In re Estate of Baker
| Citation | 386 P.3d 1228 |
| Decision Date | 30 December 2016 |
| Docket Number | Supreme Court No. S-15971 |
| Parties | In the Matter of the Estate of Alva Marie Baker. |
| Court | Supreme Court of Alaska (US) |
Stuart C. Rader, Ingaldson Fitzgerald, P.C., Anchorage, for Appellants.
David D. Clark, Law Office of David Clark, Anchorage, for Appellee.
Before: Stowers, Chief Justice, Winfree, and Bolger, Justices. [Fabe and Maassen, Justices, not participating.]
Alaska Statute 13.12.502(b) provides that a testamentary instrument will be "valid as a holographic will, whether or not witnessed, if the signature and material portions of the document are in the testator's handwriting." Before us is a purported holographic will, written totally in the decedent's handwriting, with instructions to distribute the decedent's estate at death. The sole question on appeal is whether the decedent's handwritten name at the beginning of the document is a "signature" as contemplated by AS 13.12.502(b). This is an issue of first impression in our state, and we agree with the superior court's conclusion that a testator's handwritten name in the exordium clause1 of a purported holographic will is sufficient to satisfy the signature requirement in AS 13.12.502(b) unless the instrument is otherwise incomplete.
In January 2010 Alva Marie Baker handwrote a purported will. The instrument, as closely as possible, is reproduced below [sic throughout]:
Baker died in November 2013. In February 2014 Baker's daughter, Connie Marie Sumrall, filed a petition for adjudication of testacy and formal probate of the instrument. That petition was opposed by Seth Whaley and Jessica Milwicz, two of Baker's grandchildren.
Sumrall moved for partial summary judgment, arguing that the document was a valid holographic will per AS 13.12.502(b) because it was written in Baker's hand and signed by Baker. Whaley and Milwicz opposed that motion arguing that there were genuine issues of material fact as to, among other things, whether the handwriting on the will was Baker's, whether there was testamentary intent, and whether there were issues of incapacity or undue influence. The superior court denied Sumrall's motion for partial summary judgment, ruling that an evidentiary hearing would be necessary "to determine ... whether the identification of Ms. Baker constitutes a signature as contemplated by [the holographic will statute]."
Prior to the hearing, Whaley and Milwicz stipulated that the handwriting on the contested will was entirely Baker's. And all parties stipulated that whether Baker's handwritten name in the first sentence of the contested will "complie[d] with the signature requirement of AS 13.12.502" was "an issue of law for determination by the court," and that Sumrall "[was] not precluded from offering extrinsic evidence in support of her opposition to [Whaley and Milwicz's] motion for summary judgment." The superior court issued orders accepting both stipulations.
Whaley and Milwicz then filed a motion for partial summary judgment seeking a determination that Baker's handwritten name at the top of the document was not a signature as contemplated by AS 13.12.502(b), and that Baker therefore died intestate. Sumrall opposed that motion and filed a cross-motion for partial summary judgment arguing that Baker's handwritten name was a signature as contemplated by AS 13.12.502(b) and that the document was a valid holographic will.
In March 2015 the superior court denied Whaley and Milwicz's motion for partial summary judgment. The order related exclusively to the question "whether the purported execution of the will—a signature contained in the introductory clause—can satisfy [AS] 13.12.502(b), governing holographic wills." Alaska Statute 13.12.502(b) provides that a testamentary instrument may be "valid as a holographic will, whether or not witnessed, if the signature and material portions of the document are in the testator's handwriting." The court concluded that, although there "is limited Alaska precedent" interpreting that statute, Alaska law does not require a terminal signature in order for a holographic will to be valid.
The court reasoned that "Alaska follows a holographic will statute nearly identical to that in California,"3 and California courts have determined that when faced with a purported will in which the signature does not appear at the end, "the court must determine from an inspection of the instrument's language, form[,] and the relative position of its parts whether or not there is a positive and satisfactory inference that the decedent's name was placed in that location with the intention of executing the instrument."4 Applying the California rule to this case, the superior court determined that there was a "satisfactory inference" that Baker placed her name in the introductory clause "with the intention of executing the instrument" and that the instrument therefore "as a matter of law ... meets the requirements of AS § 13.12.502(b)."
Whaley and Milwicz filed a motion for reconsideration and the superior court denied the motion. Whaley and Milwicz then notified the court that they wished to dismiss their "claims concerning decedent's competence, undue influence [,] and insane delusion"; the court issued an order dismissing those claims with prejudice. Whaley and Milwicz sought our review of the superior court's ruling that the document was a valid holographic will. We denied their petition for review without prejudice because it was not a direct appeal from the superior court's entry of a formal testacy order.5
The parties then stipulated that there were no more disputed issues. The superior court entered the stipulation "[b]ased on contestants' notice of dismissal with prejudice as to their other objections and their request that the evidentiary [hearing] to address other objections be vacated." The will subsequently entered formal probate, and Sumrall was appointed personal representative of the estate.
Whaley and Milwicz now appeal the entry of the final testacy order.
The interpretation of a statute is a legal question which we review de novo.6 "We interpret ... Alaska law according to reason, practicality, and common sense, taking into account the plain meaning and purpose of the law as well as the intent of the drafters."7 In interpreting statutes, we take "a ‘sliding scale’ approach ... : ‘the plainer the language of the statute, the more convincing any contrary legislative history must be.’ "8
Alaska Statute 13.12.502(b) recognizes the validity of holographic wills provided that "the signature and material portions of the document are in the testator's handwriting."9 The question presented by this case is whether a testator's handwritten name in the exordium clause at the top of a handwritten will is sufficient to satisfy the statute's signature requirement. Because we agree with the superior court that there is a "satisfactory inference that the decedent's name was placed [in the introductory clause] with the intention of executing the instrument,"10 we hold that the instrument meets the requirements of AS 13.12.502(b) and is valid for probate.
Every American holographic will statute requires the testator to sign the will.11 Some holographic will statutes specifically require the testator's signature to appear at the end of the document.12 The parties agree that the text of AS 13.12.502(b) does not require a terminal signature. But in states with statutes that, like AS 13.12.502(b), do not specify the location of the signature, courts nearly unanimously have declined to read the signature requirement as implicitly requiring a terminal signature.13 Yet a handful of other jurisdictions—namely, Mississippi, Louisiana, and Puerto Rico—have determined that even when the holographic will statute is silent as to the location of the signature, a signature will be valid only if located at the end of the document.14
In Baker v. Baker's Estate the Mississippi Supreme Court determined that a handwritten caption reading "Metta G. Baker writing this" was insufficient to satisfy the statutory requirement that a holographic will be "wholly written and subscribed by" the testator.15 It reached its conclusion in part through reference to the Black's Law Dictionary definition of "subscribe": "to write under; to write the name under; to write the name at the bottom or end of a writing."16 The court reasoned that the subscription requirement implies a terminal location—as opposed to a signature requirement, which would imply no such locational constraints.17
Other jurisdictions, though, have determined that "where the statute requires only that the instrument be ‘signed,’ such provision contemplates that the instrument must be signed at the end."18 For instance, the Supreme Court of Louisiana followed the doctrine in French law that a signature must...
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