IN RE ESTATES OF DAVIDSON

• Citation: 794 So.2d 261
• Decision Date: 27 February 2001
• Docket Number: No. 1999-CP-01006-COA.,1999-CP-01006-COA.
• Parties: In the Matter of the ESTATES OF W.H. DAVIDSON, Deceased, and Della Marie Davidson, Deceased. Marie S. Pringle, Appellant, v. Edward L. Shannon, Executor, Appellee.
• Court: Court of Appeals of Mississippi

794 So.2d 261

In the Matter of the ESTATES OF W.H. DAVIDSON, Deceased, and Della Marie Davidson, Deceased.

Marie S. Pringle, Appellant, v. Edward L. Shannon, Executor, Appellee.

No. 1999-CP-01006-COA.

Court of Appeals of Mississippi.

February 27, 2001.

Rehearing Denied May 15, 2001.

Certiorari Denied September 6, 2001.

Marie S. Pringle, pro se.

Shelby Duke Goza, Oxford, Attorney for Appellee.

Before McMILLIN, C.J., BRIDGES, and MYERS, JJ.

BRIDGES, J., FOR THE COURT:

¶ 1. This is an appeal from the judgment of the Chancery Court of Lafayette County, Mississippi, where Marie Pringle was denied heirship of the property of W.H. Davidson and was denied quantum meruit relief against the estate of Della Marie Davidson and Edward Shannon, Pringle's cousin and Della's nephew and executor of her estate. Pringle filed a petition to determine heirs at law and to confirm title on December 16, 1998, where she alleged that she was the sole heir of W.H. Davidson. Pringle's petition to become adjudicated the illegitimate daughter of W.H. Davidson and heir to his property was denied by the chancery court for failure to establish a claim of heirship.

¶ 2. Pringle's notice of appeal was filed on June 7, 1999, along with a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis. The latter motion was denied, but the court found that Pringle's appeal was properly and timely filed and a certificate of compliance was filed as well. Shannon and the estate of Della Davidson filed a motion to dismiss Pringle's claim and challenged her appeal. Both of these motions were denied by the trial judge. The following issues are brought forth in this appeal:

1. Whether Pringle's claim that she is the illegitimate daughter and sole heir of W.H. Davidson's property is barred under Miss.Code Ann. § 91-1-15 (Rev.1994)?

2. Whether Pringle can recover a portion of W.H. Davidson's estate on a theory of quantum meruit recovery?

FACTS

¶ 3. Pringle claims that she is and has proven that she is the illegitimate daughter and sole heir to the property owned by W.H. Davidson before his death in September 1975. It is important to note that W.H. Davidson died intestate, subjecting his estate to the Mississippi laws of descent and distribution. In contrast, Shannon and the estate are arguing that upon W.H. Davidson's death, he left his wife, Della Davidson, as his only living heir. There is a dispute as to whether W.H. and Della were ever married and no marriage license or proof of marriage has been entered into the record other than Shannon's assertion that he knows that W.H. and Della were married in 1942. Della died testate in December 1996, and her will was probated on June 13, 1997. Her will devised all of her property to Shannon. Pringle contests this will and claims one-half of Della's estate because she argues that before Della's death, Della had promised her that she would change her will to reflect that Pringle should receive all of her property, namely the property left to her through W.H. Davidson's estate. There is no record produced of any such change.

¶ 4. Pringle filed her petition to determine heirs at law and confirm title in 1998. At no time after W.H. Davidson's death and prior to this petition did Pringle ever assert her rights as W.H. Davidson's illegitimate daughter. Shannon argues that Pringle has not proven to a court of law that she is, in fact, the illegitimate daughter of W.H. Davidson. Shannon further argues that, even had she proven such a claim, she is barred under the statute of limitations from now bringing this lawsuit twenty-three years after W.H.'s death and fourteen years after the statute of limitations has passed.

¶ 5. Pringle also brings quantum meruit claims against Shannon and Della's estate, alleging that she relied on promises made to her by both Shannon and Della that she would receive a substantial amount of money from Della's estate and should receive such compensation for her services in taking care of Della while she was sick. Specifically, Pringle claims that Della promised her such compensation because Pringle moved into Della's home and cared for her a few months before Della's death. Pringle also claims that Shannon promised her compensation for taking care of his aunt and that Shannon told Pringle that he would give her some of the proceeds from Della's estate, which primarily consisted of the property of W.H. Davidson that was distributed to Della in 1975 and to which Pringle now claims she is entitled.

¶ 6. Pringle additionally asks that this Court award her veterinary bills for her two dogs that were required to live in the care of an animal clinic after Shannon evicted Pringle and the dogs from Della's home upon Della's death. Pringle's dogs have been residing at the clinic since February 1998, and the expense incurred has reached over $16,000, which Pringle claims Shannon owes her because she did not have anywhere else to take the dogs after Shannon evicted her. Pringle prays that this Court will reverse the judgment against her in the lower court and award her what she claims is her rightful portion of Della's estate. Pringle further claims that since there is no proof that W.H. and Della were ever formally and legally married, Shannon is of no relation to W.H. Davidson and should therefore not be awarded any of W.H. Davidson's property.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 7. It is well settled that the Court may not disturb the findings of a chancellor unless the chancellor was "manifestly wrong, clearly erroneous or applied an erroneous legal standard." Goode v. Village of Woodgreen Homeowners Assoc., 662 So.2d 1064, 1070-71 (Miss.1995); Tinnin v. First United Bank of Miss., 570 So.2d 1193, 1194 (Miss.1990). This Court does not hold the authority to interfere with the judgment of the chancellor where there is substantial evidence to support his findings, even where this Court may have found differently in an initial review of the matter. In re Estate of Harris, 539 So.2d 1040, 1043 (Miss.1989).

¶ 8. Where the chancellor is the fact-finder in a case before his court, his findings of fact on contradictory evidence "cannot be disturbed by this Court on appeal unless we can say with reasonable certainty that these findings were manifestly wrong and against the overwhelming weight of the evidence." Richardson v. Riley, 355 So.2d 667, 668 (Miss.1978); Liddell v. Jones, 482 So.2d 1131, 1132 (Miss. 1986). On the other hand, where the chancellor has not made any specific findings of fact, this Court "will proceed on the assumption that [the chancellor] resolved all such fact issues in favor of the appellee." Newsom v. Newsom, 557 So.2d 511, 514 (Miss.1990); PMZ Oil Co. v. Lucroy, 449 So.2d 201, 205 (Miss.1984); Goode, 662 So.2d at 1071.

¶ 9. On the issue of whether there existed a contract between two parties for services in exchange for being named in a will as compensation for those services, the Mississippi Supreme Court provided that it is the burden of the appellant to "clearly establish a contract" for such services. Liddell, 482 So.2d at 1132.

¶ 10. Furthermore, for an illegitimate child to recover as an heir of a decedent's estate, the standard of proof that burdens the child is that he or she must show that heirship exists by clear and convincing evidence rather than a preponderance of the evidence. Miss.Code Ann. § 91-1-15(3)(c) (Rev.1994); Estate of Robinson v. Gusta, 540 So.2d 30, 33 (Miss. 1989); Larsen v. Kimble, 447 So.2d 1278, 1283 (Miss.1984); Crosby v. Triplett, 195 So.2d 69, 71 (Miss.1967); Hulitt v. Jones, 220 Miss. 827, 832, 72 So.2d 204, 206 (1954).

LEGAL ANALYSIS

1. Whether Pringle's claim that she is the illegitimate daughter and sole heir of W.H. Davidson's property is barred under Miss.Code Ann. § 91-1-15 (Rev. 1994)?

¶ 11. This case holds many unanswered questions which would be helpful to a more thorough analysis of Pringle's claims, such as, whether Pringle actually is the illegitimate child of W.H. Davidson and whether W.H. and Della Davidson were legally married at the time of W.H.'s death? Nothing in the record is indicative that Pringle has proven her status as W.H.'s illegitimate daughter. There is no evidence or documentation, other than Pringle's word and her hearsay claims that W.H. and Della both acknowledged her as W.H.'s biological daughter at some point, which she claims would tend to verify or clarify her claim.

¶ 12. It is the understanding of this Court, absent evidence of such, that no blood test has ever been officially taken to confirm such a claim. Neither is there any evidence put forth and entered in the record of this case that W.H. and Della Davidson were ever married in accordance with the law. This Court could speculate that because Della changed her name to Davidson and because the lower court found that she was W.H.'s only heir at the time of his death, that the couple was most likely legally married. On the other hand, we could engage in speculation that their relationship was like those of many years ago, such as in 1942, where it was not unusual for men and women to live and be recognized as married couples without ever becoming legally married, and so it would be possible that W.H. and Della were never officially married. This would reflect the concept of common law marriages which were abolished in this state in 1956. Gaston v. Gaston, 358 So.2d 376, 378 (Miss.1978).

¶ 13. At the time that common law marriages were recognized in Mississippi, the couple had to show that they had an agreement with one another that they intended to be husband and wife and that such agreement was followed up with cohabitation, thereby holding themselves out to the public as a married couple. Because there is no indication in the record before this Court, however, that W.H. and Della had a common law marriage or a legal marriage that would conform to the laws in this state today, we cannot engage in such speculation to attempt to answer these questions either in the...