In re Exmark Mfg. Co., Inc.

• Decision Date: 30 October 2009
• Docket Number: No. 13-09-00438-CV.,13-09-00438-CV.
• Citation: 299 S.W.3d 519
• Parties: In re EXMARK MANUFACTURING CO., INC.
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

299 S.W.3d 519

In re EXMARK MANUFACTURING CO., INC.

No. 13-09-00438-CV.

Court of Appeals of Texas, Corpus Christi-Edinburg.

October 30, 2009.

Court D. Smith, Kirk T. Florence, Crouch & Ramey, LLP, Dallas, Raul A. Gonzalez, Austin, Roberto D. `Bobby' Guerra, Willette & Guerra, L.L.P., McAllen, for relator.

Steven M. Jesus A. Zambrano, Gonzalez, Gonzalez Palacios L.L.P., McAllen, Craig H. Vittitoe, Adams & Graham, for real parties in interest.

Before Chief Justice VALDEZ and Justices YAÑEZ and BENAVIDES.

OPINION

Opinion by Chief Justice VALDEZ.

Relator, Exmark Manufacturing Co., Inc., filed a petition for writ of mandamus and motion for temporary relief in the above cause on July 28, 2009, challenging an order compelling discovery in a product liability case. By order issued on July 29, 2009, this Court granted the motion for temporary relief and requested a response to be filed by the real parties in interest, Rodolfo Luis Castillo, Jr. and Yadira Ivette Arroyo. Such response has been duly filed by the real parties in interest, and the Court has further received a supplemental record and reply brief from relator. We deny the petition for writ of mandamus as stated herein.

I. BACKGROUND

Rodolfo Luis Castillo, Jr. was paralyzed as a result of a "rollover" incident involving a zero-turn riding lawnmower, the Lazer Z HP, designed and manufactured by Exmark Manufacturing Co., Inc. ("Exmark"). Castillo was severely injured when the lawnmower he was riding rolled down an embankment while he was cutting grass in the course of his employment with a landscaping company.

Real parties in interest brought suit against Exmark and others on grounds that the lawnmower was defectively designed, manufactured, and marketed without a rollover protection system.¹ According to real parties, the riding lawnmower "was not adequate for its intended use according to the industry standards at the time it was placed in the stream of commerce," and "a safer alternative design was available," but was not utilized.

Real parties in interest propounded discovery to Exmark in February 2009. By agreement, the parties delayed Exmark's deadline for the formal production of documents until after mediation, which was held on May 14, 2009. Exmark formally responded to the requests for production on June 4, 2009. Real parties filed a motion to compel on June 9, 2009, and the trial court conducted a hearing two weeks later.

At the hearing, the parties and trial court focused on a proposed order furnished by the real parties in interest. The scope of this draft order was substantially narrower than the original requests for production, and, for example, required discovery on only thirty-seven of the eighty-seven requests for production. At the hearing, Exmark's counsel stated on the record that the proposed order "goes a long way towards resolving a lot of our issues." He further informed the trial court that, "with this new order, this is something we can work with. We just need a little time to get with our people...." After conceding these points on the record, Exmark offered no evidence regarding any objections or privileges to the proposed discovery order, or any evidence suggesting an alternative scope of discovery, but instead, filed objections to the real parties' proposed order on July 6 and 10, 2009. On July 8, the trial court signed a discovery order submitted by Exmark; however, on July 13, the trial court signed a different discovery order submitted by the real parties in interest. On July 20, upon learning of the conflicting orders, the trial court entered an order extending Exmark's deadline for production by one day. On July 21, 2009, the trial court ultimately issued the order at issue herein, which had been submitted by the real parties in interest. This original proceeding ensued.

Through five issues, Exmark complains that: (1) it should not be compelled to produce documents regarding products that were not used by the injured party and incidents that have no discernible connection to the accident in question; (2) it should not be compelled to produce documents over an unreasonably long time period, including a time period that exceeds ten years prior to the accident in question and, in some cases, pre-dates the date of manufacture for the exact product at issue; (3) the trial court awarded the real parties more relief than was sought in their original discovery requests or in their motion to compel; (4) the trial court improperly restricted the production of documents to one of two manners of production set forth in Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 196.3(c), especially because real parties never asked for such relief in their motion to compel; and (5) the trial court abused its discretion in compelling the production of documents within ten days instead of thirty days.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The scope of discovery is a matter devoted to the trial court's discretion. In re CSX Corp., 124 S.W.3d 149, 152 (Tex.2003) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam). However, a writ may issue where the trial court's order improperly restricts the scope of discovery as defined by the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. See Lindsey v. O'Neill, 689 S.W.2d 400, 401 (Tex.1985) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam). Similarly, mandamus relief may be available when the trial court compels production beyond the permissible bounds of discovery. In re Weekley Homes, L.P., 295 S.W.3d 309, 322-23 (Tex.2009) (orig. proceeding); see In re Am. Optical Corp., 988 S.W.2d 711, 714 (Tex.1998) (orig. proceeding) (concluding that no adequate appellate remedy existed where the trial court ordered overly broad discovery). "If an appellate court cannot remedy a trial court's discovery error, then an adequate appellate remedy does not exist." In re Dana Corp., 138 S.W.3d 298, 301 (Tex.2004) (orig. proceeding); see Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 843 (Tex.1992) (orig. proceeding) (noting that a party will not have an adequate remedy by appeal when a trial court's order "imposes a burden on the producing party far out of proportion to any benefit that may obtain to the requesting party").

III. RELATOR'S EVIDENTIARY BURDEN

As an initial matter, we note that Exmark failed to produce any evidence supporting its objections to the discovery requests at issue on grounds of relevance or overbreadth. Exmark argues that it is "not required or necessary [to] produce evidence in support of ... objections" to discovery.

The party objecting to discovery must present any evidence necessary to support its objections. See Tex.R. Civ. P. 193.4(a), 199.6. Evidence is not always required to support an objection or claim of privilege. In re Union Pacific Resources Co., 22 S.W.3d 338, 341 (Tex.1999) (orig. proceeding) (holding that evidence is not required to support an "an assertion relating to discovery when evidence is unnecessary to decide the matter"). For example, when a request is overly broad as a matter of law, the presentation of evidence is unnecessary to decide the matter. See In re Am. Optical, 988 S.W.2d at 712; In re CSX Corp., 124 S.W.3d at 153; In re Union Pac. Res. Co., 22 S.W.3d at 341.

Accordingly, there are circumstances where a discovery order might be so overbroad that an objection to the overbreadth is self-evident from the order itself when considered in light of the issues raised in the pleadings. See, e.g., Loftin v. Martin, 776 S.W.2d 145, 148 (Tex.1989) (orig. proceeding). However, this is not always the case and is not the case in the matter now before us. See, e.g., In re Alford Chevrolet-Geo, 997 S.W.2d 173, 181 (Tex.1999) ("A party resisting discovery ... cannot simply make conclusory allegations that the requested discovery is unduly burdensome or unnecessarily harassing. The party must produce some evidence supporting its request for a protective order."); see also Garcia v. Peeples, 734 S.W.2d 343, 345 (Tex.1987); Ind. Insul. Glass/Southwest, Inc. v. Street, 722 S.W.2d 798, 802 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1987, writ dism'd). When it is not self-evident that the discovery order is overly broad, the party resisting the discovery bears the burden of offering evidence to prove its objections:

[W]e conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering the tapes produced because CI Host did not meet its burden to support its objection under our rules of civil procedure governing discovery. To object to a discovery request, the responding party must make a timely objection in writing and "state specifically the legal or factual basis for the objection and the extent to which the party is refusing to comply with the request." Tex.R. Civ. P. 193.2(a). A party is also required under the rules to produce what is discoverable when it asserts that only part of a request is protected. Tex.R. Civ. P. 193.2(b). Any party making an objection or asserting a privilege must present any evidence necessary to support the objection or privilege. Tex.R. Civ. P. 193.4(a).... CI Host had the burden to present evidence supporting its objection, see Tex.R. Civ. P. 193.4(a), but did not present any evidence to the court.... Thus, in light of CI Host's failure to produce evidence to support its ECPA objection or to segregate and produce the information it has now admitted is not protected by the ECPA, we cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in overruling that objection and ordering the tapes produced.

In re CI Host, Inc., 92 S.W.3d 514, 516-17 (Tex.2002) (orig. proceeding). This burden has been applied to objections that discovery requests are overly broad or unduly burdensome. See, e.g., In re Amaya, 34 S.W.3d 354, 357 (Tex.App.-Waco 2001, orig. proceeding); Ford Motor Co. v. Ross, 888 S.W.2d 879, 892 (Tex.App.-Tyler 1994, orig. proceeding); Chamberlain v. Cherry, 818 S.W.2d 201, 205 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 1991, orig. proceeding); Miller v. O'Neil, 775 S.W.2d 56, 59 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1989, orig. proceeding); Mole v. Millard, 762 S.W.2d 251,...