In re Estate of Parker

• Court: Arizona Court of Appeals
• Writing for the Court: Portley
• Citation: In re Estate of Parker, 177 P.3d 305, 217 Ariz. 563 (Ariz. App. 2008)
• Decision Date: 26 February 2008
• Docket Number: No. 1 CA-CV 07-0072.,1 CA-CV 07-0072.
• Parties: In re the Matter of the ESTATE OF Warren H. PARKER, Jr., Deceased. Dometri Investments, LLC, an Arizona limited liability Company; and Choice Property Group, LLC, an Arizona limited liability company, Appellees, v. Janet Parker Lind, individually and as trustee of the Warren H. Parker, Jr. Separate Property Trust, dated December 6, 1999, Appellant.

177 P.3d 305

217 Ariz. 563

In re the Matter of the ESTATE OF Warren H. PARKER, Jr., Deceased Dometri Investments, LLC, an Arizona limited liability Company; and Choice Property Group, LLC, an Arizona limited liability company, Appellees, v. Janet Parker Lind, individually and as trustee of the Warren H. Parker, Jr. Separate Property Trust, dated December 6, 1999, Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CV 07-0072.

Court of Appeals of Arizona, Division 1, Department A.

February 26, 2008.

Gust Rosenfeld PLC By Scott A. Maim, Matthew D. Bedwell, Phoenix, Attorneys for Appellees.

Murphy Law Firm, Inc. By Thomas J. Murphy, Phoenix, Attorneys for Appellant.

OPINION

PORTLEY, Judge.

¶ 1 This appeal challenges the order quieting title in favor of Appellee Dometri Investments, LLC ("Dometri") and against Appellant Janet Parker Lind, individually and as trustee of the Warren H. Parker, Jr. Separate Property Trust. Specifically, we are asked to resolve whether Dometri can claim title to real property even though the decedent's widow, Ruth Parker, had no legal interest in the property she transferred pursuant to Arizona Revised Statute ("A.R.S.") section 14-3901 (2005). For the following reasons, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶ 2 In May 1983 Warren Parker, Jr., ("Parker") purchased real property "as his sole and separate property." His wife, Ruth Parker, simultaneously recorded a Disclaimer Deed, which acknowledged that she had "no past or present right, title, interest, claim or lien of any kind or nature" against the property.

¶ 3 Years later, Parker created the Warren H. Parker, Jr. Separate Property Trust (the "Trust"). He designated his adult children from a previous marriage, Janet Lind ("Lind") and James W. Parker, as the Trust beneficiaries. He also prepared a pour-over will, which directed that any property in his estate at the time of his death be placed in the, Trust and distributed according to its terms. The property was then placed in the Trust.

¶ 4 Parker removed the property from the Trust in March 1995 by Quit Claim Deed which transferred title back to "Warren H. Parker, Jr., a married man as his sole and separate property." He died in July 2004.

¶ 5 Parker's adult children did not act to return the property to the Trust. Instead, nearly eight months after Parker's death, an Affidavit for Transfer of Title to Real Property (the "Affidavit") was recorded and filed in the superior court. The Affidavit was signed by Mrs. Parker, who was then, as noted during oral argument, in a nursing home. It stated that Parker died without a will and she was the sole successor-in-interest to the property.¹

¶ 6 Mrs. Parker subsequently signed a deed which transferred the property to Choice Property Group, LLC ("Choice"). Choice then deeded the property to Dometri. Both warranty deeds were recorded on April 11, 2005.

¶ 7 After being served, Lind filed a Notice of Objection to Distribution of Estate and a Notice of Lis Pendens. Her objection challenged the Affidavit, stated that her father had a will, that all property was to be placed in his Trust, and that Mrs. Parker had no authority to dispose of the property. The lis pendens also noted that Mrs. Parker "ha[d] no title to the property and no power to convey in fact or by law."

¶ 8 Dometri unsuccessfully attempted to get Lind to execute a quitclaim deed to the property. Dometri then filed a quiet title action.² Lind answered, filed a counterclaim for financially exploiting a vulnerable adult, and filed a third party complaint against Choice for fraud, deceptive trade practices, and financial exploitation of a vulnerable adult.

¶ 9 Dometri and Lind filed cross-motions for summary judgment.³ Dometri argued that Choice was entitled to rely upon the Affidavit executed by Mrs. Parker and that Dometri, having purchased the property from Choice, was entitled to the protections of A.R.S. §§ 14-3910 (2005), 14-3971 (Supp. 2007) and 144972(C) (2005). Lind argued that Mrs. Parker had no ownership or other interest in the property and that Choice and Dometri, as "subsequent transferee[s]," could not acquire "[any] interests . . . greater than Ruth Parker's interest."

¶ 10 The superior court granted Dometri's motion and denied Lind's cross-motion. The court signed a judgment which quieted title in favor of Dometri, quashed Lind's Notice of Lis Pendens, and awarded Dometri its attorneys' fees and taxable costs.⁴ Lind filed a notice of appeal, and we have jurisdiction pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-2101(J) (2003).⁵

DISCUSSION

¶ 11 Lind argues that the superior court erred by granting Dometri's summary judgment motion and quieting title. She also challenges the attorneys' fees award.

A.

¶ 12 Summary judgment may be granted when "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Ariz. R. Civ. P. 56(c). We review de novo a motion for summary judgment to determine the existence of any genuine issues of material fact and whether the law was properly applied. Eller Media Co. v. City of Tucson, 198 Ariz. 127, 130, ¶ 4, 7 P.3d 136, 139 (App. 2000). We view the facts and any inferences in a light most favorable to the party against whom judgment was entered. Prince v. City of Apache Junction, 185 Ariz. 43, 45, 912 P.2d 47, 49 (App.1996).

¶ 13 Lind first argues that neither Choice nor its successor, Dometri, could acquire title to the property from Mrs. Parker because she had no ownership interest to convey. We independently review the argument because it involves questions of statutory interpretation. Melgar v. Campo, 215 Ariz. 605, 606, ¶ 6, 161 P.3d 1269, 1270 (App. 2007); see also Willie G. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 211 Ariz. 231, 233, ¶ 8, 119 P.3d 1034, 1036 (App.2005) ("Matters of statutory interpretation are questions of law, which we review de novo.").

¶ 14 Real property and personal property can be transferred by affidavit outside of formal probate. See A.R.S. § 14-3971. The probate code provides a simplified procedure that allows real property to be transferred by affidavit if the property's assessed value does not exceed $75,000. See A.R.S. § 14-3971(E).⁶

¶ 15 The statutory-simplified-process requires that a person, who claims to be the successor to a decedent's interest in real property, file an affidavit of succession describing the decedent's interest in the property, and stating the following under penalty of perjury:

1. Either:

(a) An application or petition for the appointment of a personal representative is not pending and a personal representative has not been appointed in any jurisdiction and the value of all real property in the decedent's estate located in this state, less liens and encumbrances against the real property, does not exceed seventy-five thousand dollars as valued at the date of death. The value of the decedent's interest in that real property shall, be determined from the full cash value of the property as shown on the assessment rolls for the year in which the decedent died, except that in the case of a debt secured by a lien on real property the value shall be determined by the unpaid principal balance due on the debt as of the date of death.

(b) The personal representative has been discharged or more than one year has elapsed since a closing statement has been filed and the value of all real property in the decedent's estate, wherever located, less liens and encumbrances, does not exceed seventy-five thousand dollars as valued as of the date of the affidavit. The value of the decedent's interest in that real property is determined from the full cash value of the property as shown on the assessment rolls for the year in which the affidavit is given, except that if a debt is secured by a lien on real property, the value is determined by the unpaid principal balance due on the debt as of the date of the affidavit.

2. Six months have elapsed since the death of the decedent as shown in a certified copy of the decedent's death certificate attached to the affidavit.

3. Funeral expenses, expenses of last illness, and all unsecured debts of the decedent have been paid.

4. The person or persons signing the affidavit are entitled to the real property by reason of the allowance in lieu of homestead, exempt property or family allowance, by intestate succession as the sole heir or heirs, or by devise under a valid last will of the decedent, the original of which is attached to the affidavit or has been probated.

5. No other person has a right to the interest of the decedent in the described property.

6. No federal or Arizona estate tax is due on the decedent's estate.

A.R.S. § 14-3971(E).

¶ 16 After the statutory affidavit of succession is filed, the statute protects anyone who purchases the real property. In fact, and pursuant to A.R.S. § 14-3972(C), a person who purchases real property from the person designated as successor in a certified copy of an affidavit made pursuant to A.R.S. § 14-3971 "is entitled to the same protection as a person purchasing from . . . a distributee who has received a deed of distribution from a personal representative, as provided in § 14-3910."⁷ That section, in turn, provides:

If property distributed in kind . . . is acquired for value by a purchaser from . . . a distributee who has received [a] . . . deed of distribution from the personal representative, . . . the purchaser . . . takes title free of rights of any person interested in the estate and incurs no personal liability to the estate, whether or not the distribution was proper or supported by court order and whether or not the authority of the personal representative was terminated prior to execution of the . . . deed.

A.R.S. § 14-3910. The statute further provides that the purchaser "need not inquire whether a personal representative acted properly in making the distribution in kind" or "whether the authority of the personal representative had terminated prior to the distribution"...