In re Extradition of Coe, CV 03-596-DDP (PLA).

• Decision Date: 02 April 2003
• Docket Number: No. CV 03-596-DDP (PLA).,CV 03-596-DDP (PLA).
• Court: U.S. District Court — Central District of California
• Parties: In the Matter of THE EXTRADITION OF JAMES COE, aka Hui Lokkwan, aka Hsu Lo-chun

261 F.Supp.2d 1203

In the Matter of THE EXTRADITION OF JAMES COE, aka Hui Lokkwan, aka Hsu Lo-chun

No. CV 03-596-DDP (PLA).

United States District Court, CD. California, Western Division.

April 2, 2003.

Judith A. Heinz, Assist. U.S. Atty., Los Angeles, CA, for plaintiffs.

Dana Cephas, Deputy Fed. Public Defender, Los Angeles, CA, for James Coe.

ORDER RE: JURISDICTION OF COURT AND VALIDITY OF TREATY IN EXTRADITION MATTER

ABRAMS, United States Magistrate Judge.

I. PROCEDURAL SUMMARY

James Coe, aka "Hui Lok-kwan," aka "Hsu Lo-chun," was arrested November 19, 2002, in the Central District of California on an extradition arrest warrant issued pursuant to the request of the government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region ("HKSAR") of the People's Republic of China ("PRC").¹ A Hong Kong Magistrate issued an arrest warrant for Coe on 15 counts of false accounting, one count of criminal liability for misstatement in prospectus, and one count of conspiracy to defraud, all resulting from criminal activities that allegedly took place in Hong Kong in 1982 and 1983. The request for extradition was made pursuant to the United States' "Agreement with Hong Kong for the Surrender of Fugitive Offenders" ("Agreement"). Coe initially appeared before United States Magistrate Judge Ralph Zarefsky on November 19, 2002. Following a hearing on December 5, 2002, Magistrate Judge Zarefsky denied Coe's Motion for Bail. Coe filed an Application for Review of an Order Denying Bail, which came for hearing before District Judge Florence-Marie Cooper on December 13, 2002. District Judge Cooper found that special circumstances existed and granted Coe's request for bail.

HKSAR presented its formal extradition papers and supporting documents ("Formal Papers") requesting Coe's surrender to the Consulate General of the United States of America in Hong Kong on January 15, 2003. The Formal Papers, which include a copy of the Agreement as Exhibit A, were filed with this Court on January 24, 2003.

Following an initial status conference on February 5, 2003, the Court ordered the parties to file briefs addressing the legal issues involved in the case. On February 28, 2003, the United States filed a "Request for Certain Findings Re Extradition" ("Request"), requesting that the Court issue initial rulings on the following five issues relating to the jurisdiction of the Court and the scope and enforceability of the Agreement:

1. The Court has subject matter jurisdiction in these proceedings;

2. The Court has personal jurisdiction over James Coe, aka "Hui Lok-kwan," aka "Hsu Lo-chun";

3. The Agreement is valid and enforceable, and provides the legal authority for the extradition of Coe to the HKSAR;

4. Coe is sought for offenses covered by the Agreement; and

5. There is probable cause to believe that the person before the Court is the person named in the Hong Kong arrest warrants.

(See Request at 2). The United States also requested that the Court reserve for future determination whether there is probable cause to believe that Coe committed the offenses for which extradition is sought. (Id.). In addition, the Government filed a "Position and Request for Ruling on Validity of Treaty" ("Position").

Coe filed his "Response to Government's (1) Request for Certain Findings and (2) Position and Request for Ruling on Validity of Treaty" ("Response") on March 21, 2003. Coe concedes three of the issues raised by the United States and contests only the issues of whether the Court has subject matter jurisdiction in these proceedings and whether the Agreement is valid and enforceable. (Response at 1). During a second status conference, during which each party presented oral arguments, Coe confirmed that he is contesting only two of the five issues raised by the United States, i.e., subject matter jurisdiction and whether the Agreement is valid.

II. THE EXTRADITION PROCESS

The federal extradition statute provides, in relevant part:

Whenever there is a treaty or convention for extradition between the United States and any foreign government ..., any justice or judge of the United States, or any magistrate judge authorized so to do by a court of the United States ..., may, upon complaint made under oath, charging any person found within his jurisdiction, with having committed within the jurisdiction of any such foreign government any of the crimes provided for by such treaty or convention ..., issue his warrant for the apprehension of the person so charged ...

18 U.S.C. § 3184. Judicial review of extradition matters is limited to: "(1) whether the extradition judge had jurisdiction to conduct the proceeding; (2) whether the extradition court had jurisdiction over the individual sought; (3) whether the extradition treaty was in force; (4) whether the crime fell within the treaty's terms; (5) whether there was probable cause that the individual sought committed the crime; and (6) whether the crime was within the political offense exception." Cornejo-Barreto v. Seifert, 218 F.3d 1004, 1009-10 (9th Cir.2000) (internal citations omitted). But a "statute or extradition treaty is a prerequisite to extradition." Id., at 1009. Consequently, in order to resolve whether there is subject matter jurisdiction in this matter, the Court must determine whether the United States and the HKSAR have a valid extradition treaty. See, e.g., Arnbjornsdottir-Mendler v. United States, 721 F.2d 679, 681 (9th Cir.1983) ("The first issue in this case is whether Iceland and the United States have a valid extradition treaty."), superseded by statute on other grounds (see Cornejo-Barreto, 218 F.3d at 1009, n. 5).

III. THE COURT IS BOUND BY THE LAW OF THE CASE DOCTRINE TO FIND THAT THE AGREEMENT IS VALID AND ENFORCEABLE.

Coe, in contesting that the Court has subject matter jurisdiction in these proceedings, has raised only one issue—the validity and enforceability of the Agreement. This issue, however, already has been decided in this case by both Magistrate Judge Zarefsky and District Judge Cooper.

Although Coe argues that both earlier rulings concerned the existence of special circumstances that would justify bail and only touched on the validity of the Agreement in dicta, the record clearly demonstrates otherwise. First, Magistrate Judge Zarefsky continued a hearing on Coe's Motion for Bail to allow the parties to brief the issue of the validity of the extradition treaty. Both parties submitted briefs (see "James Coe's Continued Motion for an Order Granting Bail" at 5-7; "James Coe's Reply to Government's Position Regarding Legality of Extradition Agreement with Hong Kong and Position on Bail" at 1-6; "Government's Position Regarding Legality of Extradition Agreement with Hong Kong; Position on Bail" at 4-12), and presented oral argument on the issue (see Position, Ex. A at 19-20, 21-23). Coe's request for bail was premised on his argument that "[b]ail is warranted here because the extradition agreement underlying the current detention is unenforceable as a matter of law." ("James Coe's Continued Motion for an Order Granting Bail" at 1, 5-7). Coe also listed several unrelated matters that he argued constituted special circumstances and concluded with the assertion that "the legal questions arising from the treaty's enforceability are yet another circumstance that weighs in favor of release." (Id. at 12).

At the hearing, and following arguments from both parties, Magistrate Judge Zarefsky ruled that he "did not agree that the status of the treaty constitutes a special circumstance justifying bail." (See Position, Ex. A at 24). Magistrate Judge Zarefsky then stated that the "Ninth Circuit has not considered the status of the treaty, but the Second Circuit has rejected every argument that has been made here that the treaty is unenforceable." (Id.). Magistrate Judge Zarefsky held that, "for the reasons stated by the Second Circuit, the Court agrees that the agreement for extradition is enforceable under the extradition statute." (Id. at 24-5). After considering the other special circumstances raised by Coe and finding none applicable, Magistrate Judge Zarefsky denied bail. (Id. at 25).

Coe then filed an Application for Review of the order denying bail in which he again argued that the "extradition agreement underlying the current detention is unenforceable as a matter of law" and, therefore, there was no basis to detain him. (See "James Coe's Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Application for Review of an Order Denying Bail" at 1-2). Coe expanded upon the arguments presented to Magistrate Judge Zarefsky that the treaty was invalid (see id. at 6-11), argued that several other factors constituted special circumstances, and concluded by arguing that he "should be granted bail because the underlying extradition agreement is unenforceable as currently established" (see id. at 18).

District Judge Cooper held a hearing on Coe's Application for Review. The District Judge stated that she had "read all of the documents that were filed before the Magistrate Judge in connection with the issue of the validity of the extradition agreement with Hong Kong and also on the issue of special circumstances ... and also the documents that were filed with this court on those same issues." (See Position, Ex. B at 30-31). The District Judge stated that she found the analysis in Cheung v. United States, 213 F.3d 82, 89 (2nd Cir.2000), to be persuasive and believed that the issue of the validity of the treaty had been properly resolved by that court. Further, she held that "I believe that the President and the Senate had the authority to enter into an enforceable extradition agreement or treaty with Hong Kong based on the reasoning in the Cheung case." (Id., Ex. B at 31). District Judge Cooper went on to rule on the "alternative request for bail," finding that there were "a number of special circumstances that would grant an exception in this case to the detention required...