In re Estate of Orwig
Decision Date | 20 May 1918 |
Docket Number | 31147 |
Citation | 167 N.W. 654,185 Iowa 913 |
Parties | IN RE ESTATE OF THOMAS G. ORWIG |
Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
REHEARING DENIED MARCH 24, 1919.
Appeal from Polk District Court.--LAWRENCE DEGRAFF, Judge.
Reversed.
Thos J. Guthrie, W. P. Bair, Joseph I. Brody, and Roy E. Curray for appellant.
A. F. Brown, E. D. Marshall, and McLaughlin, Shankland & Lappen, for appellees.
THE opinion states the case. Rebecca H. Orwig appeals.--Reversed.
Thomas G. and Mary Orwig acquired title to Lot 1 of Hubbell's Subdivision of the northwest quarter of Lot No. 6 of Rose's Addition to the city of Des Moines, under a deed made to them prior to January 1, 1907. In March, 1907, Mary Orwig died, leaving as her only heirs, her husband, Thomas G., and her daughter, Mabel Sweet. By operation of law, therefore, Thomas G. became owner of two thirds of the lot, and Mabel Sweet of one third thereof. On the 1st day of June of the same year, Thomas G. Orwig entered into a contract with George and Mary Stanton to convey the south 42 feet of said Lot 1, upon the payment of the purchase price of $ 1,200, in installments of $ 12.50 each, on the first day of each and every month, beginning June 1, 1907. On May 24, 1911, Thomas G. Orwig, being then a single man, executed to Rebecca H. Orwig a warranty deed, reciting "a consideration of labor performed by the grantee herein and for other good and valuable consideration," and describing the property conveyed as "Lot 1 of Hubbell's Addition of the N.W. quarter of Lot 6 of Rose's Addition to Fort Des Moines, commonly known as Number 1210 Pleasant Street." Subsequent to the recording of this deed, suit was instituted by Mabel Sweet against Rebecca H. Orwig, and, on hearing, decree was entered, deciding that the deed was valid, and given for a good consideration. Thereafter, and on February 26, 1913, Mabel Sweet executed a deed conveying to Rebecca H. Orwig the grantor's undivided one third of said Lot 1. The Stantons had gone into possession, at the time of the contract between them and Thomas G. Orwig, and had so continued since; and, though having paid nearly $ 500 on the contract, suspended payment for a time, and later tendered payment of installments to the administrator of Thomas G. Orwig. The administrator reported these facts to the court, and that four claims filed against the estate of Orwig were unpaid, and prayed for instructions as to whether the contract with the Stantons was an asset of the estate, and should be collected as such, or whether it belonged to Rebecca H. Orwig. The latter pleaded the warranty deed from Orwig and the quitclaim deed from Mabel Sweet, and that, under the former, she (Miss Orwig) acquired the interest of decedent in the contract with the Stantons, and she prayed that the administrator be instructed to turn over to her the said contract and the moneys collected thereon. The sole issue, then, is whether the contract with the Stantons passed to Rebecca H. Orwig by virtue of the warranty deed from Thomas G. Orwig.
I. The deed from decedent to Miss Orwig recites a valuable consideration; and that there was such is not questioned by any pleading. Moreover, a valuable consideration is to be presumed. Though the grantee, in testifying, spoke of decedent's promise, often repeated, to give her the property, and of his having given her the deed, it appeared that she had worked in grantor's office from March, 1907, until September, 1911, and had kept house for him during this period, and until his death. This evidence is not necessarily inconsistent with the "consideration of labor performed by the grantee herein," recited in the deed. In these circumstances, it cannot well be ruled that the deed was without full consideration.
II. Appellees contend that the deed conveyed only that portion of the lot not occupied by the Stantons, i. e., Lot No. 1210. The description contained is not subject to this construction:
It will be noted that the description of the lot is complete without the added words, "commonly known as Number 1210 Pleasant St." The italics are ours. This clause must be rejected, for that the preceding description of the property granted is clear and unambiguous, and the clause in italics does not limit or restrict such description. The rule prevailing in this state is well stated by Cole, J., in Barney v. Miller, 18 Iowa 460:
See, also, as laying down the same rule, Marshall v. McLean, 3 G. Greene 363, and Cummings v. Browne, 61 Iowa 385, 16 N.W. 280. The italicized words are merely by way of explanation or reference, and as such, do not impair or destroy the specific grant preceding. The authorities are uniform in so declaring.
In Hobbs v. Payson, 85 Me. 498 (27 A. 519), the description was of "all my right, title, and interest in and to all real estate situated in Hope, Warren and Union [Counties]," to which was added, "meaning to convey all my right, title, and interest in the real estate formerly occupied by me," and the latter clause was held not to limit the grant to such estate only, the court saying:
In Barksdale v. Barksdale, 92 Miss. 166 (45 So. 615), the grant was of The grantor had acquired a tract of land in that county other than "Minter Place," under a will; and, in deciding that it passed under the deed, notwithstanding the expression, "known as the Minter Place," the court said, in part:
In Friedman v. Nelson, 53 Cal. 589, the description was:
"All that beach and water property lying between Folsom Street on the north, Ship's Channel on the east, the city limits...
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