In re Extradition of Martinez, 25,780.

• Citation: 2001 NMSC 9,20 P.3d 126,130 N.M. 144
• Decision Date: 21 March 2001
• Docket Number: No. 25,780.,25,780.
• Parties: In the Matter of the EXTRADITION OF Michael Saiz MARTINEZ. Hon. Gary Johnson, Petitioner, v. Hon. James Shuler, District Judge for the Fifth Judicial District, Respondent.
• Court: Supreme Court of New Mexico

20 P.3d 126

130 N.M. 144

2001 NMSC 9

In the Matter of the EXTRADITION OF Michael Saiz MARTINEZ.

Hon. Gary Johnson, Petitioner, v. Hon. James Shuler, District Judge for the Fifth Judicial District, Respondent.

No. 25,780.

Supreme Court of New Mexico.

March 21, 2001.

Patricia A. Madrid, Attorney General, Anthony Tupler, Assistant Attorney General, Santa Fe, NM, for Petitioner.

Hon. James L. Shuler, Carlsbad, NM, Pro Se.

OPINION

BACA, JUSTICE.

{1} This is a proceeding invoking our original jurisdiction in prohibition and superintending control as expressly granted to this Court by the New Mexico Constitution. See N.M. Const. art. VI, § 3 ("The supreme court shall have ... superintending control over all inferior courts; it shall also have power to issue writs of mandamus, error, prohibition, habeas corpus, certiorari, injunction and all other writs necessary or proper for the complete exercise of its jurisdiction...."). The Governor challenges the propriety of an injunction prohibiting the use of his extradition warrant in its current form issued by the Honorable Judge James L. Shuler, District Judge for the Fifth Judicial District. The Governor seeks relief from the injunction by requesting a writ of prohibition or, in the alternative, a writ of superintending control. We conclude that the district court had proper subject matter and personal jurisdiction in this case and, therefore, the Governor is not entitled to the writ of prohibition. We also hold that Judge Shuler's construction of NMSA 1978, § 31-4-7 (1937) was erroneous and that the injunction interferes with an express power granted to the Governor. Based on this, the Governor's petition for the writ of superintending control is granted.

{2} The underlying matter before the district court was the extradition of Michael Saiz Martinez to the State of Arizona. Arizona sought the extradition of Mr. Martinez for a violation of his probation. The Governor of the State of New Mexico, pursuant to the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act, NMSA 1978, §§ 31-4-1 to -31 (1937, as amended through 1981), issued his Extradition Warrant ordering Mr. Martinez's extradition. Mr. Martinez was arraigned on the Governor's Warrant in the Fifth Judicial District before Judge Shuler. At his arraignment, Mr. Martinez challenged his extradition based on an alleged technical defect in the Governor's Extradition Warrant. Mr. Martinez alleged that the Governor's Warrant was technically defective because it failed to inform the arresting officer of his right to a pre-extradition hearing as provided for in NMSA 1978, § 31-4-10 (1937). "No person arrested upon such warrant shall be delivered over to the agent whom the executive authority demanding him shall have appointed to receive him unless he shall first be taken forthwith before a judge of a court of record in this state . . . ." Id. (emphasis added). Judge Shuler conducted two hearings on the matter. During these hearings, Judge Shuler heard allegations that an individual had been removed to the State of Texas without being afforded his rights secured by the Extradition Act and the Due Process Clause. See U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.

{3} Judge Shuler agreed with Mr. Martinez's contention and found that the Governor's Warrant was "technically defective ... in that the warrant [did] not include in its recitals language directing law enforcement agents to present the person named in the warrant before a Court of jurisdiction to inform that person of their rights as directed by [Section 31-4-10]." In his ruling, Judge Shuler relied on NMSA 1978, § 31-4-8 (1937), which states:

Such warrant shall authorize the peace officer or other person to whom directed to arrest the accused at any time and any place where [the accused] may be found within the state and to command the aid of all peace officers or other persons in the execution of the warrant, and to deliver the accused, subject to the provisions of this act [31-4-1 to 31-4-30 NMSA 1978], to the duly authorized agent of the demanding state.

(Emphasis added.). Judge Shuler concluded that the emphasized portion of this statute should be read in conjunction with Section 31-4-7, which authorizes the issuance of the Governor's warrant. Based on this construction, Judge Shuler ruled that the Governor's warrant is subject to the provisions of the entire Extradition Act, including the protections found in Section 31-4-10. Since the Governor's warrant does not enumerate the protections found in Section 31-4-10, Judge Shuler concluded that the warrant was technically defective. Based on this technical defect, Judge Shuler enjoined the Governor from using his warrant as currently written in any further extradition proceedings. However, because the technical defect did not deprive Mr. Martinez of his due process rights, Judge Shuler ordered his extradition to Arizona.

{4} Believing that Judge Shuler made a clear error, the Governor now seeks a writ of prohibition or, in the alternative, a writ of superintending control seeking to have the injunction dissolved. The Governor seeks the writ of prohibition by arguing that Judge Shuler was without jurisdiction to issue the injunction because the Governor was not a party to the extradition matter and because the district court was deprived of jurisdiction once Mr. Martinez was extradited. Alternatively, the Governor seeks the writ of superintending control by arguing that New Mexico's Extradition Act does not require the recital mandated by Judge Shuler's injunction. To support this claim the Governor relies on Section 31-4-7, which states, "[t]he warrant must substantially recite the facts necessary to the validity of its issuance," to assert that a cautionary recital is not required in the Governor's warrant. We will address the Governor's entitlement to the writ of prohibition and the writ of superintending control after we examine substantive extradition law.

I.

{5} The foundation for extradition law is the Extradition Clause of the United States Constitution, which states:

A Person charged in any State with Treason, Felony, or other Crime, who shall flee from Justice, and be found in another State, shall on Demand of the executive Authority of the State from which he fled, be delivered up, to be removed to the State having Jurisdiction of the Crime.

U.S. Const. art. IV, § 2. The Federal Extradition Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3182 (2000), and the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act §§ 1-31, 11 U.L.A. 97 (1995), endow the Extradition Clause with additional meaning, including specific procedures with which to accomplish interstate extradition. New Mexico has adopted the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act as found in Sections 31-4-1 to -30.

{6} Extradition is intended to be "a summary and mandatory executive proceeding." Michigan v. Doran, 439 U.S. 282, 288, 99 S.Ct. 530, 58 L.Ed.2d 521 (1978). Its purpose is "to preclude any state from becoming a sanctuary for fugitives from justice of another state." Id. at 287, 99 S.Ct. 530. The United States Supreme Court has also recognized that "[a] prisoner transferred under the Extradition Act is explicitly granted a right to a pretransfer `hearing' at which he is informed of the receiving State's request for custody, his right to counsel, and his right to apply for a writ of habeas corpus challenging the custody request." Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U.S. 433, 443, 101 S.Ct. 703, 66 L.Ed.2d 641 (1981). These rights are also protected in the New Mexico Uniform Criminal Extradition Act:

No person arrested upon such warrant shall be delivered over to the agent whom the executive authority demanding him shall have appointed to receive him unless he shall first be taken forthwith before a judge of a court of record in this state, who shall inform him of the demand made for his surrender and of the crime with which he is charged, and that he has the right to demand and procure legal counsel[.]

Section 31-4-10. The issue in this case does not intrude on any of these fundamentals of extradition law. Instead, the question in this case is whether the Governor can be forced to insert a cautionary phrase into his extradition warrant, warning his agents of the procedural requirement of Section 31-4-10, in an effort to ensure that all prisoners are accorded their substantive rights prior to extradition. Since the Governor seeks a writ of prohibition or a writ of superintending control, we will view the issue through the lens provided by these writs.

II.

{7} The writ of prohibition has been described as "an extraordinary writ, issued by a superior court to an inferior court to prevent the latter from exceeding its jurisdiction, either by prohibiting it from assuming jurisdiction in a matter over which it has no control, or from going beyond its legitimate powers in a matter of which it has jurisdiction." State ex rel. Harvey v. Medler, 19 N.M. 252, 258, 142 P. 376, 378 (1914). This Court has further articulated the test as "not whether the court had a right to decide the issue in a particular way, but did it have the right to decide it at all." State ex rel. Kermac Nuclear Fuels Corp. v. Larrazolo, 70 N.M. 475, 481, 375 P.2d 118, 122 (1962). In this analysis, this Court is concerned with whether the district court had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the dispute and over each of the parties to the dispute. See id. As explained below, we conclude that the district court had both subject matter and personal jurisdiction. Thus, we hold that a writ of prohibition is not appropriate in this case.

A.

{8} Judge Shuler had jurisdiction over the general subject matter of Mr. Martinez's extradition. Section 31-4-10 expressly provides that each person prior to extradition "shall first be taken forthwith before a judge of a court of record in this state," and informed of his or her rights. The court of record in this case was Judge Shuler's court. The Governor does not dispute this notion, but instead asserts that the district...