In re Estate of Richardson

Decision Date17 February 1890
Docket Number32
PartiesESTATE OF W. T. RICHARDSON, DECEASED
CourtPennsylvania Supreme Court

Argued January 28, 1890

APPEAL BY MATILDA RICHARDSON FROM THE ORPHANS' COURT OF PHILADELPHIA COUNTY.

No. 32 July Term 1889, Sup. Ct.; court below, No. 34 October Term 1888, O.C.

On January 11, 1889, the account of Louisa S. Richardson, widow and administratrix of William T. Richardson, deceased, was called for audit before ASHMAN, J. Mrs. Matilda Richardson appeared by counsel claiming as widow of the decedent.

The essential facts, as found by the auditing judge, were as follows:

William T. Richardson was married to Matilda Little on November 22 1849, and had two children by her. On April 13, 1857, they separated, and subsequently the husband instituted proceedings in this state for a divorce, which was refused in 1859. In 1860, the husband, then residing in Indiana obtained a decree of divorce by a proceeding in the courts of that state upon substantially the same grounds he had alleged in his proceedings in this state. In 1861, he married Sarah P. Walter, by whom he had three children and who died in 1880; and in 1881 he married Louisa S., the accountant, and lived with her till the time of his death. In the meantime, Matilda Richardson, the divorced wife, was married to James Arnitt, from whom she afterwards separated.

The auditing judge, citing Fera v. Fera, 98 Mass. 155; Brown v. Brown, 37 N.H. 536; Slade v. Slade, 58 Me. 157; Vinsant v. Vinsant, 49 Ia. 639; Thurston v. Thurston, 99 Mass. 39; Bickford v. Cooper, 41 Pa. 142; Ex parte Adamson, L.R. 8 Ch. 817; Cairncross v. Lorimer, 3 MacQ. H.L. 829; Shryock v. Buckman, 121 Pa. 248, ruled that the claimant's demand should be dismissed, and reported a distribution accordingly.

To this adjudication, the claimant filed exceptions. The exceptions having been argued before the court in banc, on March 30, 1889, they were dismissed, opinion by PENROSE, J.:

A claim to take against the will of an alleged husband, by one who during a period of more than a quarter of a century preceding his death not only did not assert herself to be his wife, but acted in a manner utterly inconsistent with the existence of such a relation, does not come before the court with anything to commend it to favorable consideration, and the presumptions are all adverse to its allowance. It is true, that about forty years ago, the claimant, after separating from a former husband, married the decedent, then a boy some sixteen years of age, and it must now be presumed that the first husband was dead, or at least, believed so to be; but the fact that after 1860, though, as she asserts, in great want, she made no demand whatever upon the decedent as husband, and that, with full knowledge, she acquiesced in his marriage in the following year to another woman, with no intimation of its invalidity, then or during the twenty years or more of its continuance, gives rise to a strong presumption that her own marriage to him had either been annulled, or that it had been discovered never to have had a legal existence. And when it further appears that after having thus permitted him to be accredited in the eyes of the community, she again stood by in silence when, after the death of his first wife, the mother of three of his children, he married the lady who, after living with him for the last six years of his life, now survives as his widow, the presumption against her acquires great additional strength, if indeed it does not become conclusive.

If this were all, it would not be easy to conceive of a case to which the doctrine of estoppel could be applied with greater justice; but there is much more. Eighteen years before the death of the decedent, and twelve years before the marriage last referred to, the claimant was herself solemnly married to another man who was living when the decedent died; and, in order to sustain her claim against the estate of the latter, she must prove the illegality of this marriage and show that she deliberately committed the crime of bigamy. This is forbidden by every principle, not only of law and equity, but of good morals and common decency; and she is estopped from alleging the continuance of the former coverture, where the effect is to invalidate the later one. A right cannot be established by setting up the turpitude of the person claiming it.

It is far from clear, as a matter of fact, that the husband from whom she had separated was dead when she married the decedent. When first examined as a witness in the case, she sought to convey the impression that she had always lived with him and that she had personal knowledge of his death. She said that he had died "out in the country . . . between Chestertown and a place called Blackstone Cross-roads," and that he was buried in a field in Maryland, used by all the neighborhood as a cemetery; that he was buried there, though he died in Delaware, because it "was the nearest burying ground," and that it took her about "a couple of hours" to go from where she lived at the time of his death to this place. She gave the name of the undertaker who officiated at the funeral, adding that he was dead, and that she did not know of any person now living who had any knowledge on the subject. In answer to the question by her counsel, How long did you live with him? she replied: "A year and six months, and then I went to live out because he was dead." After his death, she said, she went to Wilmington, remaining there eight years and then coming to Philadelphia.

In all of this, as her cross-examination on a subsequent day shows were both suggestio falsi and suppressio veri. She had separated from him while he lived, and had gone to reside with her mother on a farm in the country. She was not at his funeral, and had only heard of his death from other persons, not one of whom she could designate. A certificate given by the superintendent of the New Castle almshouse, setting forth that a man bearing the name which she had stated to be that of her first husband, was admitted to that institution in October, 1844, and died there of consumption in January, 1845, was offered in evidence on her behalf, but it was quite clear, if her testimony is true, that he died "out in the country, somewhere between Chestertown and a place called Blackstone Cross-roads," and that her husband could not have been this man. Neither she nor any one of the witnesses speaks of his having died in the poor-house; nor does she suggest that their separation was caused by his ill-health. The contradictory character of her testimony upon this point tends to discredit the claim altogether. Allegans contraria non est audiendus. If after her marriage to the decedent the first husband...

To continue reading

Request your trial
10 cases
  • Union Bank & Trust Co. v. Gordon
    • United States
    • California Court of Appeals
    • March 13, 1953
    ......Kenny, Los Angeles, for respondents.         VALLEE, Justice.         Plaintiff, as special administrator of the estate of Leo Gordon, sued Elsie Gordon to quiet title to various parcels of realty. Elsie Gordon answered and filed a cross-complaint, naming Sara Gordon ...S., 107 Cal.App.2d 211, 214, 236 [116 Cal.App.2d 685] P.2d 821; Appeal of Richardson, 132 Pa. 292, 19 A. 82; Woodson v. Colored Grand Lodge of K. of H., 97 Miss. 210, 52 So. 457; Harper v. Fears, 168 Miss. 505, 151 So. 745, 93 A.L.R. ......
  • Chapman v. Chapman
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
    • June 22, 1916
    ...... executed a release, reciting the divorce therein obtained by him, and for a pecuniary consideration discharging all her claims upon him or his estate. Having done this, she cannot treat his subsequent marriage and cohabitation with another woman as a violation of his marital obligations to herself. ...401, 413, 56 N. W. 1056,23 L. R. A. 287, 43 Am. St. Rep. 514;Marvin v. Foster, 61 Minn. 154, 160, 63 N. W. 484,52 Am. St. Rep. 586; Richardson's Estate, 132 Pa. 292, 19 Atl. 82;Mohler v. Shank, 93 Iowa, 273, 280, 61 N. W. 981,34 L. R. A. 161, 57 Am. St. Rep. 274;Karren v. Karren, 25 Utah, ......
  • Commonwealth Ex Rel. Esenwein v. Esenwein.
    • United States
    • Superior Court of Pennsylvania
    • August 12, 1943
    ......See In re Dorrance's Estate, 309 Pa. 151, 163 A. 303. See, also, the learned discussion by Judge Gordon in Meng v. Meng, 47 D. & C. 429. And until the Supreme Court of the ...589, 193 A. 146. It cannot be made the basis of a collateral attack on a judgment or decree which is otherwise valid. Richardson's Estate, 132 Pa. 292, 19 A. 82; Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230, 28 S.Ct. 641, 52 L.Ed. 1039; Restatement, Conflict of Laws, § 431. And it would ......
  • Commonwealth ex rel. Esenwein v. Esenwein
    • United States
    • Superior Court of Pennsylvania
    • July 16, 1943
    ...... other circumstances which, under our decisions, are regarded. as the essentials of domicil. See Dorrance's. Estate, 309 Pa. 151, 163 A. 303. See also the learned. discussion by Judge Gordon in Meng v. Meng, 47 Pa. D. & C. 429. And until the Supreme Court of the ... Pa.Super. 589, 193 A. 146. It cannot be made the basis of a. collateral attack on a judgment or decree which is otherwise. valid. Richardson's Estate, 132 Pa. 292, 19 A. 82; Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230, 28 S.Ct. 641,. 52 L.Ed. 1039; Restatement, Conflict of Laws, § 431. And. it ......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT