament, which named James as executor of her estate, was duly probated in DeSoto County in December of 1994. Over three years later, the sisters filed a petition seeking removal of James as executor and an accounting.
¶ 3. A few months later the sisters filed a motion to declare void certain instruments of writing. Four warranty deeds dated April 1, 1994, had been found in their mother's purse on the date of her death. The warranty deeds transferred two tracts of real property in Lafayette County to the four children, giving each sister an undivided 1/3 interest in the first tract ("the Highway 30 property") and giving James all of the second tract ("the Highway 6 property"). These deeds were executed by Mrs. Hardy, but never filed or recorded.
¶ 4. After a hearing, the chancellor made findings of fact and conclusions of law which are summarized as follows:
A. Each of the four children executed powers of attorney in favor of Mrs. Hardy "for the purposes of facilitating the management of the land owned by the family and for the transaction of general business." These powers of attorneys vested Mrs. Hardy "with broad powers to dispose of the property" and were filed of record in the Office of the Chancery Clerk of Lafayette County. Over a twenty-year period, Mrs. Hardy conveyed numerous parcels of property with the knowledge of all four of her children.
B. On April 1, 1994, Mrs. Hardy executed a warranty deed conveying the Highway 30 property to the sisters. On the same date, Mrs. Hardy executed a warranty deed conveying the Highway 6 property to James.
C. Each of the four children had knowledge of the execution and the existence of the warranty deeds.
D. The applicable statute of limitations was Miss.Code Ann. § 15-1-49, which provides for a three-year limitation of actions.
E. The sisters' cause of action accrued in April of 1994, when they were made aware of the existence of the warranty deeds. The action to declare the warranty deeds void was not commenced until January 26, 1998. The sisters' action was therefore barred by the three-year statute of limitations.
¶ 5. Feeling aggrieved, the sisters request review of the chancellor's decision to dismiss their motion to set aside the four deeds purporting to convey real property situated in Lafayette County, Mississippi.
DISCUSSION
¶ 6. Delivery and acceptance are essential to a deed's validity. Martin v. Adams, 216 Miss. 270, 62 So.2d 328, 329 (1953). The recording of a deed raises a presumption of its delivery, id., but this tenet is not applicable to the case at hand because the deeds in question were never recorded.
¶ 7. A leading treatise defines "delivery" as "a transfer of [a deed] from the grantor to the grantee or his agent or to some third person for the grantee's use, in such manner as to deprive the grantor of the right to recall it at his option, and with intent to convey title." 23 Am.Jur.2d Deeds § 120, at 156 (1983) (footnotes omitted). If a grantor retains a deed and keeps it in his possession and control until his death and there is no indication that he intended to deliver the deed, it is void for want of delivery. Grubbs v. Everett, 236 Miss. 698, 701, 111 So.2d 923, 924 (1959) ( ); see also Van Huss v. Wooten, 208 Ark. 332, 186 S.W.2d 174 (1945); Butts v. Richards, 152 Wis. 318, 140 N.W. 1 (1913). The intent to deliver a deed must be mutual with the intent to accept the deed in order for delivery and acceptance to be complete. Blankenship v. Myers, 97 Idaho 356, 544 P.2d 314 (1975).
¶ 8. There is no proof in the record that the Highway 30 deeds were ever delivered to or accepted by the sisters. In fact, each of the sisters testified unequivocally that she never accepted the deed. Finding the deeds in Mrs. Hardy's purse after her death does not constitute delivery or acceptance. There was also no evidence that Mrs. Hardy entrusted the deeds to a third party for safekeeping until her death, at which time the deeds were to be delivered.
Ladner v. Moran, 190 Miss. 826, 1 So.2d 781, 783 (1941) (emphasis added).
¶ 10. James testified at the hearing that Mrs. Hardy delivered the Highway 6 deed to him at a Piccadilly cafeteria,1 so, for argument's sake, we will assume that the Highway 6 deed had a valid delivery and acceptance.
¶ 12. An agent must act in the best interest, and not to the detriment of, his principal. McKinney v. King, 498 So.2d 387 (Miss.1986) ( ); Laseter v. Sistrunk, 251 Miss. 92, 168 So.2d 652 (1964); Consumers Credit Corp. v. Swilley, 243 Miss. 838, 138 So.2d 885 (1962).
¶ 13. There is no doubt that the Highway 6 deed was a gift to James. James testified that, when his mother gave him the Highway 6 deed, she stated, He understood that she was giving him the Highway 6 property "for being a good son."
¶ 14. Other states have held that a general power of attorney authorizing an agent to sell and convey property does not authorize the agent to make a gift of the property or to transfer it without a present consideration. Johnson v. Fraccacreta, 348 So.2d 570 (Fla.Ct.App.1977); King v. Bankerd, 303 Md. 98, 492 A.2d 608 (1985); Whitford v. Gaskill, 345 N.C. 475, 480 S.E.2d 690, 691 (1997); Brown v. Laird, 134 Or. 150, 291 P. 352 (1930). A general power of attorney...
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Estate of Dykes v. Estate of Williams
...1187 (Miss.Ct. App.2001). However, the recording of a deed creates the rebuttable presumption that it was delivered.3 In re Estate of Hardy, 805 So.2d 515, 518 (Miss.2002); McMillan v. Gibson, 222 Miss. 408, 76 So.2d 239, 240 (1954). ¶ 11. In Hardy, this Court noted that where grantors reta......
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In re Estate of Hardy
...CLARIFY WALLER, Presiding Justice, for the Court. ¶ 1. The appellants' motion to clarify is granted. The prior opinion, In re Estate of Hardy, 805 So.2d 515 (Miss.2002), is vacated and withdrawn, and this opinion is substituted ¶ 2. Three sisters, Maynette Seay, Annette Seay Hinds, and Eliz......
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Everett v. Everett, 2003-CA-01930-COA.
...of [a] deed creates [a] rebuttable presumption that it was delivered." Estate of Dykes, 864 So.2d at 930(¶ 10) (citing In re Estate of Hardy, 805 So.2d 515, 518(¶ 6) (Miss.2002)). "This presumption, of course, disappears once it is shown that there was no delivery." Estate of Dykes, 864 So.......
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Morgan v. Lawrence, 2003-CA-02625-COA.
...[however] creates [a] rebuttable presumption that it was delivered." Estate of Dykes, 864 So.2d at 930 ¶ 10 (citing In re Estate of Hardy, 805 So.2d 515, 518 (Miss.2002)). "This presumption, of course, disappears once it is shown that there was no delivery." Estate of Dykes, 864 So.2d at 93......